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ABSTRACT
Colombian Law 1258 of 2008 introduced the Simplified Corporation (Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada or SAS). This type of
business entity included modern corporate law features such as simplified incorporation proceedings, full-fledged limited liability for
its shareholders, and broad freedom of contract for the definition of
housekeeping and governance rules. It also reduced old-fashioned
prohibitions pertaining to shareholders and managers activities and
reduced transaction costs. The SAS’s “opt-in” approach also has
allowed for private parties to draft the most suitable agreements.
The enabling provisions of Law 1258 have been the starting point
for the preparation of at least three Model Law proposals presented
before the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and
the Pacific Alliance.
Discussions on these draft legislative models have been underway over the last few years at different bodies within these multinational organizations. Although some progress has been made in recognizing the importance of providing some degree of harmonization
in the field of closely held business enterprises, particularly in developing jurisdictions, there are still significant obstacles that need
to be surpassed before such model law is adopted. In June, 2017 the
OAS General Assembly recommended to the Organization’s member States to adopt the Interamerican Model Law on Simplified Corporations. It is the first successful attempt for the international harmonization on the rules concerning business corporations.
Keywords: corporate law, model law, simplified corporations, harmonization, Columbian SAS, Organization of American States
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I. INTRODUCTION: A MODEL LAW ON SIMPLIFIED CORPORATIONS
On June 20, 2017, the General Assembly of the Organization of
American States (OAS) adopted a resolution 1 in which it requested
the Inter-American Juridical Committee and its Technical Secretariat to give the broadest possible publicity to the Model Law on Simplified Corporations. In the same resolution, the General Assembly
requested the General Secretariat to provide the OAS Member
States all the necessary cooperation and support if they decided to
adopt the Model Law or any parts thereof. The General Assembly’s
decision represents a significant step towards the harmonization of
company law in the Americas, since it is the first instrument ever
produced in this legal area. 2
This paper discusses the OAS Model Law on Simplified Corporations 3 (hereinafter also referred to as the “Model Law”), and analyzes harmonization of laws concerning closely held entities, especially in emerging jurisdictions. This paper also contains an analysis
concerning some of the current legislative approaches to corporate
law existing in emerging jurisdictions, and summarizes certain difficulties that entrepreneurs encounter when confronted with legal
formalism. It also describes the scope of the Model Law and the
legislation upon which it was based, i.e., the Colombian Law on
Simplified Corporations (hereinafter also referred to as “Colombian

1. See Model Law on the Simplified Corporation, Resolution AG/RES.2906
(XLVII-O/17), adopted at the first plenary session held on June 20, 2017. For the
Model Act on the Simplified Stock Corporation, see https://perma.cc/X92EDDM9 [hereinafter Model Law].
2. The resolution was adopted by unanimous consent at the General Assembly with the exception of Venezuela.
3. During its March 2011 regular session, the Inter-American Juridical
Committee approved the Model Law on Simplified Corporations. See Project for
a Model Act on Simplified Stock Corporation, CJI Res. 188 (LXXX-O/12),
CJI/doc.380/11 (Mar. 9, 2012) [hereinafter OAS Resolution 188]; See also Draft
OAS Model Law on the Simplified Stock Corporation (SAS) considered at Annual
Meeting of ASORLAC, OAS NEWSLETTER (Oct. 2014), at https://perma.cc
/6EVA-ASQ4. On various occasions, the Model Law was presented before the
Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs. This body remanded the initiative
to the Permanent Council which, on its meeting of June 14, 2017 adopted the
resolution concerning the Model Law, which was eventually sent to the OAS; See
OAS G.A. Res. 2609, AG/doc.5579/17, at https://perma.cc/2MAT-NLNR.
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SAS”). 4 In this vein, the empirical data distilled from the Colombian
experience illustrates the appropriateness of most solutions proposed in the Model Law.
Following this brief introduction, section II discusses the objective behind the enactment of the Model Law, and the current problems affecting the Latin American legislative agenda. The core idea
is that the adoption of the Model Law will help broaden the formal
economy and foster economic growth and welfare for the population. In fact, it is well known that formalization is a crucial factor
without which businesses find it hard to have access to credit from
financial institutions; the state cannot collect revenues derived from
taxes, and workers are deprived from social security benefits. It is
argued that introducing the forward-looking rules contained in the
Model Law can correct most corporate law deficiencies in the region
and could produce the desired economic results. Section III contains
a summary of the main contents of the Model Law, as well as an
explanation as to how these provisions can improve current corporate law in the region. Section IV contains empirical data on the Colombian experience concerning the Simplified Corporation (SAS by
its Spanish acronym) over nearly a decade. The relevance of the Colombian SAS is emphasized given its significant influence in the
preparation of the Model Law. The collection of empirical data provides compelling arguments in favor of the Model Law’s adoption.
Section V provides an analysis of the Colombian Specialized Corporate Law Court. This section is intended to underscore the fact
that, in order for substantive legal transplants in the corporate sphere
to be effective, they must be accompanied by reforms aimed at
strengthening the institutional infrastructure. Lastly, section VI presents a few relevant conclusions.

4. Colombian Law on Simplified Corporations introduced by Law no. 1258,
Dec. 5, 2008, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.].

2018]

OAS MODEL LAW

5

II. WHY A MODEL LAW ON SIMPLIFIED CORPORATIONS?
The Model Law is aimed at reducing transaction costs in starting, carrying out, and closing any given business venture, irrespective of its dimensions or business activity. It is argued that reducing
transaction costs for business fosters economic growth and trade,
and may incentivize formal economic activity in emerging economies. World Bank researchers have found that “informality is not
single-caused but results from the combination of poor public services, a burdensome regulatory regime, and weak monitoring and
enforcement capacity by the state.” 5 The initiative is thus intended
to counter the final two characteristics of informality: a burdensome
regulatory regime and weak enforcement capacity by the state. It is
expected that reducing informality by setting up an enabling environment for business, will ultimately enhance economic development and provide welfare for the people of a given jurisdiction. 6
The Model Law initiative is also intended to fulfill additional
useful purposes. First, regional trade may be increased by a process
that involves simplifying the legal formalities required for undertaking entrepreneurial activity. Second, at the local level, defining a
less onerous threshold for businesspersons setting up micro, small,
and medium enterprises (MSMEs) to enter the formal economy may
be achieved by simplifying the incorporation process. Finally, there
is also an academic purpose in the Model Law initiative. Despite the
importance of comparative company law as an academic discipline,
before the OAS Model Law, there had not been any comprehensive
initiatives geared towards the creation of a harmonizing instrument
in this area of law. In 2006, comparative law professor Klaus J. Hopt
5. Norman Loayza, Luis Servén & Naotaka Sugawara, Informality in Latin
America and the Caribbean (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 4888, Apr. 20, 2016), available at https://perma.cc/QJ3Z-6QXE.
6. According to Hansman and Kraakman, the general goal of corporate law
is to advance aggregate welfare of constituencies affected by the activities of an
enterprise. The Model Law intends to further said goal. See REINER KRAAKMAN
ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW—A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH ch. 1 (3d ed., Oxford U. Press 2017). The goals advanced by the Model
Law are in line with contemporary policies that give preference to business forms
referred to as “uncorporations.” See LARRY RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE
UNCORPORATION ch. 1 (Oxford U. Press 2009).
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complained about the absence of such a project: “In view of the
golden age of the elaboration of common principles of law such as
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
and the Principles of European Contract Law, it is astonishing that
similarly successful work has not yet been undertaken in the area of
company law.” 7 The initiative also intends to serve as a steppingstone to fill this gap in private international law. 8
The initiative assumes that harmonization of the company law
framework within Latin America may be achieved. 9 This endeavor
involves two distinct processes: (i) reaching a common understanding between different, albeit related, legal systems; and (ii) facilitating the mutual recognition of corporations doing business in a designated region. In this context, achieving a common understanding
refers to bridging the different legal languages within various jurisdictions. Arguably, reaching a set of homogenous legal terms will
promote economic integration by facilitating the interaction between entrepreneurs (and their advisors). 10 Achieving a mutual

7. Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Company Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
COMPARATIVE LAW 1172 (Reimann & Zimmermann eds., Oxford U. Press
2008).
8. It is relevant to underscore the efforts of the Organization for the Business
Law Harmonization in Africa (Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du
Droit des Affaires) (OAHADA). The treaty that gave rise to this organization was
executed in Port Louis, on October 17, 1993, and later revised in Quebec, on October 17, 2008. This organization has passed a uniform act on corporations, which
regulates, inter alia, the relationships among shareholders, the integration of corporate organs, the management of the corporation, the access to capital, and the
transfers of shares of stock. The Uniform Act is applicable to all signatory states
of the Harmonization Treaty. There are 17 OAHADA states: Benin, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Republic of the Congo, Senegal, and Togo.
9. Since Model Laws are legislative instruments that are not vested with any
coercive powers, it is up to each of the member state governments to adopt such
rules altogether or to use them as a prototypical structure that can be partially
imitated. Thus, one of the main benefits of the Model Law is to offer legislators
of all OAS member states broad parameters on the topic, so that each legislature
can find inspiration for the enactment of its own corporate laws, and if the case
may be, to take advantage of the model provisions to harmonize its legislation by
incorporating the above-quoted best practices.
10. The experience of the EU law harmonization is useful. It has been argued
by the European Commission that “disparate national law rules may lead to higher
transaction costs, especially information and possible litigation costs for enterprises in general and SMEs and consumers in particular.” See E.C. O.J. 2001,
OF
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recognition of corporations relates to the process of hosting a foreign
entity in a local jurisdiction without requiring compliance with cumbersome and costly formalities in the receiving country. 11 The effective mutual recognition of foreign enterprises is also intended to
promote cross-border entrepreneurial activity and to reduce transaction costs involved in operating in new markets.
At the local level, it is well-known that millions of MSMEs currently face significant formalistic barriers preventing them from entering the formal economy. 12 Transaction costs are here evident in
light of the cumbersome proceedings required to undertake the process of incorporation. In the Latin American region, the informal
economy is prevalent and micro and small entrepreneurs frequently
find that the benefits of operating formally are outweighed by the

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European Contract Law (2001/C 255/01) 5, no. 31, at https://perma
.cc/H4A8-HJGF. Facilitated interaction between businesspersons will entail a reduction of costs and will also facilitate economic integration within the region.
FRANCISCO REYES, II LATIN AMERICAN COMPANY LAW—A NEW POLICY
AGENDA: RESHAPING THE CLOSELY HELD LANDSCAPE 67 (Carolina Acad. Press
2013):
Harmonization in the field of company law could be a sensible step in
the context of the process of integration, particularly taking into consideration the fact that several countries throughout the region have either
entered into or are in the process of negotiating free trade agreements
with the United States.
11. The concept of mutual recognition is explained by Nicolaidis & Shaffer:
Mutual recognition regimes set the conditions governing the recognition
of the validity of foreign laws, regulations, standards, and certification
procedures among states in order to assure host country regulatory officials and citizens that their application within their borders is “compatible” with their own, and that incoming products and services are safe.
These conditions involve different types of obligations for home states,
who benefit from conditional recognition of the laws and regulations applicable to products, persons, firms and services, and host states, who
forego the application of their own rules to products, persons, firms and
services, provided that the agreed conditions are met.
Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance without Global Government, 68 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS.
264 (2004).
12. Studies on informality in Latin America show the link between highly
informal economies and formalistic barriers to achieve an organized business activity: “Informality is sometimes the result of agents ‘exiting’ the formal sector as
consequence of cost-benefit considerations; other times, it is the outcome of
agents being ‘excluded’ from formality as this becomes restrictive and the economy segmented.” See Loayza, Servén & Sugawara, supra note 5, at 2.
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high costs involved in such operation. 13 The existence of an informal economy also results in the loss of opportunities for foreign investment, which is crucial for less developed economies. 14 Thus,
such informality also impacts the collection of taxes which, in turn,
hinders the availability of funds for revenue distribution. 15
Business informality in several countries of Latin America
reaches high figures that can be even above 50 percent. According
to Professor David Stewart, a study shows that:
[I]n our hemisphere, both big and small economies depend
upon informally-created micro and small companies
(“MiPymes”) for much of their employment. In El Salvador,
MiPymes accounted for 99.6% of all of businesses in 2005,
and 90.52% of these were microenterprises located in urban
areas and especially in the capital city of San Salvador. Most
Salvadoran micro-businesses are conducted by a single individual or with the assistance of one or two additional employees. In Brazil, according to a report from the Serviço
Brasileiro de Apoio às Micro e Pequenas Empresas (Brazilian Service for the Support of Micro and Small Businesses),
the number of microenterprises grew 9.1% from 1997 to
2003, from 9,477,973 to 10,335,962, employing over 13 million people. In Mexico, 99% of all Mexican businesses fall
under the rubric of “micro,” “small” or “medium-sized” enterprises, employing approximately 60% of the population,

13. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
presents the link between informality and, among others, regulatory restraints:
“Informality and gender gaps remain high, and social mobility low.” OECD,
OECD Economic Surveys: Colombia 2017 (Paris, May 2017), https://perma.cc
/7GYD-J3S9.
14. World Bank researchers have evidenced the correlation between the informal sector and low levels of investment: “[T]he informal sector contributes to
an inimical investment climate for formal firms, particularly foreign investors.
Further, the informal sector in general and large informal firms in particular are
responsible for a substantial loss of fiscal revenues and narrowing of the tax base.”
Nancy Benjamin, Kathleen Beegle, Francesca Recanatini, & Massimiliano Santini, Informal Economy and the World Bank (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. 6888, Apr. 20, 2016), available at https://perma.cc
/57FB-3QSG.
15. For the purposes of this paper, an informal enterprise is that in which no
registration process, or other specific formalities required by each jurisdiction, has
been undertaken. See Abby Margolis, The Value of Informal Enterprise,
STANFORD SOCIAL INNOVATION REVIEW, Nov. 1, 2012, https://perma.cc/TM4XQKZD.
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and MiPymes are responsible for more than 20% of Mexico’s gross domestic product. 16
To further illustrate the problem of informality of MSMEs, it is
suitable to refer to the data collected by the World Bank in 2015 17:
- In the developing world, there are between 365 million and
445 million MSMEs.
- Of that number only 25–30 million are formal Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and, only, between 55–70 million
are formal Micro Enterprises.
- 285 out of 345 million MSMEs, over 70% are considered
informal and consequently, lack access to credit.
In contrast with the data above, four out of every five jobs in
emerging economies are created by MSMEs, providing over 33% of
the national income in these jurisdictions. 18 These data reveal the
importance of MSMEs for emerging economies, as well as the existing potential for developing a strong formal economy.
As a result of informality, these MSMEs, which make up the
bulk of the productive capacity, lack access to credit. The following
image contains a map of the World showing the credit gap between
informal and formal firms:

16. See David Stewart, Recommendations on the Proposed Model Act on the
Simplified Stock Corporation, Annual Report of the Inter-American Juridical
Committee 50 (2012) (quoting a study prepared by Boris Kozolchyk & Cristina
Castaneda). See also OAS Resolution 188, supra note 3.
17. Simon Bell & Ghada Teima, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) Finance, THE WORLD BANK, Sep. 1, 2015.
18. See Margolis, supra note 15. See also, e.g., Donald C. Clarke, “Nothing
but Wind”? The Past and Future of Comparative Corporate Governance, 59 AM.
J. COMP. L. 104 (2010):
Non-public-corporation business organizations (NPCBOs) play a major
role not just in advanced industrialized economies, but even more in the
transition and emerging market economies that have become increasingly important. They are major sources of employment, and are an essential stage in the life cycle of the large, successful public corporation.
To focus on public corporations without understanding how NPCBOs
operate, then, is to overlook a major part of the global economic landscape.

10
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Figure 1. Total Credit Gap Map 19

The implications of the lack of access to credit for MSMEs are
noteworthy. Firms that cannot access legal sources of finance have
limited growth opportunities and therefore cannot contribute to the
economy in a significant way. 20 Formalization of MSMEs is needed
in order to provide capital-raising opportunities for large sectors of
the economy.
In furtherance of the objectives set out above, the Model Law
initiative is aimed at creating the appropriate incentives in order for
informal firms to migrate into the formal economy. This will be
done mainly by introducing less burdensome incorporation procedures and reducing transaction costs in general throughout the life
cycle of the firm. The underlying concept is straightforward: firms
should be able to comply with a simplified registration process, facilitating incorporation, and ensuring compliance with basic regula-

19. See Margolis, supra note 15.
20. See Bell & Teima, supra note 17.
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tions. As the World Bank has stated: “Studies have shown that removing excessive bureaucratic formalities in the startup process has
numerous benefits for both economies and entrepreneurs. Some of
these gains include higher levels of firm formalization, economic
growth and greater profits.” 21 For many decades it has been compellingly argued that migration into the formal system will produce several benefits including the following: higher tax revenues, better regulation, social security protection and labor formalization, higher
levels of transparency and disclosure, better access to credit and
government services, and higher levels of investment. 22 Other positive consequences for fully complying firms are benefitting from
limited liability and asset partitioning, among others. 23
A. Focus on Latin America
The Model Law has been designed with a focus on Latin America. There are two reasons for this regional approach. First, the
Colombian experience with the recent introduction of the SAS provides a compelling body of statistics and facts (discussed in depth
below), which can serve as a benchmark for the adoption of this
model in other similar jurisdictions. Second, the Latin American
scenario offers useful features given the size of the economies in this
geographic area, as well as the transitional nature of their economies.
In line with the initiative’s regional focus, as stated by Jeannette
M.E. Tramhel, the OAS Model Law is grounded upon the Colombian legislation:
24

[B]oth the Colombian Law and the SAS Model Law on
which it is based contain the key elements that are essential
21. See World Bank Group, Doing Business 2017: Equal Opportunity for All,
doc. 14 (Washington, D.C., 2017), at https://perma.cc/9ZQ8-TTBC.
22. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, EL OTRO SENDERO—LA REVOLUCIÓN
INFORMAL ch. 3, 220 (7th ed., La Oveja Negra 1987).
23. For an insightful discussion into the characteristics of the firm and its
many benefits, see KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6.
24. Latin America consists of 22 countries, with seven official languages, a
total population of about 605 million people, and a surface of roughly 22,222,000
km2. See South America: Physical Geography, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY,
https://perma.cc/KZ8K-PER4.
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to simplified incorporation . . . . These elements could be
considered to comprise ‘global best practices’ as most have
been identified as key by various entities, including the
World Bank, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (‘UNCITRAL’) and the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (‘UNCTAD’),
among others. 25
A second feature of the Model Law initiative relates to excluding
listed companies from its scope. In this way, the accent has been
placed on closely held entities. It is a well-known fact that most
companies in Latin American are family owned and trade outside of
stock exchanges. 26 Recently, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published its Corporate Governance Factbook for 2017, noting the highly concentrated ownership

25. Jeannette M.E. Tramhel, The Simplified Corporation: A New Structure
for Doing Business in the Americas?, 24 AGENDA INTERNACIONAL 144-145
(2017). Likewise, Professor David Stewart recognizes the significant influence
that the Colombian simplified corporations law had on the OAS initiative:
Under the Colombian approach, the SAS can be formed by one or more
shareholders and can be incorporated by a relatively simple private or
electronic document (as opposed to an expensive notarial deed of incorporation). The cost is minimal. The act of incorporation provides limited
liability to its shareholders (except when the corporate veil is used to
perpetrate a fraud or abuse the corporate form). It also provides protection to third party victims of the abusive or fraudulent use of the ultra
vires doctrine by corporate officials. It enables the founders to choose an
unlimited duration for the incorporation, and replaces the costly and ineffective formality of mandatory internal comptrollers (comisarios) with
a more effective and less expensive supervision of external but fully
qualified auditors. It also provides flexibility to corporate capital, greater
contractual freedom, and increased access to capital.
See Stewart, supra note 16, at 50. See also, Jorge Oviedo Albán, La sociedad por
acciones simplificada en el derecho colombiano, in LA TIPOLOGÍA DE LAS
SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES—ENTRE TRADICIÓN Y REFORMA 174 (Grupo Editorial
Ibañez 2017) [hereinafter SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES]: “It is noteworthy that Law
1258 [of 2008] on simplified corporations has formed the basis for the Model Law
enacted by the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Juridical Committee, in its 80th Session Period . . . .”
26. The empirical analysis of the Brazilian corporate market by Érica Gorga
evidences the characteristics generally seen throughout the region:
The study of Brazilian economic reality has shown that the model proposed by Berle and Means may not serve as a basis for the analysis of
Brazilian corporate law. In fact, the Brazilian corporate reality did not
follow the same development trend that the American corporations did.
In Brazil, as a general rule, there is no degree of disjunction between
property and control, which supports the theory of Berle and Means.
ÉRICA GORGA, DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO ATUAL 129 (Elsevier 2013).

2018]

OAS MODEL LAW

13

structure of listed companies in several Latin American jurisdictions.
Table 1. Ownership Structures at Company Level 27

Noting the trend above, it is useful to establish the relative size
of the securities markets in the region in terms of number of listed
companies. For example, Brazil, the region’s largest economy also
has the greatest number of listed companies. In 2010, there were 400
corporations listed in the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (the
BOVESPA). 28 In contrast, for the same period the United States had
approximately 5,000 listed companies in the U.S. stock markets. 29
The focus on non-listed companies is also a characteristic of the
Colombian law of 2008. Pursuant to Law 1258 of that year, the SAS
is not intended to go public. The underlying rationale here is that the
level of flexibility of these provisions is incompatible with the shareholder protection that is needed concerning listed corporations. In
accordance with Article 4 of the aforementioned law, the shares of
stock and any other securities issued by a simplified corporation

27. OECD, OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2017, 12 et seq. (2017),
https://perma.cc/248B-SEA3.
28. See Pierre Habbard, Hans-Böckler-Foundation, Corporate Governance
in Brazil - An International Trade Union Perspective (Paris, Apr. 2010),
https://perma.cc/T85D-XSBS.
29. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2010 Bogle Financial Markets Research Center, https://perma.cc/KVN7-YR3X.
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shall not be listed in the National Registry of Securities and Issuers,
nor traded in any stock exchange.
Inspired by the Anglo-American approach to securities regulation, as well as certain European models such as the German Neuer
Markt, there have been attempts to broaden some Latin American
securities markets, but this has had limited success. 30 The approach
adopted in the Model Law is different. One of the main objectives
of the initiative is to offer MSMEs a simplified framework to facilitate low cost access to the formal sector, and thus to bank financing.
This proposal is coherent with the corporate structure prevailing in
Latin America where the bulk of the economic building capacity is
associated with MSMEs, instead of firms large enough to trade their
stocks on the securities markets. This orientation is not intended to
suggest that the introduction of high corporate governance standards
is to be ignored. However, efforts should now be directed towards
introducing and consolidating corporate governance standards specifically tailored to the characteristics of the Latin American markets.
The approach of the Model Law also responds to the need for a
specific set of provisions directed at the establishment and operation
of closely held entities. General corporate law in Latin America has
responded to the codification models adopted in the region, which
sometimes fail to provide for regulation aimed at the close corporation. American scholars have acknowledged the need to introduce
these types of statutes:
Corporate statutes try to fit corporations closely held by a

30. José Miguel Mendoza, The Controlling Shareholder as Reputational Intermediary (Oxford Centre for Corporate Reputation Working Paper Series, Paper
No. 302, Mar. 5, 2012), https://perma.cc/745X-GGLC:
More than a decade on, the results of these experiments in legal reform
have been disappointing. Convergence around formal rules of investor
protection has not contributed significantly to the growth of stock markets in emerging countries. Empirical tests in fact show that these efforts
were mostly futile and in many cases counterproductive.
For the discussion regarding the adoption of more European models, see Bruno
Salama & Viviane Muller, Legal Protection of Minority Shareholders of Listed
Corporations in Brazil: Brief History, Legal Structure and Empirical Evidence, 4
J. CIV. L. STUD. (2011), available at https://perma.cc/5EYM-XF9T.
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few shareholders into the same legal clothes worn by publicly-held corporations. But it’s a poor fit. The shareholders
of a close corporation are likely to think of themselves as
partners who incorporated their business to obtain limited liability or sometimes for tax reasons. They often find that the
corporate rules of centralized management and majority control are at odds with their expectations of decentralized
equality. They may wonder why they can’t simply manage
the business as they agree. 31
B. Problems with the Legislative Agenda in the Latin American Region
Throughout Latin America, it is hard to find investment vehicles
that can serve the business community with legal structures endowed with enough flexibility to respond adequately to the demands
of trade in the modern world. The lack of modern regulations aimed
at facilitating the incorporation and operation of business entities
can become a meaningful obstacle for job creation and access to
credit and, more generally, to economic development. Many of the
corporate structures present in Latin American and Caribbean countries date back to 19th century regulations characterized by formalism and several restrictions to private ordering.
The Model Law on Simplified Corporations contains basic provisions that would allow business entities of varying dimensions to
incorporate and operate in conditions that are appropriate to their
economic needs. Despite the fact that the simplified corporation is
particularly suitable for MSMEs, it is also true that it can be used to
structure businesses of a larger dimension.
Following is a discussion of some of the prevailing characteristics of Latin American corporate law that constitute a hindrance to
the formalization of new business entities in the region. 32 Thus, by
taking into consideration the problems with the legal regime, the
31. ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 1001 (West 2010).
32. For a more comprehensive analysis, see REYES, supra note 10. Although
this paper is centered in Latin America’s legislative agenda, it is noteworthy that
some of the findings are not exclusive of this geographic area, and therefore may
also be applicable to different emerging nations such as those located in parts of
Asia and Africa.
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Model Law is intended to provide tailor-made solutions that are
suited to the specific needs of Latin American businesspersons. 33 As
recently noted by Jeannette M.E. Tramhel, commenting on the problems with Latin American corporate law: “[A]s a result of these aspects of company law, which run counter to global best practices
described above, many Latin American businesses are significantly
restricted and operate at a competitive disadvantage. Although this
situation affects all business, the consequences are particularly severe for MSMEs.” 34
1. Entry Barriers
The first issue is the excessive and cumbersome set of formalities that businesspeople have to endure in order to incorporate in the
region. Some legal scholars believe that excessive formalism in
Latin America is derived from Spanish and Portuguese colonial heritage, which has been embedded in the region’s legal DNA. 35

33. As noted above, the Model Law is in line with the Colombian legal reform
of the SAS. The initial diagnosis and the objectives of both pieces of legislation
are very similar:
The starting point for the Simplified Corporation’s original proposal was
the idea of facilitating the formalization of business entities and updating
the legal system in order to introduce forward-looking approaches to
Corporate Law. For that purpose, a thorough critical revision of the previous Company Law framework was required. This analysis was made
under a functional Comparative Law methodology along with the application of relevant notions of Economic Analysis of Law. As expected,
the results of such evaluation revealed the inadequacy of most Company
Law provisions in place and the need to carry out an overhaul of both the
legal and the institutional frameworks.
Francisco Reyes, The Colombian Simplified Corporation An Empirical Analysis
of a Success Story in Corporate Law Reform, 4 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 392,
396 (2015), available at https://perma.cc/7B7J-2Q76.
34. See Tramhel, supra, note 25, at 9.
35. This legalistic trait is masterfully explained by Keith Rosenn in his analysis of Brazilian legal culture:
Closely related to legalism is the exaggerated concern with legal formalities. Every nation has some formalistic behavior, but Brazilian concern
with authenticity and verification is both impressive and oppressive. Legally permitting a friend to drive one's car requires written, notarized
authorization. In many situations the signature of the notary must itself
be verified. Foreigners may be validly divorced abroad, but before Brazilian officials will accord the foreign decree any validity, the document
must be translated by the Foreign Office and homologated by the Supreme Federal Tribunal . . . . The presumption appears to be that every
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The Doing Business Index published by the World Bank is helpful in identifying the problems created by excessive formalism. One
of the areas measured by the Index is the ease (or difficulty) of starting a business. Figure 2 below compares the number of days required to incorporate (or start a business) in several jurisdictions.
Most Latin American jurisdictions are badly ranked.
Figure 2. Selected Ranking: Expedience of Incorporation Proceedings 36
Rank: Starting a Business 2017
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Upon reviewing the best practices of highly ranked jurisdictions
in the Doing Business Index, it is noticeable that countries with the
best performance offer entrepreneurs a set of enabling rules that facilitate incorporation. Ease of starting a business is founded upon

citizen is lying unless he produces written, documentary proof that he is
telling the truth.
Keith Rosenn, The Jeito: Brazil’s Institutional Bypass of the Formal Legal System
and its Developmental Implications, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 514, 530 (1971).
36. Data taken from World Bank website; see World Bank Group, supra note
21.
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online procedures, a limited number of forms that have to be filled
in order to accomplish the process, and the absence of notary publics
or registrars with costly and lengthy formalities. In New Zealand,
for example, the entire process can be completed by applying for
registration on the Companies Office’s website, 37 and it takes only
a few hours to complete. The World Bank recommends the implementation of the so-called “one stop shop strategy” by which all proceedings related to incorporation can be accomplished before a single window, either physical or virtual. In this manner, a single governmental office is entrusted with processing not only the business
registration but also the tax ID, social security, business licenses,
etc. Within developing jurisdictions, the case of Kenya is a good
example of improvement made by providing an efficient business
registration system. 38
At the other end of the spectrum, the World Bank argues that
Brazil incorporation takes an overwhelming 101 days. 39 This is the
result of a highly bureaucratic procedure. The general rule in Latin
American countries is that incorporation requires that the applicant
personally appear before the respective governmental entity (tax,
social security, pension and severance funds, notary public,
mercantile registry, foreign direct investment registration,
environmental permits, business license, etc.), fill out long forms,
37. See Companies Register, NEW ZEALAND COMPANIES OFFICE, at
https://perma.cc/V2LX-MMED. The first step is to log on through the setting up
of a user account on the designated website. Afterwards, the applicant must reserve the corporate name, complete the relevant forms, and pay the registration
fee. Responses notifications, and the certificate of incorporation from the companies’ office are sent by e-mail. While incorporating a company, an applicant can,
at the same time, register online for the Goods and Services Tax and apply for a
company Inland Revenue Department number. See Ease of Doing Business in
New Zealand, THE WORLD BANK, at https://perma.cc/24BF-PRW7.
38. According to the Doing Business Report, Kenya’s improvement in the
“starting a business” segment resulted in a change in rank of 34 places from 2016
to 2017. See Ease of Doing Business in Kenya, THE WORLD BANK, at
https://perma.cc/6J86-4EJT. Additionally, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is currently developing a legislative guide
for registration of businesses, which is deemed particularly useful for emerging
economies. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Report
of Working Group I (MSMEs) on the work of its twenty-eighth session (New York,
1-9 May 2017) A/CN.9/900 (Vienna, 2017), at https://perma.cc/ECT6-EE8G.
39. See Ease of Doing Business in Brazil, THE WORLD BANK, at
https://perma.cc/UN2R-Y93U.
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and, consequently, spend a considerable amount of time and
money. 40
The way towards facilitating incorporation procedures is not
without obstacles. There are many powerful stakeholders and pressure groups who may wish to perpetuate the status quo, as there is a
lot to gain by maintaining the rents derived from formalistic procedures, which require third party intervention. José Mendoza points
out the political economy problem associated with the powerful influence of such groups:
Local institutional arrangements can produce significant
benefits for interest groups. These groups can easily coordinate their actions in order to block any changes to the institutions from which they obtain these benefits, regardless of
whether reform would also enhance overall welfare. Resistance to institutional reform can manifest itself through
the open obstruction of legislative initiatives or by subtler
tactics such as the promotion or acceptance of ineffective
rules. 41
However, this rent-seeking phenomenon is not specific to Latin
American or other emerging jurisdictions. As noted by Jesper Lau
Hansen, the EU has also faced opposition from certain sectors
against the simplification of corporate law:
Besides the natural tendency of vested interest to uphold the
status quo, the system of notaries is often lauded for being
efficient, fairly inexpensive and an important safeguard that
may also guide the founders of the company on difficult
questions of company law. For these reasons, the [Societas

40. See REYES, supra note 10. As already discussed, the formalistic traits of
the region’s legal tradition are rooted in the colonial period. Procedures and ritualism for incorporation of business associations have been in place ever since.
This fact is shown in the early presence of the notary publics, which were also
referred to as “scribes.” See MATTHEW C. MIRROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW—A
HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA 75 (U. of
Texas Press 2004); Mirrow notes that during colonial times, in order to incorporate “[t]he members needed to sign an agreement (estatutos) before two witnesses
and a scribe.”
41. José Miguel Mendoza, Convergence, Coordination and Collusion in Securities Regulation: The Latin American Integrated Market, in LAW AND POLICY
IN LATIN AMERICA: TRANSFORMING COURTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND RIGHTS’ (Pedro
Fortes, Larissa Boratti, Andrés Palacios Lleras, & Tom Gerald Daly eds., Palgrave
Macmillan 2017), available at https://perma.cc/B8ND-LZDC.
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Unius Personae] proposal has already encountered considerable opposition from jurisdictions accustomed to notaries. 42
In addition to the time consumed by registration formalities, the
process also involves fees. The following Table shows the regional
ranking of costs and number of days needed for both men and
women to set up a business venture.
Table 2. Time and Costs Required to Set Up a Business—World
Bank Doing Business Index 43

Pursuant to the same index, Latin America and the Caribbean
are currently second to last in terms of incorporation costs and time
required to set up, with only Sub-Saharan Africa behind. Breaking
down the above data, the World Bank calculates the cost of incorporating as a percentage of a person’s income per capita. For example, in Mexico a person spends 19 percent of their annual income in
paying for incorporation expenses. 44 In comparison, a person in

42. Jesper Lau Hansen, The SUP Proposal: Registration and Capital (Articles 13–17), 12 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 179 (2015).
43. Starting a Business, THE WORLD BANK, at https://perma.cc/K52HG5GK.
44. Starting a Business: Mexico, THE WORLD BANK, at https://perma.cc
/VA38-G5H7.
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New Zealand would only have to pay 0.3 percent. 45 This comparison
provides an insight into the differences in jurisdictions that have implemented best practices, and those that are still lagging behind. In
this vein, it provides a route for reform.
2. Restrictions to Freedom of Contract and Dichotomy of Private Law
The second issue with Latin American company laws is the
range of unwarranted restrictions to private ordering. The region
inherited the Napoleonic codifications, in which, following the 19th
century liberal approaches, the parties were supposed to be granted
great latitude to govern their legal relationships. 46 Notwithstanding
this, the concept of freedom of contract appears to be very
restrictive, particularly in the field of Company Law. 47 Several
provisions of public order (ordre public) concerning all aspects of
corporate governance can be found when reviewing legislation
throughout the region. 48 These include, among others, mandatory
rules on minority shareholders’ rights, structural changes,
functioning of corporate bodies, mergers, dissolution, and
liquidation. The result of this legislative trait is a rise in transaction

45. Starting a Business: New Zealand, THE WORLD BANK, at https://perma
.cc/H2UC-BXCW.
46. However, even in France, the principles of economic liberalism, which
were embraced in the 19th century Act of July 24, 1867 on Company Laws (Loi
du 24 juillet 1867 sur les sociétés commerciales) were harnessed after the 1920s.
According to Pierre-Henri Conac, the 1929 crisis resulted in a general questioning
of economic liberalism in favor of a large degree of state intervention in the economy, which was justified by the market failures, as well as a reduction in the freedom of enterprise which was subject to a highly directory legislation. Pierre-Henri
Conac, La société par actions simplifiée une révolution démocratique, in LA
SOCIETE PAR ACTIONS SIMPLIFIEE : BILAN ET PERSPECTIVE 3 (Pierre-Henry Conac
& Isabelle Urbain-Parleani eds., L.G.D.J. 2016).
47. This may be the result of the deeply rooted formalism inherited by the
region from colonial times. As Mirrow notes, commenting on the excessive regulation of business associations: “In general, the colonial market was highly regulated by both royal law and commercial practices.” MIRROW, supra note 40, at
76.
48. The above analysis of excessive formalities in Latin America is in sharp
contrast with other jurisdictions such as Delaware, where most corporate law rules
are embodied in default provisions, which may be opted out by the parties. See
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (AEI Press
1993).
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costs and legal uncertainty. The following paragraphs explain this
point further.
Mandatory rules in company law are all pervasive in the region.
Consequently, private parties are not always able to adjust their contractual clauses to their particular needs. 49 Parties and their advisors
have to find loopholes and other devices to circumvent certain restrictions, which may seem anachronistic today. A short-term solution found by parties may be to adopt schemes that tend to include
simulated contracts that do not fully reflect the business reality. As
a result of these contractual solutions, there is an increase in transaction costs, not to mention the uncertainties arising from such
schemes. Moreover, simulated provisions may even be considered
wrongful and subject to judicial scrutiny.
An example of this type of situation is shown in the participation
of straw men in the process of incorporation whenever the legislation requires multiple shareholders in order for limited liability to
exist. This requirement is contrary to contemporary business practice in which there may be situations where the sole shareholder is
better suited for certain ends. Company laws throughout the region
are deeply rooted in ancient legal concepts. The following can explain this trait 50: the Roman law concept of societas, which was later
developed into different forms of business entities, was strongly
grounded upon a contractual foundation. 51 Later, the French Commercial Code maintained the idea whereby all forms of business associations arise out of an agreement between two or more persons. 52
49. See REYES, supra note 10, at 18.
50. Id.
51. Within the classification undertaken by the Roman jurist Gaius, the societas was included as the last of the so-called consensu contracts. See PASCAL
PICHONNAZ, LES FONDEMENTS ROMAINS DU DROIT PRIVE 512 (Schultess Verlag
2008). The societas contract required, inter alia, the participation of two or more
persons. See id. at 513.
52. In spite of this characteristic, the French, primal creators of the contractual theory, have now fully accepted the benefits derived from the flexibility of
the French Société par Actions Simplifiée (SAS):
[The SAS] represents a major breakthrough for French Law, given the
fact that it is the first time that the legislation accepts a single member
business corporation in which the capital is divided into shares. It is easy
to understand the success of this corporate entity in light of the freedom
provided to the shareholders by the legislation, to define the internal

2018]

OAS MODEL LAW

23

The transplantation of the Napoleonic codifications into Latin
America resulted in the inception of a full-fledged contractual theory throughout the region. 53 Although the experience of several jurisdictions around the world has shown the benefits of the sole
shareholder scheme and the limitations of the strict contract theory, 54 surprisingly, some sectors of Latin American academia still
desperately cling to trite formalism. 55 The result has been the wide-

rules for the company, and the suppression of a minimum capitalization
requirement.
María-Beatríz Salgado, La société par actions simplifiée: una estructura diferente
en el derecho de sociedades, in SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES, supra note 25, at 349.
53. For Colombia, see CÓDIGO DE COMERCIO (Commercial Code) art. 374
[C. COM.]; whereby traditional corporations “may not be formed or start operation
with less than five stockholders.” See id. at art. 98:
By means of the company contract, two or more persons undertake to
make a contribution in cash, work, or in other goods representing currency, for the purpose of sharing in the profits derived from their enterprise. On legal formation of a company, it will turn into a juridical person
distinct from each individual shareholder.
54. For a long time, the European Union has recognized the benefits of the
single member corporation. This trend has found a recent formulation in the Societas Unius Personae:
One of the most recent initiatives adopted by the European Commission
in 2014 is the proposed Directive on the Sole Proprietor Limited Liability
Company, which includes as its highlight the ‘Societas Unius Personae.’
Said proposal seems to be an alternative to other initiatives, focused on
the importance of the European MSME’s in strengthening the EU economy.
Linda Navarro Matamoros, Tipologia societaria y derecho de la Unión Europea,
in SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES, supra note 25, at 307. The aim at which the Societas Unius Personae Directive geared is similar to that of the Model Law. It is
noteworthy that both initiatives focus on MSMEs and have an additional purpose
of furthering economic integration and harmonization:
The proposal by the European Commission of a directive on singlemember private limited liability companies of 9 April 2014 is designed
to facilitate cross-border activities of enterprises, especially small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by requesting Member States to provide a company form called the Societas Unius Personae (SUP) that
would be set up online and would follow harmonised rules on key issues.
Pierre-Henri Conac, The Societas Unius Personae (SUP): A “Passport” for Job
Creation and Growth, 12 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 140 (2015).
55. For an example of this trend, see NÉSTOR H. MARTINEZ NEIRA, CÁTEDRA
DE DERECHO CONTRACTUAL SOCIETARIO ch. 2 (2d ed., Legis 2014). Contrast this
stance with the forward looking comments by another Colombian scholar, Jorge
Oviedo Albán:
Under Colombian Law, by allowing for the creation of single member
entities under the simplified corporations, it is no longer correct to refer
now to the ‘corporate contract.’ Today, it is more appropriate to refer to
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spread prohibition of the single member corporation, making it cumbersome for multinational companies and investors alike to have a
presence in these countries, as they would have to associate with
other persons or firms in order to carry out the investment. 56
Another problem brought about by the restrictions to freedom of
contract is standardization. Disregarding the importance of private
ordering, hinders the development of flexible and useful legal
schemes that foster innovation and creativity. Consequently, the activity of setting up a business entity is reduced to a box ticking and
blank filling exercise, 57 to the detriment of legal innovation involved
in modern business practices, which require a higher level of flexibility. 58
In addition to reducing mandatory provisions, the simplification
process heralded by the Model Law also results in reducing transaction costs by eliminating the outdated dichotomy of private law
throughout the region (meaning the presence of both a civil code and
a commercial code for the ordering of private matters). 59 Indeed,

the ‘corporate juridical act,’ bearing in mind that this concept encompasses both contractual corporations and also sole shareholder entities.
Albán, supra note 25, at 182.
56. Naturally, an investor can always set up several subsidiaries outside of
the Latin American region in order to cope with the multiple member requirement.
This procedure will entail significant costs.
57. For instance, legal information services providers, such as Lexis Nexis
(or in the Latin American region, Legis), have established form articles of association for use by the public in setting up their corporations. For the Legis models
applicable to Latin America, see Minutos y Modelos, LEGIS, https://perma.cc
/6C7R-GMRY.
58. For example, this situation is contrasted with the French SAS, which is
the corporate vehicle preferred by tech startups. See Fancisco Reyes & Erik P.M.
Vermeulen, Company Law, Lawyers and ‘Legal’ Innovation: Common Law versus Civil Law (Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working
Paper No. 2011-3, 2011).
59. The dichotomy of private law in Latin America, although currently embodied in two sets of codifications as transplanted from Napoleonic law, has deep
roots in the region, dating back to colonial time: “Just as the regime of contract
law was divided amongst the various important sources of civil, commercial, and
public law, so too was the organization and operation of the various forms of
business associations.” MIRROW, supra note 40, at 75. Furthermore, it is interesting to note the dispersed and sometimes contradictory nature of statutory rules in
the region. Mirrow further notes that in the context of laws regulating business
associations, “[t]he Siete Partidas shared their authority in guiding companies
with the Ordenanzas de Bilbao, which often provided somewhat different rules.”
Id.
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most codes and corporate statutes in the region have maintained a
differentiation between civil and commercial companies following
the French 19th century model, whereby separate substantive rules
apply according to the nature of the business company.
Scholars from civil law jurisdictions have commented on this
point:
In Chile the criteria to classify a firm as either civil or commercial is related to the definition set forth in its business
purpose. Therefore, Article 2.059 of the Civil Code mandates that ‘the corporation may be either civil or commercial.
Commercial corporations are those that are formed to carry
out commercial acts, classified as such by the Law. The remaining entities are civil corporations.’ Pursuant to the
quoted cited article, the classification of a corporation as
commercial is framed within an external criterion relating to
purpose clause as set up in the by-laws, at the moment of
incorporation. If the business purpose entails carrying out
any of the acts regarded as commercial by Article 3 of the
Commercial Code the corporation shall be commercial, regardless of the actual business undertaking carried out by the
corporation. 60
The elimination of this useless differentiation for the simplified
corporation increases legal certainty in the simplest way possible:
parties may now be assured of which law applies, without incurring
either expensive advice or illegality. This certainty reduces transaction costs.
3. Multiple Piercing the Corporate Veil Hypotheses
The third issue found in the legislation throughout Latin America is the growing number of exceptions to the principle of limited
liability. The issue is so problematic that according to some scholars,
for example in Brazil, piercing the corporate veil has become the
rule instead of the exception. 61 Commenting on this legal trend of
reducing limited liability, Bruno Salama notes the following:

60. María Fernanda Vásquez Palma, Sobre los tipos de sociedades en el Derecho Chileno, in SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES, supra note 25, at 147.
61. In this regard, see KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at ch. 5.
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In the period after the adoption of the 1988 [Brazilian] Constitution, the principle of limited liability was radically adjusted. Statutory rules and judicial decisions questioning the
asset partitioning between the firm and its members were issued in virtually all areas of law (including labor law, tax,
corporate and even consumer protection, as well as administrative and criminal law). Said decisions reached third parties related to the firm, including directors, contractors or
counselors, and sometimes even persons having no contractual relationship with the firm, such as counsel to the shareholders. In this manner, the basic focus of the legal system
shifted from protection of entrepreneurs, to protection of
creditors. The pendulum moved. 62
The erratic case law sometimes encountered throughout the region is mainly based on situations or regulation arising outside the
scope of corporate law. Continuing with the Brazilian example, consumer protection laws contain a provision for the disregard of the
corporate personality whenever the judge finds certain wrongful use
of the corporate form, in the event of bankruptcy, or even whenever
it is found that the corporate personality is “somehow a hindrance to
the reimbursement of losses caused to consumers.” 63 However, even
more noteworthy from the Brazilian case is that the courts have applied “unlimited shareholder liability in favor of workers by analogy
to consumer protection legislation.” 64 Thus, in Brazil not only is
there specific legislation on certain causes that may result in veil
piercing, but the courts have also applied this remedy on the grounds
of additional unrelated matters.
The situation is not limited to Brazil. In Colombia, for example,
a judicial decision from 1992 extended liability for labor obligations
to shareholders of limited liability companies, 65 notwithstanding the
fact that the Commercial Code explicitly provided for a system of

62. BRUNO SALAMA, O FIM DA RESPONSABILIDADE LIMITADA NO BRASIL:
HISTÓRIA, DIREITO E ECONOMIA 26 (Malheiros 2014).
63. Unofficial English translation of article 28 of the Código de Proteção e
Defesa do Consumidor (Consumer Protection Code).
64. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at n. 41.
65. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación
Laboral. Nov. 26, 1992.
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limited liability for this type of entity. 66 Additionally, a different decision from the Constitutional Court appears to have extended liability arising from pension obligations of the subsidiary to a parent
company, for the mere fact of being the parent. 67 The trend to hold
parent companies liable is also present in legislation throughout the
region. 68
To be sure, piercing the corporate veil is a valuable remedy in
corporate law. It cures wrongdoing by controlling shareholders and
the abuse of the principle of limited liability. However, when this
solution is extensively applied by courts without sufficient justification, it gives rise to legal uncertainty and distrust in the corporate
form. 69 Seen in this light, the proliferation of exceptions (both statutory and judicial) to limited liability throughout the region may
have the effect of discouraging local and foreign investment. 70
In order to prevent these types of situations, the initiative advocates for a sound balance between the principle of limited liability,
clearly incorporated in Article 2 of the Model Law, 71 and a narrow
instance of veil piercing, applicable only when the simplified corporation is used for the purpose of committing fraud or any other
wrongful act, as stated in Article 41. 72

66. Article 353 of the Colombian Commercial Code [C. COM] reads as follows: “the shareholders of a Limited Liability Company shall be liable up to the
amount of their contributions.”
67. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sentencia SU1023, Sept. 26, 2001. However, more recent decisions from the same court appear
to have produced more certainty by upholding the principle of limited liability of
corporations.
68. REYES, supra note 10, at n. 21, includes the following summary of legislation: for Brazil, see Law no. 6.404, art. 246; for Argentina, see Law no. 24.522,
art. 161; and for Colombia, see Law no. 1116, 2006, arts. 61, 82.
69. Bainbridge has argued that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil
should be abolished, due to its uncertainty and lack of predictability increasing
transaction costs for small businesses. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil
Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 470 (2001).
70. For an argument against the doctrine of disregarding the corporate veil,
in the context of Colombia, see Enrique Gaviria Gutiérrez, Contra el Disregard,
in GRANDES TEMAS DEL DERECHO COMERCIAL MODERNO: SU INCIDENCIA EN LA
CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1991 (Diké 1993).
71. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 2.
72. Id. at art. 41.
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4. Difficult Access to Information Subject to Public Record
The fourth issue brought about by legislation in the region is the
limited role of mercantile registries. In this geographic area, the concept of commercial publicity is deemed important in order to provide legal certainty for acts of business persons. 73 However, the effect of registration in the corporate sphere is restricted to publicity.
In several cases the act of registration does not by itself result in the
formation of a corporate body. In fact, additional bureaucratic steps
are needed in order for a business to acquire legal personality. Aside
from the registration, certain laws in the region frequently require
notarization and sometimes even governmental authorizations.
However, the recent trend in modernization of corporate law
throughout the world has resulted in legislation, which derogates
cumbersome multiple incorporation steps. 74
Additionally, the technology used is generally obsolete and access becomes complicated. Once again, high transaction costs surface in this area. Formal registration is so complicated that the process cannot be completed without the intervention of third parties,
particularly lawyers, making it even more costly, bureaucratic, and
less efficient. 75 Additionally, this matter is plagued with stern oppo-

73. See REYES, supra note 10, at n. 77 (discussing the different regulations in
certain countries in the region); for Brazil, see CÓDIGO CIVIL (Civil Code) art. 993
[C.C.]; for Mexico, see Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles [General Law of
Business Associations] art. 5; for Argentina, see Law no. 19.550, art. 12; and for
Colombia, see C. COM. art. 112.
74. Commenting on the trend to reduce formalism, José Miguel Embid notes
that:
[A]side from the fact that [the simplification process] results in eliminating the effect of several corporate law institutions, which have been developed over a long time (such as the irregular company and the nullification of incorporation, among others), this simplification process reveals that only in the context of closely held corporations that the system
electronic incorporation acquires true meaning and effect.
José Miguel Embid, El significado de la tipología societaria en el derecho de
sociedades, in SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES, supra note 25, at 49.
75. The World Bank Doing Business report for 2016 discusses the most common problems with registration systems, which require third party intervention:
“Hiring a lawyer is most common in Latin America and the Caribbean—while
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sition to change the status quo. There is a multimillion-dollar business behind formal registration of firms, making it harder to break
the pattern of formalization in order to achieve simplification of procedures.
The Model Law initiative firmly states that incorporation should
be simple and straightforward. This idea is particularly strong in
light of the empirical evidence showing that economies with thirdparty involvement in the process of incorporation have more businesses operating in the informal sector. 76 Thus, the aim of contributing to the formal economy is partly achieved by simplifying this
process.
According to the World Bank, the golden principle is minimum
human intervention. 77 By removing the participation of people and
creating a more automatized process, the business owner by herself
will be able to carry out the procedures to set up a new firm formally.
The World Bank has analyzed highly inefficient legal systems in
which the process of incorporation is as complicated as it is costly
and prepared a graph (Figure 3) that depicts a collection of extremely complicated steps required for business formalization, evidencing a maximum degree of human intervention.

using a notary’s services is most common in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America
and the Caribbean and the Middle East and North Africa.” The World Bank, Doing Business 2016 Report (2016), available at https://perma.cc/DDX2-XDGB
[hereinafter Doing Business 2016 Report].
76. Id. As shown in the Doing Business report data, high costs for business
incorporation, especially those incurred through third-party involvement, can
drive entrepreneurs to choose to operate in the informal sector.
77. See the Doing Business report for 2017, arguing that increased trade digitalization, which minimizes human interaction, creates fewer opportunities for
bribery and fraud, using the Philippines as a compelling example in the customs
sector. The World Bank, Doing Business 2017 Report (2017), available at
https://perma.cc/Q3S6-AUYQ [hereinafter Doing Business 2017 Report].
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Figure 3. World Bank—Procedures for Incorporation Including Human Intervention 78

An example of the cumbersome ritualism in Latin American
company law is the resolution rendered by a former Inspector of
Justice in Argentina, according to which, parties to a corporate contract had to prove that the paid-in capital had been contributed to the
company through the delivery of cash to the corporate officer. 79
78. Doing Business 2016 Report, supra note 75.
79. The Argentinian Inspection of Justice is an agency entitled with the supervision of business corporations in the city of Buenos Aires. The Inspection is
empowered to issue resolutions concerning the formation and operation of business corporations within that region. Proof of actual capital contributions must be
brought before the National Inspection of Justice. General Resolution no. 7 of
2005 describes a rather unusual requirement for this purpose. According to its
wording:
The payment [of capital] must be accredited in the legal proportion determined in the act of incorporation. Evidence of payment must be provided by deposit with the Argentinian National Bank . . . . Alternatively,
proof of payment may also be provided through: 1. The explicit assertion
by a notary public, in the public deed of incorporation, stating that the
shareholders have effectively delivered the capital to the firm’s directors,
in the presence of the notary public. Alternatively, the public deed may
contain an assertion in the sense that the capital has been delivered to the
notary public herself, with the further obligation of transferring said
funds to the firm’s directors, after formal incorporation has taken place
....
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This procedure had to be certified by a notary public. In the alternative, the parties were bound to deposit such capital contributions in
the National Bank. This is contrasted with the example of New Zealand or Kenya, as already discussed, where registration is carried out
online and is completed within only a few hours.
5. Enforcement Failure
The fifth problem posed by Latin American legislation is the
lack of effective enforcement mechanisms throughout the jurisdictions in the region. This situation can be analyzed under the prism
of Roscoe Pound’s seminal ideas. At the beginning of the 20th century, Pound posed the question of legal efficiency by contrasting law
in the books with law in action. 80 The empirical observation in Latin
America shows the obsolescence of the court system. 81 As a consequence, judicial enforcement of contracts is highly inefficient. 82 One
of the prime causes of the region’s judicial delays is the fact that the
law is overly ritualistic and plagued with several procedural devices
that allow parties to challenge almost every decision that is rendered. As a result, the processes are lengthy and their outcome is
highly uncertain. This situation gives rise to a significant degree of
unpredictability and requires parties to design contractual provisions
that are self-enforcing, outside of the ordinary court system.

Resolución General de la Inspección General de Justicia, in Nueva Regulación
de la Inspección General de Justicia, Resolución Número 7 de 2005 y anexos
(Aug. 23, 2005), Ediciones Gari, 2006, at 95.
80. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV.
(1910).
81. See Doing Business 2017 Report, supra note 77, at 190, 195, 199, 200,
224.
82. Ronald J. Gilson notes that emerging jurisdictions sometimes display a
broader scope of legal deficiencies, beyond merely lacking minority protection
rules:
With bad commercial law, exchange must be self-enforcing because
there are neither authoritative rules nor an effective judicial system to
enforce those obligations. Transactions in this circumstance take place
in a reputation market, which substitutes for law (or law’s shadow) as a
means to assure that parties perform their contractual obligations.
Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, 60 STAN. L. REV. 633 (2007).
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The following chart shows the difficulty of the enforcement of
contracts in the region.
Table 3. Enforcement: Procedures, Time and Cost 83
Latin America
(selected economies)

Processes
Quality Index

Time

Cost

(days)

(% of claim)

(0-18)

Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico

11.5
13
9
9
9.5

660
731
480
1,288
350

22.5
20.7
28.6
45.8
33.5

Aside from the transaction costs imposed on parties by the Kafkaesque proceedings, another primal cause of inefficiencies is the
fact that, normally, there are no specialized corporate law courts in
the region. In general, it is fair to say that Latin American jurisdictions lack what Professor Luca Enriques refers to as “good corporate
judges.” 84 As a result, case management is not well developed and
there is no specific regulation concerning time standards for the proceedings. Additionally, court automation is underdeveloped, to say
the least, causing delays by failing to make use of existing technologies to facilitate the different instances within the legal process.
The following diagram presents the main areas of focus by the

83. Doing Business 2017 Report, supra note 77, at 190, 195, 199, 200, 224.
84. See Luca Enriques, Off the Books, but on the Record: Evidence from Italy
on the Relevance of Judges to the Quality of Corporate Law, in GLOBAL
MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A
NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 258 et seq. (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., Columbia
U. Press 2003). The characteristics of good corporate judges are as follows:
“1. Honesty, rapidity, and expertise . . . . 2. No deference in conflict-of-interest
cases . . . . 3. Capacity to identify real rights and wrongs . . . . 4. Antiformalism
. . . . 5. Concern for spill-over effects.” Id. at 7-9. Additionally, Enriques summarizes these traits: “At the most basic level, there is widespread agreement that a
certain degree of judicial honesty and effectiveness . . . are necessary elements of
a sound corporate law system . . . . Their absence is a real problem today mainly
in developing countries . . . .” Id. at 3.
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Doing Business Index when evaluating the quality of the proceedings. The difficulties associated with the judicial system have been
meticulously assessed by the World Bank in its Doing Business Report. For this purpose, the Bank carefully analyses the basic aspects
that could lead to an efficient judicial system. Among the most relevant, the following factors are considered: (i) the availability of
specialized courts; (ii) the regulations concerning the timeframe for
each procedural instance; (iii) the access to automated systems for
filing complaints and serving notices, and (iv) the existence of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
Figure 4. Areas Covered by the Quality of Judicial Processes Index 85

As a result of the court inefficiency described above, costs are
prohibitively high when litigating in the region, both in terms of
monetary expenditure and time spent. For example, according to the
Doing Business report for Mexico, in 2017 the cost of enforcing a
contract before the judiciary, as a percentage of the claim, rises to
33.5 percent. 86 As a consequence, a contracting party wishing to
have its contract enforced will lose almost half of the amount
85. Doing Business 2016 Report, supra note 75.
86. See Ease of Doing Business in Mexico: Enforcing Contracts, THE WORLD
BANK, at https://perma.cc/P2AH-9ZHF.
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claimed in the court proceedings (if successful). 87 The difference
between law in books and law in action throughout the region is described by the distinguished scholar Robert Charles Means in the
following excerpt: “the tendency for Latin American countries to
enact laws with little regard for social reality and less for effective
implementation is well known . . . . This kind of isolation of legal
rules from reality might be called enforcement unreality.” 88
In the same vein, Bruno Salama and Viviane Muller describe
this scenario, capturing many of the problems present throughout
the region by using Brazil as an example:
Brazilian courts are largely deemed by corporate lawyers
and other market players to lack the necessary expertise to
delve into the intricacies of securities laws and the economic
dynamics of securities transactions. This trait can be partly
attributed to the absence of courts and judges specialized in
corporate and securities transactions. In fact, Brazilian
courts are remarkably slow and their decisions on corporate
matters are somewhat unpredictable. 89
6. Costs of Starting a Business
Another problem with the current legislative approach is the expense associated with the creation of a business. Figure 5 below
shows the average cost related to starting a business by focusing
mostly on bureaucratic expenses that the entrepreneur must incur in
order to set up a formal business structure. As may be seen from the
graph, the costs of incorporating in the region are significant. This
situation is particularly worrisome when bearing in mind that business startups already require large amounts of capital up front. Businesspersons should not have to divert their scarce resources into
complying with bureaucratic formalities. It is noteworthy that the
highest costs seen below do not relate to the operation of the business itself, but are solely incurred in legal formalities.
87. Obviously, if the claiming party is not successful, she would spend the
equivalent to half of her claim and a significant amount of time.
88. See ROBERT CHARLES MEANS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF LAW: CORPORATIONS AND CORPORATION LAW IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY COLOMBIA 151 (U. of North Carolina Press 1980).
89. See Salama & Muller, supra note 30, at 178.
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Figure 5. The Costs of Opening a Business 90

This situation is in contrast with more advanced systems in
which businesspersons are able to focus their resources (financial
and other) on developing their business, rather than in complying
with costly formalisms. Therefore, in many cases there is no need to
resort to lawyers and other professionals in order to complete the
incorporation process.
III. CONTENTS OF THE MODEL LAW
The Model Law is inspired by the Colombian SAS. Reference
to the Colombian experience is, thus, crucial in understanding the
main aspects of the initiative. In December of 2008, the Colombian
Congress enacted Law 1258 of 2008, creating this new type of business. The Colombian law contains elements found in corporate law
coming from both the common law and civil law traditions. In fact,
the basic structure and contents of the law are based on the French
legislation on the société par actions simplifiée. 91 Additionally, certain American law elements, mainly from the state of Delaware,
90. Doing Business 2016 Report, supra note 75.
91. The original legislation of the French SAS was enacted in 1994 (Law no.
94-1, Jan. 3, 1994). Several reforms followed to make it even more flexible and
simplified. For an overview of this type of business entity, see PIERRE-HENRI
CONAC & ISABELLE URBAIN-PARLEANI, LA SOCIÉTÉ PAR ACTIONS SIMPLIFIÉE
(SAS) (Dalloz 2016).
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were also included in the statute. 92 The result is a closely held corporation that resembles the so-called uncorporations that have been
introduced into the United States, the United Kingdom and some
civil law jurisdictions. 93
It is also noteworthy that there have been other similar laws introducing regulation on simplified closely held corporate vehicles in
Latin America. The first legislation of the sort was the Chilean Law
20.190 of June 5, 2007. According to Chilean commentator María
José Viveros Bloch, this legislation was aimed at allowing the small
business owner to formalize her venture. 94 On the other hand, Mexico enacted a law on December 9, 2015 regarding sociedades anónimas simplificadas (simplified corporations). The most recent case is
the Argentinian adoption of the sociedad por acciones simplificada
with Law 27.349, 95 which incorporated in the law designed to encourage entrepreneurship (Title 3). There is also draft legislation on
various types of similar business entities in Brazil.
By providing a combination of corporate and partnership-like
components, the Colombian SAS allows for significant contractual
flexibility, while still preserving the benefits of limited liability and
asset partitioning. As an example, some of the partnership-like features include simple formation procedures, internal flexibility and
share transfer restrictions. These features allow businesspersons to
cope better with agency problems within the corporations in which
management has been delegated. 96 On the other hand, certain crucial

92. See ROMANO, supra note 48.
93. See Reyes & Vermeulen, supra note 58; see also RIBSTEIN, supra note 6.
94. See MARÍA JOSÉ VIVEROS BLOCH, SOCIEDAD POR ACCIONES: ANÁLISIS DE
UN NUEVO TIPO SOCIAL 44 (Librotecnia 2006) (for the summary of the Chilean
law’s objectives).
95. Published in the Official Bulletin on Apr. 12, 2017.
96. By allowing a higher degree of contractual flexibility, parties are enabled
to set up devices aimed at defining ex ante each of the corporate participants’
obligations and rights. This latitude is oriented towards the completion of the corporate contract, reducing the potential for exposed disputes. For a discussion regarding the incomplete contract theory, see Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis,
Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design 56 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 187 (2005).
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corporate features, like having a separate legal personality and continuity of life, have also been kept. 97
The Model Law contains a total of 43 articles regulating all
stages in the life span of the corporation. As with any other model
law, its provisions are intended to serve as a guide for legislators and
policymakers alike. Therefore, they can be adapted in order to make
them compatible with domestic legislation. The following is a short
discussion of the main traits of the Model Law, inspired by the Colombian SAS.
A. Facilitating Incorporation Procedures
Following an Anglo-American approach to corporate law, the
Model Law significantly reduces formalities for incorporation.
Many of the proceedings existing in Latin American countries are
reminiscent of ancient formalities that have been abandoned in other
jurisdictions. Therefore, streamlining the requirements to set up the
business by removing some of these cumbersome steps is not incompatible with legal certainty. Interestingly, the latter goal can be
reached through a simple filing procedure before a public registry
(such as a chamber of commerce).
Article 5 of the Model Law reads as follows: “A simplified stock
corporation will be formed by contract or by the individual will of a
single shareholder, provided that a written document is granted. The
formation document shall be registered before the Mercantile Registry . . . .”
The same article also lists a total of seven items, which normally
form part of the incorporation document. 98 This requirement is not
intended to create an unjustified burden on the parties, but instead is
aimed at the disclosure of basic corporate information. The article
contains minimum legal requirements such as the corporation’s
domicile, its name, and the subscribed capital, among a few others.
It is basic information designed to identify the business entity, so
97. These characteristics allow for limited liability and indefinite duration of
the business enterprise.
98. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 5.
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that third parties can deal with it confidently. The same Model Law
provision categorically mandates that “no additional formalities of
any nature shall be required for the formation of the simplified stock
corporation.” 99 Even more significant is the removal of the notary
public’s intervention in the process. This recommendation is geared
towards the suppression of intermediaries and the reduction of unnecessary costs (including monetary and time related expenses).
Furthermore, the Model Law provides certainty as to when legal
personality arises. Article 3 states that “[u]pon the filing of the formation document before the Mercantile Registry . . . , the simplified
stock corporation will form a legal entity separate and distinct from
its shareholders.” 100 This simplification is intended to settle the discussion concerning the precise moment in which the legal personality is acquired. Where the law requires several different steps for the
incorporation to be completed, as is frequently the case in Latin
America, it becomes difficult to tell when the process has come to
fruition. Under the Model Law, all incorporation formalities are reduced to a filing before the mercantile registry. 101 Such registration
partly covers the functions previously served to the intervention of
notary publics. Experience has shown that there is no practical need
in having two sets of formal procedures (granting of a public deed
of incorporation, and filing before the mercantile registry) directed
towards the same end. Thus, the Model Law has granted the mercantile registry with certain attestation functions over the incorporation documents filed. 102 The mercantile registry shall only provide
a review of the legality of the provisions set in the incorporation
documents, and may only deny registration where it finds that the
elements enumerated in Article 5 of the Model Law have not been
included. 103
99. Id. at art. 5.
100. Id. at art. 3.
101. This feature appears in other jurisdictions, including some in the United
States, whereby filing before the registry acts as a presumption as to the existence
of the corporate body. See ABA, REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
(2006) Section 106.
102. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 6.
103. Id. at art. 8.
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Following the underlying concern with simplification and cost
reduction, a system of online registration should be implemented. In
Colombia, certain local mercantile registries have implemented an
electronic system for the formation of simplified corporation. 104 The
system requires the incorporator to have a personal digital signature
which can also be acquired through an online application system. 105
All these electronic devices find solid legal grounds in Colombia,
given the early adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on electronic commerce, by Law 527 of 1999. This law incorporated the
principle of functional equivalence, whereby any data message is
sufficient to replace paper-based formalities at least concerning socalled private documents (i.e., those that are not subject to notarization or any other form of authentication by a public officer). 106
B. Full-Fledged Limited Liability
The Model Law reinforces the foundational principle of limited
liability by including legal provisions directed at ameliorating the
impact of the piercing of the corporate veil doctrine. Accordingly,
the few exceptions to limited liability are reserved exclusively to
situations where there is clear and sufficient evidence of an abusive
use of the corporate form, provided that the liable party has acted
wrongfully or in a fraudulent fashion.
There is an attempt in the Model Law to strike a balance between
asset partitioning on the one hand, and the extension of liability to
104. The following web page may be accessed to incorporate the simplified
corporation electronically, Constitución de Sociedades por Acciones Simplificadas (SAS), CAMARA DE COMERCIO DE BOGOTÁ, https://perma.cc/5MV7-ZXEK
(under “Constitución Virtual de SAS,” follow “Constituir” hyperlink).
105. The digital signature may be acquired filing out the necessary forms in
the following web page, Adquiera o renueve su firma digital, CERTICÁMARA,
https://perma.cc/T7AJ-J9GN.
106. In accordance with Article 6 of Law 527 of 1999, where a legal provision
requires that information be in writing, such requirement shall be complied with
by means of a data message, provided that the information contained therein is
accessible for its future consultation. The use of new technologies has been described by scholars as one of the factors modernizing Corporate Law: “The progressive use of new technologies has been one of the factors accompanying the
process of typology renovation in the closely held corporation, with the aim of
facilitating and simplifying its existence, organization and operation.” Embid, supra note 74, at 48.
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responsible parties. 107 The economic rationale for the limitation of
liability and the instances of veil piercing have been broadly discussed by renowned scholars. 108 Following the mainstream approach to these principles, one of the objectives of the Model Law
in this regard is to provide an appropriate remedy for the aggrieved
when the legal entity status has been severely eroded. The initiative
thus intends to limit the situations for judges to hold shareholders
liable for the company’s obligations. Fraud or misuse of the corporate form should be the sole events to trigger judicial intervention. 109
There appears to be no valid justification introducing so many exceptions to the principle of limited liability. There is a willingness
to counteract the wholesale disregard of the legal entity in view of
the many cases where the exception to the principle of limited liability becomes the rule. This is particularly true when case law is
founded to a large extent upon situations unrelated to the domain of
corporate law.
The region’s writs of constitutionality (mandado de segurança
in Brazil, acción de amparo in Mexico and Argentina, and acción
de tutela in Colombia) have been used on several occasions as a
mechanism for piercing the corporate veil. This type of litigation
threatens the economic foundations of corporate law. This way, “defending weak creditors through expeditious writs (in which the true
merits of each case are not carefully assessed by constitutional
courts) negatively impacts certainty and reasonable reliance on these
legal systems.” 110 The Brazilian experience must serve as an important warning for the region, given the precedents that have jeopardized the economic benefits arising from the principle of limited
liability. In the opinion of Salama, the Brazilian trend of allowing
107. See Model Law, supra note 1, at arts. 2, 41.
108. See among many other works: FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 40 (Harvard U. Press 1996);
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. (1991); Bainbridge, supra note 69; Robert B.
Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. (1991); PIERRE MOUSSERON, DROIT DES SOCIET S 79 (2d ed., Montchrestien
2005); SALAMA, supra note 62.
109. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 41.
110. REYES, supra note 10, at 21.
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the government radical involvement in the allocation and reallocation of corporate risks was eventually consolidated. As a result of
that, additional legal branches were introduced to better protect the
interests of certain groups. Therefore, new fields of the law appeared, such as environmental law, consumer, labor law, social security law, urbanistic law, and others. 111
Similarly, it has been widely held that upholding the principle of
limited liability is a plausible objective, particularly when facing
voluntary creditors. 112 Currently there does not seem to be a major
dispute on this topic. On the other hand, regarding the so-called involuntary creditors, there is an ongoing doctrinal debate as to
whether the principle should also prevail in tort cases. 113 Notwithstanding the scholarly debate surrounding these topics, there is no
differentiation in the Model Law concerning the situation just described. The legal entity can be judicially disregarded in the exceptions already discussed.
C. Private Ordering
The Model Law upholds the principle of freedom of contract between private parties. This marks a defining trait of modern corporate law, particularly regarding hybrid business forms. 114 Upon discussing the French SAS, Périn and Germain, single out a distinctive
feature of the simplified corporation which lies in the possibility to
adjust internal functioning, enabling shareholders to benefit from
both corporate characteristics and added flexibility: “The method of
internal organization confers the SAS its originality vis-à-vis other
types of company. The simplified corporation is a liberalized form

111. See SALAMA, supra note 62, at 356.
112. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 108.
113. Id.
114. Commenting the Colombian SAS legislation, local scholars note: “Today, there is consensus in Colombia of the fact that the Law 1258 of 2008 is the
most important reform to Corporate Law of the last decade. The SAS was created
based on the pillar of corporate flexibility by incorporating, in its majority default
rules.” William Hernandez, La sociedad por acciones simplificada en Colombia,
in SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES, supra note 25, at 204 (citations omitted).
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of moral person, which includes the financial benefits from the corporate form, with a vast autonomy to define its internal powers.” 115
The flexibility provided by the Model Law is characteristic of
best practices from both the common law and civil law traditions.
As noted above, a broad freedom for parties to define their legal relationships is pervasive in American corporate law. 116 Likewise, the
1994 French law on SAS, along with its numerous amendments is a
good example of private ordering. According to Philippe Merle:
“The novelty introduced by the SAS consists in granting absolute
preponderance to freedom of contract for the shareholders, as manifested in the by-laws. The application of legal provisions may be
opted out of by contracting parties.” 117
As has already been explained, the simplified corporation introduced by the Model Law is barred from listing its securities in a
stock exchange. This is due to the need to maintain the Model Law
regulation as flexible and enabling for businesspersons. In fact,
keeping it away from the securities markets removes the difficult
issues concerning the protection of dispersed investors as there is a
close relationship between ownership and control in the simplified
corporation. 118

115. PIERRE-LOUIS PÉRIN & MICHEL
ACTIONS SIMPLIFIÉE : ÉTUDES-FORMULES 3

GERMAIN, SAS - LA SOCIÉTÉ PAR
(3d ed., Joly Éditions 2008).
116. Noting the increasing flexibility awarded to close corporations by judges
and legislators in the United States, Palmiter and Partnoy state that:
For many years, planners of the close corporation confronted judicial antagonism to special arrangements-whether embodied in the articles, bylaws, or a separate agreement if they departed too far from the traditional
statutory model. Two parallel developments, starting mostly in the
1960s, have substantially loosened this judicial attitude. First, courts
have become more realistic about the special demands of close corporations and have become far more tolerant of departures from the norm.
Second, legislatures have recognized the unnecessary rigidity of the traditional structure and have created special rules for the close corporation.
PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 31, at 1005. See also ROMANO, supra note 48;
and the ABA, MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT (2006).
117. PHILIPPE MERLE, DROIT COMMERCIAL : SOCIETES COMMERCIALES 602
(5th ed., Précis Dalloz 1996).
118. Commenting on the approach adopted in the United States, Professor
Bainbridge notes: “The regulatory regime for statutory close corporations is substantially more liberal in a variety of ways than is mainstream corporate law.”
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 486 (3d ed., Foundation Press 2015).
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The prohibition to offer securities on an exchange does not imply that the simplified corporation cannot be used to undertake large
business projects, or that it is to be adopted exclusively by MSMEs.
It is likely that the flexible capital structure is the most attractive
element of the entity for large firms. This flexibility allows for different types of investors, some active and some passive, and is generally regarded as adequate for large business groups and tax planning. 119
In the absence of the simplified corporation, Latin American
MSMEs are subject to a challenging dilemma. On the one hand, they
could choose the traditional corporate form in Latin America (generally the sociedad anónima), benefitting from its features, but assuming the downside of stringent rules and formalities. 120 On the
other hand, they could adopt partnership-like entities which provide
wide flexibility, but are subject to the disadvantage of unlimited liability. The simplified corporation combines the benefits from both
types of business entities. Cozian notes the following regarding the
French law on SAS: “The fundamental idea is to offer members of
119. As an example of the benefits provided by this flexibility, the following
is noted:
The Model Law enables the corporation to issue classes and series of
shares. The distinction between these two concepts has obvious practical
consequences. Share ‘classes’ refer to various categories of instruments
that are differentiated on the basis of the inherent rights associated with
them, according to the relevant regulation. On the other hand, the ‘series’
identify successive issues of the same class of shares, where such shares
have been placed at different time periods. Finally, Article 10 of the
Model Law also contemplates that the company may issue shares ‘for
any consideration whatsoever, including in-kind contributions, or in exchange for labor contributions pursuant to the terms and conditions contained in the by-laws.’
REYES, supra note 10, at 114.
120. The French simplified corporation was partly adopted with the objective
of establishing a corporate vehicle, which is free from the formalities of the classic
corporation (Société Anonyme or S.A.):
The S.A. bears the inconvenient of requiring at least seven shareholders,
and having a complex system establishing the existence of a general
shareholders assembly, board of directors, and director general. None of
these are required in the SAS . . . to sum up, the SAS counts with all the
advantages of the classic S.A. (limited liability, share transfers etc.),
without the inconveniences of said entity (minimum shareholders requirement, internal organization).
JEROME BONNARD, DROIT DES SOCIETES 126-127 (3d ed., Hachette Supérieur
1999).
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the simplified corporation an organizational form very similar to the
‘company-contract’ (société contrat), where the essential functioning rules are provided by agreement between the parties. This way,
the rules of the corporation (société anonyme) may be opted out
of.” 121
The initiative contains default provisions which the parties may
opt into, or opt out of at their will. Consequently, business participants can implement almost any arrangement which they deem better suited to their business needs. 122 Some examples of these provisions in the Model Law are the possibility for shareholders to either
fully define the main business activities of the corporation, or set up
an open ended purpose clause whereby the corporation may engage
in any lawful business; 123 the possibility for the corporation to have
an unlimited life span; 124 freedom to organize the internal structure
and operation of the corporation; 125 leeway to define voting majorities for a shareholders meeting, 126 among others.
121. MAURICE COZIAN ET AL., DROIT DES SOCIETES 365 (18th ed., LexisNexis
2005). Périn and Germain note the following regarding the French SAS:
“[A]dding freedom of contract to the creation of a corporation constitutes an unprecedented privilege in French Law. For any rational agent, incorporating her
firm as an SAS corresponds to the desire to increase organizational efficiency, by
having it adapt to its shareholders particular needs.” PÉRIN & GERMAIN, supra
note 115, at 11. The same characteristic is present in the Colombian SAS whereby
decision on the internal configuration of governance organs is left to the will of
the shareholder(s).
122. Private ordering is an important feature introduced by the Colombian
SAS law, into the previously rigid Colombian Corporate Law:
Naturally, the SAS’ opt in approach also allows for private parties to step
out of the standard provisions contained in model by laws and to draft
sophisticated agreements that are appropriate for more complex undertakings. The enabling non-directory provisions of Law 1258 have fostered private ordering and sparked innovation in Corporate Law across
the country. Aside from the boilerplate type of agreements that are used
by most start-ups, practicing attorneys are becoming skillful at developing new legal structures suitable for a more sophisticated business environment. A survey conducted with law firms and sole law practitioners
in the capital city of Bogotá has allowed for the identification of several
legal structures in which one or more SAS can be properly used for an
unlimited number of business purposes.
Francisco Reyes, Corporate Governance in Latin America: A Functional Analysis, 39 U. OF MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. (2008).
123. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 5(5).
124. Id. at art. 5(4).
125. Id. at art. 17.
126. Id. at art. 22.
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The approach based on the primacy of private ordering assumes
that contracting parties will be diligent enough either to adequately
negotiate the terms of the agreement so as to suit their particular
needs, or to adapt by default to off the rack housekeeping rules provided in the corporate statute. Naturally, the fact that there is significant latitude for parties to define the structure of their corporation
also entails a burden to prevent unintended consequences by careful
negotiation of provisions from the outset. 127 For example, incorporators may wish to establish special supermajorities which differ
from those contained as fallback provisions, in case they desire to
implement their voting arrangements. Depending on the specific circumstances, parties need to carefully design their own agreement in
order to fit their needs.
D. Unrestricted Business Purpose, Perpetuity and Commercial
Character
The Model Law allows for the adoption of an unrestricted business purpose for any Simplified Corporation. 128 This characteristic
coincides with the trend of advanced jurisdictions such as the United
States, 129 and to a lesser extent, the EU 130 and the UK. 131 By means

127. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 9
(Foundation Press 2002).
128. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 5(5).
129. Palmiter and Partnoy explain the evolution and fallout of the ultra vires
doctrine in the United States: “In the nineteenth century, the law of corporations
was mainly devoted to the resolution of disputes arising under the ultra vires doctrine. Today the issue rarely arises. Clearly, the original purpose of the doctrine
to curb the powers of large corporations has failed, largely replaced by expanded
fiduciary duties.” PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 31, at 171.
130. Commenting on the first European company law Directive, it has been
asserted that:
Even though this directive notes that the corporation’s legal capacity is
defined by the purpose clause as set forth in the relevant articles of incorporation, it also underscores that innocent third parties are protected
vis-à-vis the validity of ultra vires business transactions to which they
were a party—provided they did not know that the corporation lacked
sufficient capacity to undertake such a transaction. Pursuant to the same
directive, bad faith will not be presumed solely on the grounds that the
relevant party had access to a certificate issued by the relevant company
registry, in which the purpose clause is described.
REYES, supra note 10, at 31.
131. See the United Kingdom’s Companies Act of 2006 (c.46), at 31(1).
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of this provision, the anachronistic ultra vires doctrine that still exists in many Latin American countries is altogether left behind. Said
doctrine is supposed to protect shareholders from the presumed excess of powers which managers may sometimes arrogate upon themselves by acting beyond the terms of their mandate. According to
this view, establishing limitations to the capacity of the corporation
ensures that the entity will only be liable for acts that are explicitly
provided for in the corporate documents.
However, modern corporate law across the board tends to disregard the usefulness of this doctrine. It has been asserted that the prohibition of ultra vires acts may be deemed too formalistic and detrimental to entrepreneurial activity. 132 This doctrine may even tend to
create legal uncertainty, as it subjects contracting third parties acting
in good faith, to the nullification of contracts with the corporation.
In fact, the corporation can always challenge its own acts on the
grounds that it lacked sufficient legal capacity to execute them.
The trend against this doctrine may also take into consideration
the ownership structures prevailing in Latin America. As already
explained, closely held family enterprises, with no separation between ownership and control, are common in the region. This may
render the ultra vires doctrine useless, given the fact that shareholders may themselves assert direct control over the day-to-day running
of the company. 133 On the other hand, the ample flexibility contained in the Model Law allows shareholders to either choose an unrestricted business purpose, or to introduce limitations thereto.
Additionally, the Model Law introduced the perpetuity of existence theory, which runs contrary to many Latin American legislations. Most corporate laws in the region have maintained a Napoleonic provision whereby a company should be created for a limited
132. See FRANCISCO REYES, DERECHO SOCIETARIO 299 (3d ed., Editorial
Temis 2016).
133. Palmiter and Partnoy however hold that there is still a place for the ultra
vires doctrine in closed corporations; See PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 31,
at 172. The present paper suggests quite the contrary: by having shareholders actively participating in the day-to-day management of the closely held corporation,
their scrutiny of directors’ actions renders the protection of the ultra vires doctrine
useless.
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duration. 134 The objective is to reduce outdated formalities and introduce more flexibility for entrepreneurs. 135
The initiative also intends to put an end to the anachronistic dichotomy of private law present throughout the region. The Model
Law mandates that the simplified corporation is to have a commercial nature—without regard to the objects or purposes set forth in
the relevant incorporation documents. 136 Consequently, it becomes
irrelevant to analyze whether the business association’s activities
have a civil or a commercial nature. This characteristic is intended
to provide the maximum amount of legal certainty for shareholders
and for parties contracting with the simplified corporation.
E. Freedom to Define Internal Structure
With the aim of introducing more flexibility for the benefit of
businesspersons, the formation and operation of internal governance
organs are also simplified in the Model Law. As well as achieving a
streamlining of procedures and eliminating unnecessary bureaucracy, this characteristic arguably reduces costs for the entrepreneur.
An example of this leeway can be seen in the board of directors
regulation contained in the initiative. Under the Model Law there is
no statutory obligation to create a board of directors. 137 Even though
the importance of said body for the management of corporations is
acknowledged, regulatory restrictions have been loosened to the
point where shareholders may even decide if they require such a
board or not. For instance, small business ventures may find benefits
in excluding the board altogether. This feature specifically responds
to the already analyzed fact that most companies in Latin America

134. The former art. 1865 of the French Civil Code [C. CIV.] established that
the corporation would be terminated by the expiration of the term for which it was
contracted (now art. 1838, Law no. 78-9, Jan. 4, 1978). The Law no. 66-537 of
July 24, 1966 contained a provision whereby corporations could not be formed
for a term exceeding 99 years.
135. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 5(4).
136. Id. at art. 1.
137. Id. at art. 25.
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are closely held, and thus do not reflect the idea of a separation between ownership and control. 138
In the event the incorporators determine that there will not be
any board of directors in the corporation, both the management and
direction shall be entirely allocated on the legal representative and
any of her subordinates. In accordance with Article 25 of the Model
Law, “in the absence of a provision requiring the operation of a
board of directors, the legal representative appointed by the shareholders assembly shall be entitled to exercise any and all powers
concerning the management and legal representation of the simplified stock corporation.” At the moment of incorporation or at any
point during the corporation’s life span, additional committees may
be created such as management, audit, or any other that the parties
deem necessary.
This flexibility is not restricted to the creation of governance organs, but also to the applicable rules for their operation. There is
thus ample freedom for shareholders to determine aspects such as
calling of meeting, quorum, voting majorities, and shareholders’
representation, among others. 139
This flexibility will be particularly beneficial for MSMEs, as
their owners will have leeway to decide whether a corporate organ
such as the board of directors is excluded, instead of having to set
up mandatory corporate bodies with the only purpose of complying
with cumbersome legal ritualism.
F. Rules on Capital
New provisions on capital and classes of stock are also included.
The capital structure of the simplified corporation allows for any
138. See GORGA, supra note 26 and accompanying text.
139. For example, it is clear that this freedom of determination would benefit
different types of shareholding configurations. When two shareholders wish to
have shared management and direction of the corporation a single-member board
may prove helpful, particularly when the manager is different from the sole director. Such a system enables those shareholders to divide the corporation’s direct
management by granting binding authority to the legal representative and oversight powers to the single board member. In fact, in corporations with two shareholders and symmetrical capital contributions, this may be a suitable structure
because it allows the exercise of reciprocal controls.
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imaginable form of equity financing. Rules are introduced, for example, to set up either ordinary or dual classes of voting shares, including multiple voting rights. Contributions in kind or in labor are
also permitted in the simplified corporation. The flexibility afforded
by the Model Law is in sharp contrast with formalistic restrictions
on capitalization in the region. Article 9 of the SAS Model Law contains rules that are a departure from the general rule that has typically been included in commercial codes throughout Latin America.
Specifically, Article 9 enables business parties to define the amounts
for the corporation’s authorized, subscribed and paid-in capital. Furthermore, the term provided in the Model Law for the payment of
any capital contributions can be made within the following two
years, from the moment in which the shares of stock were subscribed. 140
An additional feature that is closer to the partnership regime than
to corporate law, relates to transfer restrictions that can be included
in the corporation’s by-laws. In this sense, shareholders may be required to submit any transfer of shares to rights of first refusal. Additional limitations, such as the inability to convey the shares of
stock for a fixed period of time can also be stipulated. Likewise,
preemptive rights for the issuance and subscription of new shares
can also be included in the by-laws. All these contractual devices
are particularly important in the context of family owned businesses,
where shareholders may wish to keep the entity as closed as possible. By setting up these types of clauses, third parties are normally
denied access to ownership.
G. Protection Mechanisms
The SAS Model Law contains significant protection mechanisms, which are more sophisticated and effective than those normally contained in traditional corporate law across the Latin American region. As it has been stated before, the Model Law provides
significant leeway to business participants. Thus, most ex ante legal

140. REYES, supra note 10, at 113.
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devices containing restrictions to freedom of contract or setting forth
prohibitions imposed upon directors, officers and shareholders, are
not included in such Model Law. By means of this approach, directory regulations are replaced with default provisions, which are only
applicable in the absence of specific contractual provisions.
To prevent the misuse of the corporate form, the Model Law
contains legal standards aimed at the protection of shareholders and
creditors. For example, as noted above, third parties are entitled to
bring actions for piercing the corporate veil where there is an abusive or fraudulent use of the business entity. Additionally, minority
shareholders are protected by certain causes of action intended to
reduce tunneling and abuse of right.
The point of departure for this legal approach is the well-known
presence of agency problems existing between controlling and minority shareholders (as opposed to the traditional dichotomy which
confronts the interests of management vis-a-vis those of shareholders as a class). 141 As a result of the significant capital concentration
across the region, 142 controlling shareholders are enabled to extract
private benefits of control. If this situation remains unharnessed,
non-controlling shareholders may be expropriated. 143 Consequently,
141. For a detailed discussion on agency problems, see KRAAKMAN ET AL.,
supra note 6.
142. See GORGA, supra note 26 and accompanying text. It is noteworthy that
the capital structure seen in the Latin American region, is somewhat similar to
that of Continental Europe. Thus, in terms of agency problems, the solutions proposed in both regions should share certain characteristics. Klaus J. Hopt notes:
In Continental European company laws, the primary principal-agent conflict is not so much the conflict between shareholders and the board of
directors, but rather the conflict between minority shareholders and the
majority shareholder. This reflects the different prevailing patterns of
stock ownership and control structures in the United States and Great
Britain on the one hand and, broadly speaking, in Continental European
states on the other.
See Hopt, supra note 7, at 1166.
143. Commenting on the several notions of corporate governance, Donald
Clarke notes the following regarding protection of minority shareholders:
This concept is concerned with issues of finance and agency cost and has
a policy component: the prevention of the exploitation of those who supply the money by those who control it. It centers on the relationship between stockholders, the board of directors, and senior management, and
in effect asks, with Schleifer and Vishny, ‘[H]ow can financiers be sure
that, once they sink their funds [into a firm], they get anything but a
worthless piece of paper back from the manager?’
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the Model Law contains provisions designed to counteract potential
abuse of rights. 144 This theory of abuse of rights has been widely
developed in foreign jurisdictions, particularly when dealing with
the exercise of voting rights by majority shareholders. 145 The institution of abuse of rights (abus de droit) has become an important
mechanism for protecting shareholders in close corporations in
countries adhering to the civil law tradition, which generally lack
the equity remedies present in the common law.
Article 42 of the Model Law states that “[s]hareholders shall exercise their voting rights in the interest of the simplified stock corporation.” 146 In this vein, when there is evidence of decisions rendered by a corporate body undertaken for the sole benefit of controlling shareholders, or aimed at purposes different from the corporate
interest, the affected parties may seek judicial redress. Motives that
constitute abuse of right may include inflicting harm or damages
upon other shareholders or the corporation, or unduly extracting private gains for personal benefit, among others.
The abuse of rights theory is applied to three different instances,
depending on the facts of the case: abuse of majority, abuse of minority and abuse of equal shareholdings (i.e., dual ownership on a
fifty-fifty distribution). By adopting these protection mechanisms,
the provisions of the Model Law introduce to Latin American Corporate Law the important developments on this field, spearheaded
by French courts. Barthélémy Mercadal has noted on this regard
that:
Voting rights may not be used in a discretionary manner.
Courts will often temper voting liberty through the application of the abuse of right doctrine. Thus, they will penalize
any and all decisions responding to an abusive exercise of
voting rights, i.e., those votes issued in contradiction to the
corporation and cast with the sole purpose of benefitting the
majority (or minority) shareholders to the detriment of their
See Clarke, supra note 18, at 79.
144. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 42.
145. In the United States, the language used is that of “oppression” instead of
abuse. See Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc. 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984).
146. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 42.
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counterparties. 147
The action for abuse-of-right provided under the Model Law
may result in damages and rescission of an abusive act.
H. Restructuring Transactions
The rules on restructuring transactions in the Model Law are
more flexible as compared to traditional corporate law prevailing in
the Latin American region. For instance, Article 33 of the model act
includes the so-called “short form merger.” This transaction may
take place within a corporate group and consists of a merger of a
subsidiary entity into its parent. In order for this transaction to proceed, it is necessary that the parent entity of the simplified corporation shall own at least 90 percent of the outstanding shares of its
subsidiary. In this event, the latter can be merged with the former,
after a decision taken by the directors or managers of both entities.
The short-form merger is an exception to the general rule whereby
the shareholders meeting is the only corporate body entitled to make
decisions regarding structural changes. 148
The Model Law also contains a specific provision concerning
the sale of all or substantially all assets of the corporation. 149 In this
type of transaction, the selling entity may receive either cash or
shares of the purchasing entity as consideration. The Model Law
defines it as the event where “a simplified stock corporation purports
to sell or convey assets and liabilities amounting to 60% or more of
its equity value . . . .” 150 In this event, the selling corporation does
not cease to exist immediately, as is the case in a merger transaction.
In fact, in order for it to be extinguished, it is necessary to wind up
the corporation through the distribution of its remaining assets. The
sale of all or substantially all assets, which obviously takes place

147. BARTHELEMY MERCADAL,
COMMERCIALES, 584 (Éditions Francis

MEMENTO PRATIQUE :
SOCIETES
Lefebvre 1995).
148. The short-form merger was first introduced by Anglo-American company
law. DEL. CODE ANN. (Delaware Code Annotated) tit. 8, § 253, contains the relevant provisions. For a detailed discussion, see REYES, supra note 10, at 132.
149. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 32.
150. Id.
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outside of the ordinary course of business, requires majority shareholder approval.
Additional provisions are included to protect the rights of minority shareholders in restructuring transactions of simplified corporations, including the applicability of dissenter rights and appraisal remedies under certain circumstances. 151
I. Dissolution and Winding Up
It is as important to consider the legal framework for the formalization of business entities, as the rules relating to their dissolution
and winding up. Therefore, it is useful to thoroughly regulate the
entire cycle of a business, so that it can be formalized at the outset
in accordance with up-to-date legal provisions and also be able to
close its operations and resolve all relations with creditors and shareholders at the end of such a cycle. This is particularly relevant in
light of the obvious fact that many of the business entities will not
be successful and therefore will need to close their operations and
resolve all outstanding legal situations before extinction. In that
sense, it is useful to provide a few suggested rules to govern its dissolution and liquidation.
The Model Law contains three articles devoted to the dissolution
and winding up of the simplified corporation. These rules are particularly useful for corporations that have gone out of business but
need not resort to an insolvency proceeding to close their operations
and resolve all situations with creditors and shareholders. This situation frequently takes place in MSMEs in cases in which the corporation’s liabilities do not exceed the value of available assets after
dissolution. In these situations, it is necessary for those responsible
for the business venture to provide publicity concerning the state of
liquidation, appoint liquidators, prepare inventories and other financial statements, sell corporate assets, pay liabilities according to legal priorities, and eventually return any remaining assets to the
shareholders.

151. Id. at art. 30.
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Article 34 of the Model Law contains the events of dissolution.
There is an attempt in the Model Law to simplify the processes of
dissolution and liquidation in order to make them expeditious, less
ritualistic, and more in tune with contemporary business needs. Dissolution for the simplified corporation will become effective as of
the date at which the shareholders’ decision to wind up the business
entity, or the acknowledgment of the relevant legal cause for dissolution, is filed before the commercial registry. There is no need for
further proceedings or decisions rendered by any third party. The
only exception to the above mentioned rule relates to such cases in
which the term of duration has elapsed (if expressly included by the
shareholders in the company’s by-laws). In this case, the corporation
will be dissolved automatically.
Furthermore, dissolution does not take place in events related
exclusively to the reduction of a minimum number of shareholders,
or the increase of shareholders above a predefined number. The absence of provisions setting forth plurality requirements or caps concerning the amount of shareholders effectively excludes any mandatory winding up events resulting from such circumstances.
Article 35 of the Model Law contains provisions aimed at curing
the events of dissolution. The inclusion of these methods responds
to the fact that, whenever materially possible, it is deemed to be less
costly to preserve the business, instead of allowing for its dissolution. Consequently, the Model Law establishes that dissolution
events may be cured by adopting any and all measures available to
that effect, provided that such measures are adopted within one year,
following the date in which the shareholders’ assembly acknowledged the cause of dissolution. 152 Furthermore, in order to incentivize the conversion of other business entities into simplified corporations, and with the aim of furthering corporate law beyond the present state of formalism, the Model Law contains an additional provision intended to avoid dissolution.153 In fact, whenever there is a

152.
153.

See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 35.
Id.
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business entity, organized under any form for which an event of dissolution consists of the reduction of the minimum number of shareholders, partners or members, such instance may be cured by conversion into a simplified corporation. Article 35 of the Model Law
mandates that in order for this event to take place, a unanimous decision must be rendered by the holders of all issued shares, or by the
will of the surviving shareholder, partner or member.
J. Dispute Resolution
According to comparative legal theory, the adoption or transplantation of substantive rules of a foreign origin may have a limited
impact on the receiving jurisdiction, if the transplanted rules are not
adequately accompanied by an effective institutional framework
aimed at facilitating their enforcement. 154 Consequently, the Model
Law contains provisions concerning dispute resolution mechanisms,
which are oriented towards the efficient application of the law in the
event of disputes among business parties.
The rules on this topic include the well-known methods of arbitration and mediation. The adoption of these mechanisms responds
to the frequent lack of expeditious judicial enforcement mechanisms
throughout the region. 155 The Model Law also contains an additional

154. See Mendoza, supra note 30:
The imposition of foreign rules without concern for local conditions (i.e.
demand for law, pre-existing political and social arrangements, institutional background) is usually a recipe for failed legal transplants. Under
this view, the principal effect of the program mentioned earlier was to
increase the disparity between the law in the books and the law in action
without significant improvements in the actual protection of outside investors.
Katharina Pistor further illustrates the point: “Without ensuring complementarities between the new law and preexisting legal institutions, harmonization may
distort rather than improve the domestic legal framework.” Katharina Pistor, The
Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP.
L. 98 (2002).
155. For example, under the Chilean law on simplified corporations, arbitration is mandatory in all instances. This effectively bars parties from taking disputes related to or under the simplified corporation, to state judges. See art. 441
CÓD. COM. (Chile), as modified by Law no. 20190, June 5, 2007. Although this
solution may seem drastic, it is merely a natural response to the dramatic situation
of judicial backwardness experienced throughout the region.
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dispute resolution system, which relates to the assignment of adjudication powers to specialized judicial or quasi-judicial courts. This
proposal is intended to counteract the general absence in Latin
America of specialized judicial tribunals in charge of commercial or
corporate law matters.
The Colombian experience in this regard is noteworthy. In this
jurisdiction, a short-term solution to the lack of specialized courts
has been the introduction of a quasi-judicial decision making body
within a governmental entity (i.e., Superintendence of Companies).
This type of court has been in place in that country during the last
five years. Such experiment has proven to be highly successful.
The technical quality of specialized corporate law judges has
been recognized as a crucial factor for the development of corporate
law. 156 It is obvious that having well trained, expert adjudicators results in better decisions. In the Colombian case, the Superintendence
has a higher level of technical qualification and, consequently, a better understanding of complex corporate issues, as compared to the
ordinary judges. Furthermore, the degree of predictability, legal certainty, and expeditiousness of this specialized court is much higher
than that of the regular judiciary. This point will be dealt with in
more detail in Section V below.
Article 39 of the Model Law also limits the possibility of appealing the first instance decisions rendered by this specialized tribunal.
This is an attempt to curtail the common practice of endlessly appealing processes to higher judicial instances. This will produce
greater legal certainty as litigating parties will avoid being subject
to protracted litigation. 157 The additional safeguards for litigants in
Latin America, such as appeals for the violation of due process can
be achieved through writs of constitutionality that are commonplace
in Latin America (amparo, tutela, and mandado de segurança).

156. See Enriques, supra note 84. See additionally REYES, supra note 10, at
147: “The underlying rationale for bypassing ordinary courts has to do with the
notion that cases should be heard by highly-qualified officials with specialized
technical and professional knowledge of corporate law.”
157. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 39.

2018]

OAS MODEL LAW

57

IV. EMPIRICAL DATA ON SIMPLIFIED CORPORATIONS IN COLOMBIA
As stated above, the OAS Model Law on simplified corporations
is altogether based upon the Colombian Law 1258 of 2008 by means
of which the SAS was introduced in that country. 158 The Colombian
simplified corporation has proven to be effective and useful for local
and foreign investors. The empirically tested effects of the
Colombian legislation provide a compelling argument which favors
the adoption of the Model Law. The Colombian simplified
corporation (SAS) has been in existence for almost a decade, with
an unprecedented success and an equally unparalleled impact in the
business community. 159 The OECD recently acknowledged the
positive effect of recent legal reforms in the country, including
legislation aimed at streamlining procedures for starting a business:
“Over the last decade Colombia has significantly improved its
regulatory environment by simplifying the process to start a
business, paying taxes, protecting investors and resolving
insolvency, as well as reducing entry costs and barriers to
entrepreneurs.” 160 Simplification procedures to start a business are,
to a large extent, a result of the adoption of the SAS’ enabling
regulation.
In simple terms, the Colombian SAS is by far the most successful business vehicle created in the country. Alongside the wide
recognition of its benefits by the local business community, reputed
legal scholars have acknowledged the success of this Colombian legal experiment: “[T]rue success stories may be mentioned from the

158. In its recommendations to the OAS on the proposed Model Act on Simplified Stock Corporations, Dr. David P. Stewart highlighted the fact that such
Model Law is based on the Colombian law from the outset. He said the following:
“At our March 2011 regular session, the Chair proposed that the Committee
should consider the topic of a ‘simplified stock corporation,’ with particular reference to the new law adopted by the Congress of the Republic of Colombia in
December 2008.” Stewart, supra note 16, at 1.
159. The Colombian reform is partly based on the French SAS (Société par
Actions Simplifiée), which was initially introduced in the mid 1990’s and has
been updated since. See, among many others, Conac, supra note 46.
160. Economic Survey of Colombia 2017, OECD, at https://perma.cc/V2MXMUHT.
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viewpoint of creation of new corporate structures. One of such instances is the introduction of the simplified joint stock corporation,
whose initial adoption by French Law, has been continued, by Colombian Law, with an even more positive response by business practice.” 161 Likewise, Professor Pierre Henri Conac has stated that: “Its
success has been so great that this type of entity has replaced all
other forms of business associations existing in the country.” 162
Since the introduction of the Colombian simplified corporation
in 2008, the country has experienced a certain degree of
“competition” among different types of business vehicles. 163 Over
the course of the years, the SAS phenomenon gave rise to a
reduction in the use of other corporate forms which existed prior to
its creation. The less sophisticated legal devices in pre-SAS
company law may even render the future use of traditional business
corporate entities unnecessary. 164 The SAS has received wide
recognition as the most convenient vehicle to conduct business,
given its simplified nature and the low level of transaction costs

161. Embid, supra note 74, at 48.
162. Conac, supra note 46, at 30.
163. Although Latin America has no competing market for corporate chartering due to the non-existing harmonization of private law, the EU has long since
benefited from such a process. Recently, describing the prevailing trends in Germany and the positive impact of importation of different models, it has been noted
that: “This situation [of competition for corporate chartering] has given rise to the
importation, into Germany, of numerous companies with a more flexible structure
than that of the GmbH, but with similar functions. Notably, the English company
limited by shares, known commonly as the Ltd.” Miguel Gimeno Ribes, Un modelo societario de éxito en el Derecho alemán, in SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES,
supra note 25, at 337.
164. It has been argued that:
The SAS has displaced all traditional business forms that existed during
the 1971 Colombian Commercial Code rule. Today these outdated forms
represent less than 4% of the total amount of business entities that file
articles of association before the country’s 52 Mercantile Registries. Not
surprisingly, the remaining 96,6% of the new incorporations corresponds
to the formation of new Simplified Corporations. This is probably due to
the formalistic nature of the previous regulation and the SAS’ reduced
transaction costs, simplified structure and contractual flexibility. Moreover, the new type of entity has sparked legal innovation and fostered
new business structures that were difficult to design in the recent past,
given the rigidities of the Commercial Code regulation.
Reyes, supra note 33, at 2.
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associated with its formation and operation. 165 This assertion is
evident in light of the exponential growth of the simplified
corporation in Colombia, during the last decade, as discussed below.
A. Number of SAS Created Since the Enactment of Law 1258 of
2008
The Colombian SAS Law 1258 was enacted on December 5,
2008. Within 25 days after such enactment, 160 of these entities had
been created, representing 7.42 percent of the total number of entities registered in December of such year. By the end of 2009, the
SAS was already the prevailing type of corporate entity being created in Colombia. As seen in the Table below, during January of that
year, 293 simplified corporations were formed, which corresponded
to 11 percent of the total amount of business entities created in that
month. By December of 2009, 1,551 SAS were incorporated. This
figure raised the percentage of the total amount of business entities
created in that month to 74.2 percent. As of December 2009, the
traditional business association forms in Colombia, i.e., the sociedad
anónima (regular corporation), the sociedad colectiva (general partnership), the sociedad en comandita (limited partnership), and the
sociedad de responsabilidad limitada (closely held corporation),
represented only 25.8 percent of the total business incorporated in
that period.
Table 4. Number of SAS Incorporated in 2009 166
Month
January

Number of SAS
incorporated
293

Percentage
out of total
11%

165. According to Albán, supra, note 25, at 174 n. 5, José Miguel Embid introduces the idea of a “simplification spectrum,” whereby different jurisdictions
may be placed according to the contractual freedom awarded to businesspersons.
In the words of José Miguel Embid, as cited by Jorge Oviedo Albán, Colombia
would be placed in the “maximum” freedom category “due to the wide reception
of contractual freedom, which has been introduced by the simplified model,
alongside the repertoire of traditional figures.”
166. Source: Confederación de Cámara de Comercio, CONFECÁMARAS, at
https://perma.cc/Y2ZC-WVB3.
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Month
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

Number of SAS
incorporated
629
1019
1184
1424
1544
2052
1773
2316
2183
1872
1551

[Vol. 11

Percentage
out of total
19,8%
33,8%
39,4%
47,6%
53,6%
59,4%
62,4%
66,5%
67,8%
70,2%
74,2%

In 2010 the number of SAS continued to rise. During that year,
more than 70 percent of the entities registered on a monthly basis
were of this type. This fact provides evidence as to the progressive
shrinking of traditional business forms predating SAS regulation.
Table 5. Number of SAS Created in 2010, and Percentage Out
of the Total Entities 167
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August

167. Id.

SAS entities
registered
2,422
3,091
3,364
2,817
2,879
3,069
2,923
3,448

Percentage
out of total
70%
71%
74%
74%
77%
79%
78%
81%
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Month
September
October
November
December

SAS entities
registered
3,734
3,414
3,275
2,935

61
Percentage
out of total
82%
83%
84%
82%

These data show the rapid adoption of the SAS, and suggest that
the Colombian business community was in dire need of a corporate
vehicle which was flexible enough to accommodate their needs.
B. Formalization and the SAS
A comparative measurement concerning the rate of formalization of business shows that the number of units formalized went
from 35,921 in 2009 to 48,084 in 2010. This data show an impressive 25.3 percent increase in the formalization of business entities in
a single year. It is evident that the flexibility afforded by the SAS
regulation is responsible for the significant number of businesses
that migrated from the informal sector to full formality. An increase
of more than one quarter in the number of formal incorporations is
an eloquent demonstration of the potential of SAS to improve the
business capacity of developing countries. As already explained,
formalization also improves compliance with labor and social security regulations, enhances publicity and transparency, and may increase the amount of taxes collected by the Government.
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Figure 6. Formalization of Business Units from 2009 to 2010 168

C. Dimension of Incorporated SAS
Aside from the impact of SAS on formalization, it is noteworthy
that this type of corporate vehicle is useful for all types of undertakings, both in terms of business activity and dimension. The Colombian SAS has not only been useful for thousands of MSMEs, but
also appropriate for large business undertakings. The data in Table
5 below show a substantial number of business ventures that have
chosen the SAS to carry out their economic activities. The broad
majority of MSMEs are created as simplified corporations.
Table 6. Newly Created Business Entities in Terms of Size169
Size

Employees

Micro
Small
Medium

1-10
11-50
51-200

Large

> 200

Total
Assets 170
< 501
501-5,000
5,00130,000
> 30,000

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

86,362
443
46

84,776
1,736
279

81,744
4,095
849

77,954
7,060
1,484

75,679
8,508
2,097

62,229
8,275
1,397

56,262
5,753
947

60,570
3,966
590

10

52

173

363

577

312

242

113

168. Id.
170. Calculated in Colombian minimum monthly wages (Salario mínimo legal
mensual vigente). One minimum monthly wage is equivalent to USD 251,728 (at
an exchange rate of COP 2,930 for USD 1).
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D. SAS Versus Traditional Business Associations
As already noted, the menu of traditional business entities existing before the SAS was not responsive to market needs. As a consequence, the new technology incorporated in the simplified corporation’s legislation has resulted in a significant migration to the more
suitable framework of the SAS. Figure 7 and Table 7 show the outstanding progress made by this company type vis-à-vis the previously existing ones. In less than a decade, the Colombian SAS has
come to represent almost the whole market share of new registered
entities, with 98 percent of businesses created as such by the end of
2016. Figure 7 evidences the rapid growth and superiority of the
SAS, while Table 7 presents detailed figures which show the actual
amount of registered entities for each year beginning in 2009.
Figure 7. Growing Market Share of SAS in Colombia 171
All other corporate forms

Colombian SAS

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

170. Calculated in Colombian minimum monthly wages (Salario mínimo legal
mensual vigente). One minimum monthly wage is equivalent to USD 251,728 (at
an exchange rate of COP 2,930 for USD 1).
171. See Confederación de Cámara de Comercio, supra note 166.
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Table 7. Detailed Market Share of SAS in Colombia 172

Year
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017175

Total Registered
Corporations 173
40,690
47,356
58,676
62,685
63,861
72,213
63,205
65,240
33,815

Total SAS
Percentage
Registered 174
21,809
54%
38,725
82%
53,713
92%
59,239
95%
60,975
95%
69,578
96%
61,315
97%
63,710
98%
33,139
98%

The success of the Colombian SAS can be attributed to this entity’s superior production technology. As it has already been stated,
its simple configuration allows for an easy adaptation to the businessperson’s specific needs. Colombian entrepreneurs quickly realized the potential present in the SAS as contained in its forward
looking legislation. Additionally, greater formalization of MSMEs
has been achieved due to the fact that transaction costs have been
reduced and the SAS law has allowed for a single shareholder to
incorporate as a separate and distinct legal entity.
Following the Colombian experience reflected in the data presented above, one can only expect that the widespread adoption of
the Model Law in other Latin American countries would likely produce similar effects. These results could arguably ensue, in spite of
the absence of a harmonized private law regime in this region.
172. Id.
173. This includes all types of business forms other than the SAS, namely: the
sociedad anonima (regular corporation), the sociedad colectiva (general partnership), the sociedad en comandita (limited partnership), and the sociedad de responsabilidad limitada (closely held corporation).
174. Including newly formed entities and corporations already in existence,
transformed into SAS.
175. Data between January 1st and May 31st, 2017.
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V. SPECIALIZED CORPORATE DISPUTES COURT
The Colombian experiment concerning the simplified corporation also included the creation of a specialized corporate law court
designed to be a sophisticated forum for the adjudication of corporate disputes. The longstanding experience of the Colombian Superintendence of Companies was a critical element in order for this new
jurisdiction to be implemented. 176
The Superintendence of Companies 177 has had limited and exceptional quasi-judicial powers since 1971. This entity is in charge
of a special adjudication mechanism which is in line with the principles of the 1991 Colombian Constitution. 178 Nevertheless, only by
2008 did the entity form a specialized corporate law court, which

176. In order to address the issue properly, it is necessary to review first the
legal and social conditions, which prompted the legislator to establish this mechanism:
Pursuant to comparative law analytical principles, it is advisable to study
the specific economic, social and political realities that underlie any
given institution. Failing to do so may result in misleading conclusions
vis-à-vis a particular legal reality. In the case of Latin American corporate law, such a reality is one of discrepancy between the law in the texts
and its actual application.
REYES, supra note 10, at 40.
177. The Colombian Superintendence of Companies is a governmental entity
entrusted with supervision and other faculties over companies in the country. In
the words of Robert Charles Means:
The Superintendencia [Superintendence] possesses a broad mandate to
supervise the creation and operation of Colombian non-financial corporations. The enactment of Law 58 of 1931 by which the Superintendence
was initially created was permeated by the idea of protection concerning
the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders from potential abuses
carried out in business corporations.
MEANS, supra note 88, at 283. The official comment written by the Congressmen
who prepared the draft legislation establishing the entity reads as follows: “The
disrespect of the corporate entity in our system is paradigmatic. We all have numerous examples taken from real life to prove that it is a threat against a person’s
equity to contribute assets to a corporation. This word is tantamount to loss, failure
and fraud.” See REYES, supra note 132, at 625.
178. The Colombian Commercial Code [C. COM], issued under Decree 410 of
1971, introduced the first quasi-judicial functions to the Superintendence of Companies in the sphere of insolvency proceedings. As these functions were consolidated with time, and the positive results secured the mechanism, the legislator
gradually increased the matters to be decided by the entity. Additionally, article
113 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution (CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE
COLOMBIA) mandates that the executive branch of government can undertake certain limited judicial functions of a non-criminal nature.
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was radically updated in 2012 under a new and more efficient framework model. This adjudicating body is entrusted with deciding over
a broad range of corporate disputes. 179
The technical prowess of the Superintendence of Companies,
with over 87 years of experience in the supervision of companies,
should also be noted. This track record ensures a deep understanding
of the corporate law issues which are brought before this forum:
[O]ne of the Superintendence’s major contributions to the
interstitial development of Colombian corporate law relates
to the ‘administrative jurisprudence’ that it has provided. In
fact, reported ‘precedents’, doctrinal opinions and no-action
letters form an impressive body of law that is permanently
used as a point of reference to elucidate the meaning of corporate law provisions. Such reporting of decisions and other
relevant materials supplies a large degree of predictability as
to the outcome of proceedings that are litigated before the
Superintendence. Robert Charles Means recognized this fact
when he asserted that the Superintendence’s ‘primary contribution to the development of Colombian corporate law has
been through its jurisprudence. 180
The Colombian experience demonstrates that, although not a
strictly orthodox solution, this dispute resolution mechanism by a
governmental entity, adequately responds to local problems with the
judiciary. First and foremost, among these problems is the pathological judicial delay, as evidenced in Figure 8 below, which shows that
Colombia ranks almost in last place when measuring the number of
days required to enforce a simple debt contract, far behind OECD
standards. Therefore, one of the primary objectives of conferring
quasi-judicial functions to an administrative agency has been to redress the judicial backlog in rendering decisions. As will be shown
below, one of the main aspects in which the specialized court stands
out concerns its expeditious handling of cases.

179. Originally, the law provided only for adjudicating disputes over SAS
companies, but gradually the legislature has extended the procedures to cover all
types of corporate vehicles.
180. Reyes, supra note 122, at 52.
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Figure 8. Number of Days Required to Enforce a Contract 181

A. Matters Brought to the Colombian Specialized Corporate Law
Court
Since the adoption of the SAS law in Colombia, the Superintendence of Companies has consolidated over time as a very relevant
Corporate Law court in Latin America. Law 1564 of 2012 by which
the Colombian Code of Civil Procedure was adopted, provides
broad adjudicating functions to the above mentioned Superintendence, regardless of the corporate form within which the dispute
arises (excluding financial entities under the surveillance of the Financial Superintendence). The substantive matters to be adjudicated
by the Superintendence of Companies are as follows 182:
1. Lifting the corporate veil;

181. OECD, supra note 13, at 73. The OECD study has noted that:
Companies regularly rely on the court system to enforce contracts or settle disputes. Lengthy and cumbersome procedures of dealing with courts
can substantially add to firms’ costs and reduce their productivity. Enforcing a standard debt contract takes much more time than in OECD
and EMEs . . . . [H]igher enforcement costs hamper firm productivity,
and this effect becomes particularly pronounced for young firms . . . .
Id.
182. As contained in CÓDIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL (Civil Procedure
Code) art. 24.5 [C.P.C]; articles 133, 136 and 148 of Law 446 of 1998; and articles
28, 29 and 43 of Law 1429 of 2010.
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2. Compliance with and specific performance of undertakings within a shareholders agreement;
3. Actions intended to set aside decisions rendered by corporate bodies (i.e., shareholders’ assemblies and boards
of directors);
4. Acknowledgement of situations resulting in nullification;
5. Appointment of experts;
6. Discrepancies over the occurrence of situations resulting
in dissolution;
7. Adjudication of intra-corporate conflicts;
8. Abuse of voting rights;
9. Liability of managers and directors; and
10. Opposition to corporate reactivation.
Some of these actions are entirely new for the Colombian legal
system, and thus constitute an innovation in terms of protection
mechanisms for businesspersons. As shown in Chart 1 below, it is
relevant to observe that from 2008 and 2011, the complaints filed
before this court related exclusively to four different issues ((i) appeals of previous corporate decisions; (ii) intra-corporate disputes;
(iii) actions to set aside resolutions of the shareholders meeting; and
(iv) requests for dissolution). Alternatively, as of 2012, the types of
legal disputes were significantly broadened to encompass additional
matters (including, inter alia, (i) processes for lifting the corporate
veil; (ii) the appointment of experts to provide appraisals of shares
of stock, and (iii) actions arising from the abuse of rights).
As an example of the above, causes of action for corporate abuse
were introduced by both the SAS’ law and by the procedural reforms
of 2012. The innovation present in the new protections awarded for
corporate abuse has dramatically increased legal certainty in Colombia, given the high degree of predictability and the introduction by
the new court of a precise language establishing the situations which
give rise to judicial remedies. This increased scope of matters that
are resolved at the specialized corporate court is starting to provide
credibility to the government’s ability to enforce substantive law
provisions contained in the legislation.
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Chart 1. Corporate Law Matters Brought Before Specialized
Court 183

B. Broad Access to the Specialized Court
The specialized court has made use of technology, ever since its
inception, in order to facilitate public access to justice. Colombia is
a highly centralized Republic, thus, parties located outside of the
main capitals could not seek judicial redress or enforcement of contracts in Corporate Law related matters. Since 2012, live internet
streaming has been used by the court to carry out proceedings with
the participation of litigants and businesspersons located in remote
regions of the country. As shown in Figure 9 below, almost half of
the lawsuits are currently filed electronically from locations away
from the country’s capital. This means that swift and effective justice is reaching areas where there was none before. The already analyzed trend which has taken place from 2012 to 2016 has not been
restricted to Bogotá. In fact, there is an increasing participation of
litigators from several different regions.
Additionally, the Superintendence of Companies has introduced
183. Source: SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SOCIEDADES, at https://perma.cc/V3PMLRE8.

70

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 11

an electronic submissions platform, which allows users to present
their briefs and get notified online, and facilitates communication
between the judge and the clerks. This mechanism means that all
proceedings may now be carried out electronically, without the need
for parties to travel to the country’s capital city in order to either
initiate action or defend themselves before the judge.
Figure 9. Percentage of Lawsuits Filed in Bogotá “vis-à-vis” other
Regions 184

C. Productivity and Performance of the Specialized Court
The performance of the specialized court is also noteworthy.
Figure 10 below presents the total number of lawsuits filed since
2012. The steady increase in the use of the court evidences the growing confidence that businesspersons and their advisors have in the
adjudication organism. In 2012, there was an average of only 4 lawsuits per month. This amount has since risen steadily up to 34 lawsuits per month by the end of 2016. This effectively means that from
2012 to 2016, the Superintendence of Companies has dealt with
1,227 corporate lawsuits.

184. Id.
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Figure 10. Corporate Law Related Lawsuits 2012-2016 185
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The growing confidence of businesspersons in the specialized
court, evidenced by the growing number of lawsuits brought, is very
likely due to the fact that the Superintendence has been able to benefit from the insights of corporate law expert judges, highly trained
clerks, and appropriate physical and technological facilities which
allow for an adequate adjudicating environment. This is added to the
experience and insight on corporate law matters gained by the Superintendence within its functions as the companies’ supervisor
agency.
Another key aspect of the specialized court is its ability to decide
cases expeditiously. In a country accustomed to protracted litigation,
endless formalities, and corruption in the judicial system, it is a great
achievement to have a jurisdiction in which these vices are absent.
The high quality of the decisions rendered by the specialized corporate court and the short time required to obtain a final judgment
speak eloquently for the great success of this legal experiment. Figure 11 below shows the efficient operation of the new jurisdiction in
terms of the average time employed by the court to render a final
185. Id.
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decision. This reduces the heavy burden of transaction costs for litigating parties. In 2011, before the introduction of the specialized
court, adjudication of such disputes lasted approximately 20 months.
However, after 2012, the specialized court has reduced this time period to an average of about six-months. This is the amount of time
effectively taken to decide the case, from the moment in which the
complaint is notified, until the final decision is rendered.
Figure 11. Duration of Proceedings in the Specialized Court
(months) 186

VI. CONCLUSION
The Model Law on simplified corporations for Latin America
constitutes a breakthrough on several levels. The initiative promotes
a harmonized legal framework tailor-made to the emerging economies of the region. The initiative’s primary objective is to generate
economic growth for the jurisdictions which adopt the model legislation by enabling businesspersons to incorporate with ease and migrate to the formal economy.

186. Id.
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The Model Law takes into consideration some of the prevailing
difficulties present in the different company laws and corrects them
by introducing a forward looking and simplified legal framework.
The Model Law’s provisions are also crafted to strike a balance between common law and civil law elements in order to find creative
and purposeful solutions. This characteristic establishes a useful
symbiosis which is based on the region’s specific characteristics and
thus caters to its particular development needs.
The Model Law also has a proven track record, based on the
success of the Colombian experience with the SAS. Consequently,
the initiative benefits from the real life experiment carried out during
almost a decade in one of the region’s jurisdictions. This ensures
that the solutions provided by the Model Law constitute a proven
formula for the advancement of the economies in transition.
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ABSTRACT
Quebec, the only province within Canada to follow the civil law
tradition, is an ideal microcosm for the study of unity and diversity
within legal orders. The question of whether Quebec’s civilian legal
tradition should be interpreted and applied so as to be in unity with
the common law or, rather, adhere to its own distinct legal culture
has pervaded doctrine and jurisprudence for over a century. Interestingly, the pendulum has swung widely. Quebec has seen moments
when the philosophy of the Supreme Court of Canada was one of
unification and harmonization of Quebec law with the common law
tradition, as well as moments when it advanced staunch diversity.
The situation today is more nuanced. Quebec’s civilian tradition
has undoubtedly survived as a distinct legal order within Canada
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due to legal interpretation but also interdisciplinary factors, including language and politics. Even within areas borrowed through legal transplantation from the common law, Quebec maintains a distinct civilian methodology and interpretation and the Supreme
Court has held that Canada’s legal traditions should continue to
evolve side by side, each maintaining its distinctive character. Diversity, however, has been recently tempered by a growth in comparative law as between Canada’s legal traditions. Increasingly, the
Supreme Court is looking to Quebec civil law in appeals from common law provinces and Quebec continues to look to the common law
in many areas. However, far from leading to unity, comparative law
in Canada has been used as a tool for information, education and,
most importantly, inspiration.
Keywords: comparative law, legal traditions, mixed jurisdictions,
judicial methodology
I. INTRODUCTION
Quebec, the only province within Canada to follow the civil law
tradition, is an ideal microcosm for the study of unity and diversity
within legal orders. Canada is a bijural country because of the presence of the French civil law tradition, which applies in private law
matters in Quebec, and the English common law tradition characteristic of the rest of Canada. 1 For over a century, jurists have debated
the status of the civil law tradition within the common law nation
and have questioned how, and sometimes whether, the two traditions can co-exist. This article will examine three general trends that
have emerged in response to this debate; three different ways to imagine the relationship between Quebec’s civilian tradition and the
broader Canadian common law legal system. These trends reflect
the philosophies of unification, diversification and, more recently,
of inspiration and cross-fertilization of ideas between these two traditions.

1. Canada has more than the two legal traditions of the civil and the common
law. In particular, it also has indigenous legal traditions. However, the focus of
this paper will be on the relationship between the civil and common law traditions.
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Over Canada’s 150-year history, the pendulum has swung
widely between unification and diversification. Towards the end of
the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court of Canada was largely
motivated by a philosophy of unification, which had the effect of
making Quebec civil law more compatible with the common law.2
However, by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century,
prominent Quebec jurists began to reject this approach and to advance instead a philosophy of staunch diversification emphasizing
the civilian tradition’s distinctiveness from the common law. 3 The
situation today is more nuanced. While Quebec’s civilian tradition
has undoubtedly survived as a distinct legal order within Canada,
the emphasis on diversity has recently been tempered by a growth
in comparative law between Canada’s legal traditions. In recent
years, we have seen the Supreme Court of Canada increasingly look
to Quebec civil law in appeals from common law provinces, and to
the common law in appeals from Quebec, embracing the concept of
learning from the other. 4 This does not, however, imply a return to
earlier attempts to harmonize or unify Canadian civil and common
law traditions. Rather, it represents an emergent trend, one of inspiration, in which courts use comparative law as a tool for information
and education, as a positive influence in the development of each
distinct legal tradition.
By focusing on these three trends, this article will examine the
dialectic and changing relationship between Quebec civil law and
2. David Howes, From Polyjurality to Monojurality: The Transformation of
Quebec Law, 1875-1929, 32 MCGILL L.J. 523, 526 (1986-1987). See also Charles
D. Gonthier, Some Comments on the Common Law and the Civil Law in Canada:
Influences, Parallel Developments and Borrowings, 21 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 323,
326 (1992-1993).
3. Sylvio Normand, Un thème dominant de la pensée juridique traditionnelle au Québec : La sauvegarde de l’intégrité du droit civil, 32 MCGILL L.J. 559,
564 (1986-1987).
4. This trend, while not as pronounced, can be found in lower court decisions as well. See, e.g., Opron Construction Co. v. Alberta (1994) 151 A.R. 241
(Can. Alta. Q.B.) (an Alberta common law case citing Quebec law on duty to
disclose) [hereinafter Opron Construction Co.]; and Churchill Falls (Labrador)
Corporation Ltd. v. Hydro-Québec, 2016 QCCA 1229 (Can. Que.) (a Quebec
Court of Appeal decision citing the common law on good faith).
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Canadian common law. Many protagonists have helped shape this
relationship, from the early Supreme Court justices Henri-Elzéar
Taschereau and Pierre-Basile Mignault, to Justice Louis LeBel, who
served on the same Court roughly one century later. Their voices are
crucial in understanding the philosophies they helped develop. Before examining these figures and these ideological movements,
however, it is important to explain Quebec’s position as a mixed
jurisdiction and the only Canadian province with a civilian legal tradition.
II. QUEBEC AND THE CANADIAN LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Quebec enjoys a unique legal position in Canada, which stems
from its history as having been a French colony before becoming a
British one. Quebec passed from French to British control after the
English conquest in the Battle of the Plains of Abraham in 1759,
affirmed by the Treaty of Paris of 1763. 5 However, a seminal moment in Canadian legal history occurred a decade later, in 1774,
when the British Parliament enacted the Quebec Act. 6 This Act was
aimed largely at appeasing the colony’s French-Canadian population by guaranteeing them the continued use of the French language,
the maintenance of their Catholic religion, and the application of
French law in private matters. Public law, however, remained governed by the English common law system. In this way, two legal
systems found their home in Quebec.
This bijurality was preserved in the British North America Act
(today, the Constitution Act), which established Canada as a Confederation in 1867. The Canadian Constitution divided powers between the federal and provincial governments, leaving provinces the

5. The Definitive Treaty of Peace and Friendship (The Treaty of Paris), Feb.
10, 1763, 15 R.A.T.F. 66.
6. The Quebec Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 83, § VII (U.K.).
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control over many areas of private law, such as contracts, extra-contractual responsibility (torts), property, successions, and procedure. 7
Accordingly, in Quebec, these aspects of private law continued to
be regulated by a codified civilian legal tradition. 8 Areas of law falling under federal jurisdiction, such as criminal law, banking, and
bankruptcy, became regulated uniformly by the federal government
under a common law framework. 9 As such, Quebec is a mixed jurisdiction that maintains its historically unique position within Canada as the only one of ten provinces and three territories to follow
both civilian and common law traditions.
Quebec is a mixed jurisdiction in other respects as well. As judicial institutions are uniform across Canada, Quebec courts, like
those of other provinces, are modeled on the English system and are
courts of inherent jurisdiction. 10 There is one final appellate court in
the country, the Supreme Court of Canada, which reviews all matters of Canadian law: private, public, provincial, federal, civil law
and common law. Three out of the nine Supreme Court judges must
come from Quebec. 11 Moreover, while Quebec judges apply substantive civil law to private matters, they are similar, in style, to their
common law counterparts in many ways. They are nominated from
the Bar as opposed to educated in an École de la Magistrature. Their
decisions are written in a similar manner to English common law
judgments in the sense that they are discursive and personalized, include dissents, and refer to precedent, although Quebec does not adhere to a formal system of stare decisis. 12 Finally, while procedural
7. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, §§ 92(13) to 92(14) (U.K.),
reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. II, No. 5 (Can.) [hereinafter Constitution Act,
1867].
8. Quebec has both a Civil Code, the first version of which came into force
in 1866, and a Code of Civil Procedure, which first came into effect in 1867.
9. See Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 7, §§ 91(15), 91(21), 91(26).
10. Hétu v. Notre-Dame-de-Lourdes (Municipalité de), 2005 QCCA 199, paras. 35-47 (Can. Que.); I.H. Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, 23
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 23, 23 (1970).
11. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, §§ 3, 6 (Can.).
12. Rosalie Jukier, Inside the Judicial Mind: Exploring Judicial Methodology
in the Mixed Legal System of Quebec, 6 J. COMP. L. 54, 59 (2011).
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law in Quebec is codified and thus in a civilian format, its content is
largely inspired by the common law adversarial process, as opposed
to the continental inquisitorial one, and it is focused on oral advocacy and driven by common law rules of evidence and procedure. 13
III. THE UNIFICATION MODEL
While the federal division of powers in the Constitution has allowed Quebec to maintain its civilian tradition in private law, it was
not always clear that this tradition would survive as an autonomous
legal order in an otherwise common law country. In the decades following Canada’s creation in 1867, there was a distinct trend on the
Supreme Court of Canada that favoured standardizing Canadian
law, accomplished largely by imposing common law solutions onto
Quebec civil law issues. 14 While this trend was based on a philosophy of harmonizing the law across Canada, it unfolded in a markedly
non-reciprocal way and ultimately became a project of making the
civil law compatible with the common law and not vice versa. Had
this trend continued, it is possible that the civilian tradition of Quebec would have lost its distinctive character entirely or, at the very
least, would not be the robust legal tradition it has become today.

13. Id. at 63. For example, Quebec procedure includes pre-trial discovery and
the class action, both quintessential common law elements of procedural law.
However, recent revisions to procedural law have significantly broadened judges’
powers of case management and have moved Quebec procedure somewhat closer
to a judge-centered model. See also Rosalie Jukier, The Impact of Legal Traditions on Quebec Procedural Law: Lessons from Quebec’s New Code of Civil Procedure, 93 CANADIAN BAR REV. 1 (2015).
14. See, e.g., Magann v. Auger (1901), 31 S.C.R. 186 (Can.) [hereinafter
Magann v. Auger]; Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Robinson (1887), 14 S.C.R. 105
(Can.) [hereinafter Canadian Pacific Ry. Co.]. Note that this case came before the
Supreme Court again in 1891, in Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Robinson,
[1891] 19 S.C.R. 292, and that this second decision was overturned by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in Robinson v. The Canadian Pacific Railway
(Canada), [1892] UKPC 37 (U.K.). The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
in the United Kingdom continued to review appeals from the Supreme Court of
Canada until 1949. The Canadian Pacific Railway decision referenced in this article is the one decided by the Supreme Court in 1887. See also Jean-Louis Baudouin, L’interprétation du Code Civil Québécois par la Cour Suprême du Canada, 53 CANADIAN BAR REV. 715 (1975).
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This philosophy of unification was prevalent in the “Taschereau
years” of the Canadian Supreme Court. Sir Henri-Elzéar Taschereau
was appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court in 1878, just three
years after its creation, and served until 1906, the last four of those
years as chief justice. Taschereau believed in standardizing and unifying the laws across Canada, and saw the Court as the instrument
of bringing the civil and common law in line with each other. 15
Taschereau argued in favour of unification for two reasons. First, he
thought it was illogical to have contradictory answers to the same
legal questions depending on the region of Canada in which a case
arose. For instance, in Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Robinson,
Taschereau, writing for the majority, interpreted an article of the
Civil Code of Lower Canada, the primary source for Quebec’s civil
law at the time, on the premise that it should be consistent with the
rest of Canadian law. 16 In that case, Taschereau held that it would
be contrary to the legislative intent behind the Civil Code that a
widow should be compensated in damages for her husband’s death
in Lower Canada (Quebec) when such compensation did not lie in
Upper Canada (Ontario). To interpret the article differently would
be to suggest that the legislator intended for such disparity whereas
Taschereau believed the intention was, instead, to “put the law in
both Provinces on the same footing.” 17 He reasoned that, “a statute
would not be held to mean one thing in England and another in Scotland. And so here, I take it, it cannot mean in Lower Canada what it
does not mean in Upper Canada, or give a larger remedy in one
Province than in the other.” 18 In short, he interpreted the codal article in such a way as to render it consistent with the common law
applicable in the rest of Canada.

15.
16.
17.
18.

Howes, supra note 2, at 525-526.
Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 14, at 124.
Id.
Id. at 125.
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The second reason behind Taschereau’s philosophy of unification was that he believed it preferable to base arguments and decisions on any legal source that provided reasonable guiding principles, rather than to adhere exclusively to the sources of a particular
legal tradition. He was open to looking beyond the Civil Code of
Lower Canada and to using alternative sources to inform his civil
law decisions including Roman law, sources from other countries
and, most particularly, common law precedent. 19 This approach is
visible in Magann v. Auger, a case concerning contract formation by
post. Here, Taschereau examined a multitude of sources including
the approach to the same legal problem in France, a variety of doctrinal writings, and the Civil Code. Ultimately, however, he based
his decision on common law precedent, concluding that, “we declare
the law to be in the Province of Quebec upon the same footing as it
stands in England, and in the rest of the Dominion.” 20 In so doing,
Taschereau indicated that sources like common law precedent could
be brought in and prioritized over sources from the civilian tradition
if they seemed more appropriate in any given situation. Unlike later
jurists, he did not see the civil law as a distinct tradition that should
be informed exclusively by its own particular sources. Rather, he
believed the use of any source could be valid if it brought about a
reasonable outcome. To Taschereau, that often meant a unified outcome across Canada.
In the decades following Justice Taschereau’s tenure on the
Court, many Quebec jurists voiced opposition to this unifying approach, arguing that it threatened and undermined the civil law tradition. Critics went so far as to argue that the civilian tradition might
cease to exist if the pattern were to continue. 21 A modern lens on
Taschereau’s approach, however, has shed a more positive light on
his philosophy. David Howes has characterized Taschereau’s willingness to look across traditions as a form of “polyjurality” and has
19. Howes, supra note 2, at 542.
20. Magann v. Auger, supra note 14, at 193.
21. Howes, supra note 2, at 551. Normand, supra note 3, at 578-579.
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lauded his attempt to develop pan-Canadian legal principles. 22 From
this vantage point, Taschereau sought “universally admitted rules of
law” by looking to every available legal source, rather than narrowing his vision and working within one tradition to the exclusion of
others. 23 Moreover, although Taschereau clearly favoured harmonization of Canadian law, he did not undertake this unification project
in a conscious attempt to undermine the civilian tradition. 24 While
he was not a militant protector of the civil law, he nonetheless considered elements of it in his decisions and, on occasion, attempted
to bring civilian principles into common law judgments. 25
However, regardless of Taschereau’s motives, unification was
not, in practice, a reciprocal process. The philosophy of harmonizing
the laws of Canada was frequently used to bring common law principles into civil law cases, but never actually resulted in bringing
civil law principles into common law ones. 26 Gaps in the civil law
were filled by importing common law ideas rather than by interpreting civilian sources, such as the Civil Code, or by looking to French
law, while the common law remained distinctive and was developed
with exclusive reference to its own sources and concepts. This unification philosophy left little autonomy for the application of a distinct civilian tradition, and the approach eventually gave rise to a
fear that the civil law was under threat of extinction. 27 Not surprisingly, this period was followed by one in which the pendulum swung
to the other extreme and jurists adopted an opposing diversification
22. Howes, supra note 2, at 525-527.
23. Id. at 525, 558.
24. For instance, in 1882, Taschereau wrote to the Prime Minister suggesting
that appeals from Quebec should only be heard by the Supreme Court in cases
touching on criminal, constitutional, and electoral matters, that is, that the Supreme Court should avoid judging private law cases from Quebec entirely. This
suggestion was based on the idea that a majority common-law court was not ideally suited to judge civilian cases. See JAMES G. SNELL & FREDERICK VAUGHAN,
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA: HISTORY OF THE INSTITUTION 30, 47 (U. of
Toronto Press 1985).
25. Id. at 130. See, e.g., Monaghan v. Horn (1882), 7 S.C.R. 409 (Can.)
(Taschereau, J., dissenting).
26. Baudouin, supra note 14, at 719.
27. Normand, supra note 3, at 578.
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approach, arguing that the civil law tradition was unique and distinct, and should not be informed by anything other than civilian
sources.
IV. THE DIVERSIFICATION MODEL
The movement away from the model of unification to one of diversification and legal autonomy for the civil law tradition is largely
attributable to Justice Pierre-Basile Mignault, who served on the Canadian Supreme Court from 1918 to 1929. Mignault fervently believed that the civil law was part of Quebec’s ancestral heritage and
had to be protected at all costs. 28 Worried about the survival of the
civilian tradition in Canada, Mignault emphasized the distinctiveness of the civil law and argued that it needed to be developed autonomously from common law influences in order to preserve its
identity, originality, and integrity. 29
In his decisions, Mignault emphasized the differences between
Quebec’s laws and those of the rest of Canada, focusing more on
what was unique about the civil law as opposed to Taschereau’s approach, which focused on what was universal and shared with the
common law. 30 Since the two systems were so distinct, Mignault
argued, using one to inform the other was unnecessary and would
only render each system less pure and coherent. The civil law, he
maintained, was an internally strong and fertile system and there
was thus no need to borrow concepts from the common law in order

28. Pierre-Basile Mignault, L’avenir de notre droit civil, 1 REVUE DU DROIT
104, 116 (1922).
29. See, e.g., The Mile End Milling Co. v. Peterborough Cereal Co., [1924]
S.C.R. 120 (Can.) [hereinafter The Mile End Milling Co.]; Colonial Real Estate
Co. v. La Communauté des Sœurs de la Charité de l'Hôpital Général de Montréal
(1918), 57 S.C.R. 585 (Can.) [hereinafter Colonial Real Estate Co.]; Magann v.
Auger, supra note 14, at 193; Mignault, supra note 28. Mignault was not the only
Supreme Court Justice who used this approach. Justice Brodeur, for instance,
serving on the Court from 1911 to 1923, was also “vigilant on behalf of the civillaw tradition” in his decisions. See SNELL & VAUGHAN, supra note 24, at 130.
30. Jean-Gabriel Castel, Le juge Mignault défenseur de l'intégrité du droit
civil québécois, 53 CANADIAN BAR REV. 544, 545-549 (1975).
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to answer civilian legal questions or develop principles. 31 Instead,
answers could be found within the civil law tradition, most notably,
in the Civil Code, which Mignault believed to be internally consistent and rational, as well as in doctrinal interpretations of codal
articles. 32
Mignault believed that it was not only unnecessary but, indeed,
undesirable to import common law principles into the civil law since
doing so weakened the civilian tradition as a whole. Transplanting
common law ideas into the civilian legal framework risked the introduction of concepts that conflicted with existing civil law rules,
causing contradictions and detracting from the system’s integrity,
making an otherwise rational system impure and illogical. 33 Moreover, he believed this endangered the tradition’s continued existence, warning that, “we should not forget the case of Louisiana.” 34
Mignault believed that Louisiana was losing its distinctive civilian
tradition and implied the same might happen in Quebec if this importation continued. As a result, Mignault was “of the opinion that
each system of law should be administered according to its own
rules and by reference to authorities or judgments which are binding

31. Pierre-Basile Mignault, Les rapports entre le droit civil et la common law
au Canada, spécialement dans la province de Québec, 11 REVUE DU DROIT 201,
205-206 (1932).
32. Castel, supra note 30, at 550-551. See also Regent Taxi & Transport Co.
v. La Congrégation des Petits Frères de Marie, [1929] S.C.R. 650 (Can.) [hereinafter Regent Taxi]; Mignault, supra note 31, at 204-205; Pierre-Basile Mignault,
Le Code civil de la Province de Québec et son interprétation, 1 U. TORONTO L.J.
104, 129-139 (1935).
33. Castel, supra note 30, at 546. See, e.g., The Mile End Milling Co., supra
note 29, at 129, where Mignault criticized the respondents’ lawyers for citing
common law authorities stating that, “it is not in this way that we will conserve
Quebec civil law in all its integrity” (author’s translation) (“Ce n'est pas ainsi que
l'on conservera dans toute son intégrité le droit civil dans la province de Québec.”).
34. Mignault, supra note 28, at 116 (“N'oublions pas le cas de la Louisiane.”)
(author’s translation). Mignault was writing at a time when others were expressing
similar concerns in Louisiana itself. In his article, Mignault based his opinion on
a letter he received from a lawyer in Louisiana who explained that the common
law was becoming increasingly influential within the state. See also, e.g., Gordon
Ireland, Louisiana's Legal System Reappraised, 11 TULSA L. REV. 585, 596
(1937).
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on it alone.” 35 The difference between Mignault’s and Taschereau’s
approach is evident in Mignault’s dissenting opinion in Regent Taxi,
a case that dealt with the same two articles of the Civil Code that
Taschereau had interpreted earlier in Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Robinson. 36 Where Taschereau’s interpretation was based on a philosophy of unifying different traditions, Mignault’s methodology
was completely different as it focused on reconciling the apparently
contradictory articles with one another, situating them within the rational framework of the Code. 37
Justice Mignault was not alone in this concern for the continued
viability of Quebec civil law. Sylvio Normand’s study on the editors
and authors of the Revue du Droit, a Quebec law journal published
from 1922 to 1939, indicates a similar apprehension among numerous Quebec jurists at the time. 38 One of the major themes discussed
in the Revue was the deep connection between Quebec’s heritage,
society, culture and its civil law tradition, and the sense that this tradition was under threat by common law influences. 39 Like Mignault,
participants in the Revue sought to protect Quebec’s civilian tradition by emphasizing its distinctiveness, discouraging the importation of common law principles, and developing legal concepts
through the exclusive use of civilian sources. David Howes has argued that this staunch diversity approach has its drawbacks since the
select use of such sources forces jurists into a narrow, text-focused
interpretation of the law and ignores the benefits of attaining global
consensus. 40 However, it is clear that this diversification trend dominated legal discourse in Quebec in the early twentieth century and
undoubtedly played a large role in preserving the heritage of the civil
law tradition in Canada.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Colonial Real Estate Co., supra note 29, at 603.
Regent Taxi, supra note 32; Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 14.
Regent Taxi, supra note 32, at 682-683.
Normand, supra note 3.
Id. at 562-564.
Howes, supra note 2, at 552-553.
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V. THE CONTEMPORARY POSITION
The unification trend of the Taschereau years and the diversification model that followed at the time of Mignault’s tenure on the
Supreme Court represent two opposing ends of the spectrum. However, neither movement is confined to one specific time in history
nor, indeed, to one jurist, and one can discern evidence of both
trends in Canada today.
The unification mentality, while largely replaced by one of diversification, can still be found in decisions rendered many decades
later, particularly in instances where the relevant legal concepts at
issue had been transplanted from the common law into the civil law.
For example, as recently as 1975, in a case emanating from Quebec
dealing with the remedy of specific performance, the Supreme Court
declared that, “the principles established in common law jurisdictions [must apply in Quebec] since this is a remedy taken from
them.” 41 Similarly, in a 2007 decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal dealing with judicial recusation, the Court condoned recourse
to Canadian and foreign precedent, even going so far as to state it
was incumbent to do so when Quebec law was silent on the subject,
on the ground that the principles in question in the common law
were similar to those in Quebec law. 42
Moreover, elements of the unification philosophy have recently
surfaced in cases where the Supreme Court has explicitly noted the
advantages of reconciling civil and common law principles. In a
very recent set of cases on appeal from Quebec, the Court has remarked that the “natural convergence in principles and outcomes

41. Trudel v. Clairol Inc. of Can., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 236, 246 (Can.). This is no
longer the interpretation given to the remedy of specific performance in Quebec
law. See Royal Bank of Canada v. Propriétés Cité Concordia Ltée, [1983] R.D.J.
524 (Can. Que. S.C.); Construction Belcourt Ltée v. Golden Griddle Pancake
House Ltd., [1988] R.J.Q. 716 (Can. Que. S.C.); Varnet Software Corp. v. Varnet
U.K. Ltd., [1994] R.J.Q. 2755, 2758 (Can. Que. C.A.).
42. Wightman v. Widdrington (Succession de), 2007 QCCA 1687, para. 58
(Can. Que.). See also Droit de la famille – 1559, [1993] R.J.Q. 625, para. 11 (Can.
Que. C.A.).
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[between the civil and common law] is generally desirable,” 43 and
that the approach it adopted in a particular case, “[had] the advantage of being compatible with the most recent developments in
the North American law . . . .” 44 In a parallel to Taschereau’s claim
regarding the consistency of damage awards across Canada in the
1887 case of Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Robinson, the Court, in
2013, has even noted the advantages of assessing compensation for
bodily harm on a similar scale in Quebec as in common law Canada
on the premise that it “should not vary greatly from one part of the
country to another.” 45
On the other hand, the diversification model has also endured
and continued to develop well after Justice Mignault’s time on the
Supreme Court. In 2014, the Supreme Court explicitly reaffirmed
this approach, writing that, “the common law and the civil law
[should] evolve side by side, while each maintains its distinctive
character.” 46 This model has even found a modern champion in Justice Louis LeBel, a judge of the Supreme Court from 2000 to 2014.
LeBel, like his forerunner, Mignault, continued to stress the importance of prioritizing civilian sources in civil law decisions, focusing particularly on the unique position of the Civil Code in Quebec law. Several of his judgments reaffirm that “the starting point is

43. Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SCC
55, para. 52 (Can.) [hereinafter Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc.].
44. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Val-Brillant v. Blouin, 2003 SCC 31,
para. 22 (Can.) [hereinafter Caisse populaire Desjardins de Val-Brillant].
45. Cinar Corporation v. Robinson, 2013 SCC 73, para. 85 (Can.); Canadian
Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 14.
46. Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21, para. 93
(Can.) [hereinafter Supreme Court Act, 2014]. This idea is also supported in the
Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, a statute aimed at making federal law
more compatible with the law of Quebec. The Act states:
Both the common law and the civil law are equally authoritative and recognized sources of the law of property and civil rights in Canada and,
unless otherwise provided by law, if in interpreting an enactment it is
necessary to refer to a province’s rules, principles or concepts forming
part of the law of property and civil rights, reference must be made to the
rules, principles and concepts in force in the province at the time the
enactment is being applied.
Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, S.C. 2001, c. 4, § 8.1 (Can.).
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not the common law but the Civil Code of Quebec, which is the
basic general law in Quebec, as provided for in the preliminary provision of the Civil Code,” 47 and that, “the Civil Code is the jus commune of Quebec.” 48
Like Mignault, LeBel has cautioned against the dangers of importing common law principles into the civilian tradition without a
careful consideration of how the principles in question would fit into
a civilian framework. 49 According to LeBel, “it would be extremely
unwise to import, holus bolus, legal concepts that were developed
in another system of law without first determining whether they are
compatible with the rules that apply to civil liability in Quebec.”50
He, too, believed that indiscriminate importation could cause contradictions and thus undermine the coherence of the civilian tradition. 51 Justice LeBel is not alone in expounding this idea. Caution
against wholesale importation of common law principles permeates
the discourse of civilian decisions penned by other Supreme Court
justices, as well as those rendered by lower courts in Quebec. 52

47. Gilles E. Néron Communication Marketing Inc. v. Chambre des notaires
du Québec, 2004 SCC 53, para. 56 (Can.) [hereinafter Gilles E. Néron].
48. Doré v. Verdun (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, para. 15 (Can.) [hereinafter
Doré v. Verdun].
49. Gilles E. Néron, supra note 47, para. 53 (“Courts should avoid needlessly
importing or applying common law rules in a matter which, subject to the principles of Charter law, is governed by the procedure, methods and principles of the
civil law.”).
50. Prud’homme v. Prud’homme, 2002 SCC 85, para. 54 (Can.).
51. Id. para. 58 and para. 63:
[T]he defence of qualified privilege cannot be incorporated in that form
into the civil law rules which are based on a presumption of good faith,
without disturbing the coherence of its application in the area of public
authority liability. . . . It is not only unjustified, but pointless, to import
that defence into the civil law.
52. For an example of a Supreme Court decision, see Farber v. Royal Trust
Co., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 846, para. 30 (Gonthier, J.) (Can.) (“Caution must be exercised in adopting unreservedly common-law concepts of contract into cases arising under the Civil law, except where there is useful necessity and authoritative
precedent.”); for an example of a lower court decision, see Anglo Pacific Group
PLC v. Ernst & Young, Inc., [2013] R.J.Q. 1264, para. 36 (Can. Que. C.A.) (“The
civil law is a complete system and one must guard against adopting principles that
come from foreign legal systems without questioning their compatibility with our
law.”).
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Despite evidence of both philosophies in contemporary Canadian jurisprudence, the predominant trend is that of diversity. Without question, the civilian tradition has not only survived but has enjoyed a “renewal of [its] distinct legal culture.” 53 Moreover, while
the efforts of jurists such as Mignault and LeBel have been crucial
in maintaining the distinctiveness of the civil law tradition, one cannot ignore the social and political factors that have also contributed
to this outcome.
One reason that Quebec civil law has continued to remain distinct is that the civilian tradition in Quebec is inextricably linked to
the French language. William Tetley has argued that the linguistic
separation of traditions is one of the most important factors in keeping legal traditions in mixed jurisdictions distinct. 54 At the very
least, a different language serves to ensure that jurists are aware of
a tradition’s distinctiveness and separation from the other applicable
tradition in the same jurisdiction. This linguistic separation is somewhat nuanced in Canada since both linguistic versions of the Civil
Code are equally official, as are both English and French versions
of Supreme Court decisions. 55 However, Quebec civil law is linguistically delineated from Canadian common law in the sense that the
former is typically associated with the French language and the latter
with English. 56 While most Quebec jurists are bilingual, law is prac-

53. John E.C. Brierley, The Renewal of Quebec’s Distinct Legal Culture: The
New Civil Code of Québec, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 484 (1992).
54. William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 676, 727-728 (2000).
55. Doré v. Verdun, supra note 48; Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 7, §
133 para. 2; Administration of the Court, SUPREME COURT OF CANADA,
https://perma.cc/LUV9-5JKH.
56. There are exceptions to this rule. McGill University in Quebec teaches
the Civil Law in English, while the University of Moncton in New Brunswick, as
well as the University of Ottawa in Ontario, teach the Common Law in French.
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ticed primarily in French in Quebec, and today the majority of judgments are rendered in French. 57 The bilingual nature of Quebec jurists also enables them to engage with civilian sources in either their
original French or English, particularly the French sources that inspired many principles in Quebec’s Civil Code. There exist, of
course, civil law jurisdictions in the world that are characterized by
the English language such as Scotland, Jersey, and Louisiana, where
even the Louisiana Civil Code is published in English only. 58 While
this is not fatal to the continued viability of these civilian traditions,
in addition to detracting from their linguistic distinctiveness, the reliance on translations of the tradition’s most important French
sources makes it more difficult to maintain their autonomy. 59
Legal education in mixed jurisdictions with a civil law presence
also plays an important role in preserving legal traditions and Quebec’s civilian tradition has remained distinct, in part, due to the legal
education offered in the province. 60 Jurists in Quebec must hold a
civil law degree, or its equivalent, in order to be eligible to write the
Quebec Bar exams and practice law in the province. Unlike some
57. This is only natural given that the majority of Quebeckers are francophone with 79.7% listing their mother tongue as French, and 87% of the population speaking French at home in 2011, see Statistics Canada, French and the francophonie in Canada—Language, 2011 Census of Population, 2 (2011),
https://perma.cc/4K55-7CVY.
58. There is, however, a recent translation of the Louisiana Civil Code making it available in French. See CODE CIVIL DE LOUISIANE ÉDITION BILINGUE (Olivier Moréteau ed., Société de législation comparée 2017). See also Olivier Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project: An Introduction, 5 J. CIV. L.
STUD. 97 (2012).
59. For example, in Jersey, jurists are predominantly Anglophone but frequently cite the works of the French author Pothier, often relying on a translated
edition. See Timothy V.R. Hanson, Comparative Law in Action: the Jersey Law
of Contract, 16 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 194, 202 (2005) (“French has become a
foreign language in the Channel Islands, thereby making a perusal of the old
French texts that bit more onerous . . . .”); The Jersey Law Commission, Report:
The Law of Contract, 6 (2004) (“[T]he majority of Jersey residents are insufficiently fluent in French to be able to consider the relevant case law and text books
. . . .”). See also Roger K. Ward, The French Language in Louisiana Law and
Legal Education: A Requiem, 57 LA. L. REV. 1284 (1997) for a discussion of this
phenomenon in Louisiana.
60. William Tetley, Nationalism in a Mixed Jurisdiction and the Importance
of Language (South Africa, Israel, and Quebec/Canada), 78 TULSA L. REV. 175,
189 (2003-2004).
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other mixed jurisdictions, such as Louisiana, all Quebec law faculties offer civil law degree programs, even if some offer the possibility of also obtaining a common law degree if students opt to pursue
additional studies. 61 At McGill University, all students graduate
with both civil law and common law degrees, and its program,
which is built on an integrated, or transsystemic, study of both civil
and common law, offers a solid grounding in both legal traditions. 62
A very important factor in the survival of the civil law as a distinct legal tradition is Quebec’s Civil Code itself. Its successful
modernization and recodification in 1991 has contributed greatly to
the stature of the civilian tradition. The Civil Code of Quebec is not
merely a modernization of the laws contained in the previous Code,
the Civil Code of Lower Canada, which had been in place since 1866
and which had grown less coherent over time with the addition of
updates and amendments. 63 The new Code also reflects a modernized and distinctive view of Quebec’s civilian tradition, visible in its
“substance, language and symbolism.” 64 Both its tone and content
offer an image of Quebec law that John Brierley has called “selfsufficient,” presenting Quebec’s law as entirely autonomous from
external influence. 65 Brierley maintains that for this reason, the

61. For example, the Université de Montréal in Quebec and the University of
Ottawa in Ontario offer their civil law students the possibility of completing an
extra year and obtaining a common law degree. This is in contrast to, for instance,
Louisiana, where students typically receive a common law education with some
civil law courses in the curriculum and the option of obtaining a certificate in civil
law. See Olivier Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, The Place of the Civil Code in
Louisiana and in the Legal Universe, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 31, 51 (2012).
62. See Yves-Marie Morissette, McGill’s Integrated Civil and Common Law
Program, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 12, (2002). See generally Navigating the Transsystemic, 50 MCGILL L.J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) (2005).
63. Sophie Morin, Quebec: First Impressions Can Be Misleading, in A
STUDY OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS: ENDANGERED, ENTRENCHED OR BLENDED
165, 171 (Susan Farran, Esin Örücü, & Seán Patrick Donlan eds., Ashgate Publ’g
2014).
64. Brierley, supra note 53, at 484.
65. Brierley argues that the Code presents this image by breaking explicit ties
to the origins of its provisions that were derived from, or inspired by, other traditions or legal systems. Id. at 498-499.

2018]

CANADA’S LEGAL TRADITIONS

93

Code is in fact an expression of “the philosophy of Quebec as a distinct society,” and a declaration of Quebec’s legal sovereignty over
itself. 66 This legal nationalism complements the political nationalism present in the province of Quebec and underscores its recognition, by the rest of Canada, as a distinct society. 67
The new Code’s preservation of the civil law as a distinct and
autonomous tradition is reinforced by the inclusion of a Preliminary
Provision that proclaims the Code to be “the jus commune” of Quebec law and “the foundation of all other laws.” 68 Brierley remarks
that the Preliminary Provision indicates that the Code is “a reservoir
of fundamental juridical precepts and essential legal values,” which
makes it a valuable source not because it derives its authority from
any external or antecedent legal source, but because it is inherently
valuable. 69
The Preliminary Provision’s declaration that the Code is the
“foundation of all other laws” and the “jus commune” of Quebec is
entirely consistent with the approach advocated by proponents of the
diversification model. 70 In the opinion of Louisiana scholar Olivier
66. Id. at 496, 502.
67. See Adrian Popovici, Libres propos sur la culture juridique québécoise
dans un monde qui rétrécit, 54 MCGILL L.J. 223 (2009); Roderick A. Macdonald,
Reconceiving the Symbols of Property: Universalities, Interests and Other Heresies, 39 MCGILL L.J. 761, 810 (1994); Patrice Garant, Code civil du Québec, Code
de procédure civile et société distincte, 37 CAHIERS DE DROIT 1141 (1996).
68. Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, Preliminary Provision (Can.):
The Civil Code of Québec, in harmony with the Charter of human rights
and freedoms and the general principles of law, governs persons, relations between persons, and property. The Civil Code comprises a body
of rules which, in all matters within the letter, spirit or object of its provisions, lays down the jus commune, expressly or by implication. In these
matters, the Code is the foundation of all other laws, although other laws
may complement the Code or make exceptions to it.
69. Brierley, supra note 53, at 500. See also H. Patrick Glenn, La Disposition
préliminaire du Code civil du Québec, le droit commun et les principes généraux
du droit, 46 CAHIERS DE DROIT 339 (2005).
70. See, e.g., Doré v. Verdun, supra note 48, paras. 15-16:
[T]he Civil Code is the jus commune of Quebec. Thus, unlike statute law
in the common law, the Civil Code is not a law of exception, and this
must be taken into account in interpreting it. It must be interpreted
broadly so as to favour its spirit over its letter and enable the purpose of
its provisions to be achieved. . . . [T]he Code is also the foundation of all
other laws dealing with matters to which the Code relates . . . .
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Moréteau, the Preliminary Provision has successfully “re-center[ed]
private law on the Civil Code” by reaffirming the Code’s primary
importance in the civilian tradition. 71 Moréteau views this approach
as all-important in a society in which there are numerous legal
sources that may compete with a code, and he has advocated for the
adoption of such a preliminary provision in other codes, specifically
Louisiana’s. 72
Finally, we cannot ignore the significance of the civilian judicial
presence on Canada’s final appellate court. With three of the nine
Supreme Court justices hailing from Quebec, “[t]he two legal traditions . . . continue to be living realities in the highest court of the
land.” 73 For all of these reasons, rather than being absorbed by the
common law as was once feared, the civilian tradition has continued
to thrive as a distinct and autonomous legal tradition in Canada.
VI. THE INSPIRATION MODEL
While the distinct nature of the civilian tradition is well accepted
today, we are currently witnessing a new trend, from one of staunch
diversification to one of inspiration. In recent years, we have begun
to see a greater willingness among judges to look to the other legal
tradition in their reasoning, with the result that comparative law between the two traditions has become a more important part of judicial methodology in Canada. Unlike the earlier unification model,
however, this trend is based on the premise that there is value in
looking across legal traditions, not to unify them but, rather, to borrow ideas from one to inform the other. The inspiration model is
perhaps most clearly articulated by Justice Stevenson as follows:
This Court has the benefit of being the final court of appeal
in a country that has two legal traditions: the English common law and the French civil law. Our two legal traditions
71. Moréteau, supra note 61, at 59.
72. Id.
73. Tetley, supra note 54, at 735. Tetley also notes the lack of any similar
tradition in the United States of having Louisiana judges on its Supreme Court.
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are independent and should not be confused. Concepts and
solutions found in one tradition should not be imposed on
the other tradition. But this does not mean that there is no
place for comparative law on this Court. 74
As this passage indicates, this new trend of inspiration maintains
the distinctiveness and integrity of the two legal traditions while, at
the same time, acknowledging the mutual influence they can have
on each other. It demonstrates that a comparative approach has the
potential to encourage the cross-fertilization of ideas between the
traditions while not detracting from the distinctive character of either. 75
There is, however, a legitimate concern that this use of comparative law may, in fact, cause a reversion to the nineteenth century
trend of unification, with all the potential dangers to the civilian tradition that this trend presented at the time. 76 While one must
acknowledge this as a serious potential danger, the inspiration trend
can, nonetheless, be seen as a positive movement provided it does
not repeat the mistakes of unification and builds upon the principles
developed by jurists who have insisted on the importance of diversification over the past century. An examination of recent cases
demonstrates that there are three major reasons these dangers are
indeed being mitigated.

74. Canadian National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., [1992]
1 S.C.R. 1021, 1174 (Can.). See also Louis LeBel & Pierre-Louis Le Saunier,
L’interaction du droit civil et de la common law à la Cour suprême du Canada,
47 CAHIERS DE DROIT 179 (2006).
75. In White v. Central Trust Co. (1984), 7 D.L.R. 236, para. 27 (Can.), Supreme Court Justice LaForest J., as he then was, spoke of the judicial use of comparative law as a way to achieve “cross-fertilization.” This passage is cited in a
discussion of the growing use of comparative law in the Supreme Court of Canada
by another Supreme Court Justice, Gonthier J., see Gonthier, supra note 2, at 21.
76. Daniel Gardner, L'harmonisation des solutions en droit privé canadien :
regard sur quelques arrêts de la Cour suprême portant sur le droit civil at the 15e
Conférence Roger-Comtois at l’Université de Montréal, Montreal, Quebec (Apr.
27, 2017).
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A. The Use of “Caution” in Cross-Fertilization
Judges who look to the common law to inspire their civil law
decisions have insisted on using caution in this approach and have
established limitations on the application of the common law in
Quebec cases. First, there is a methodological limitation pursuant to
which judges acknowledge that civilian sources and methodology
are to be prioritized. 77 Secondly, there is a recognition that any residual role played by the common law will not apply where it would
contradict civil law sources, particularly the Code and the Quebec
Charter. 78 Finally, there is a translational limitation because today,
Quebec judges are mindful of the need to adapt or translate borrowed common law principles to fit within the particular context and
contours of Quebec civil law. 79 As a result, contemporary judges
have demonstrated that the common law can provide inspiration in
civilian cases when appropriate and when done in a manner consistent with the civil law tradition.
This cautious use of inspiration is evident in many judgments
written by Justice LeBel who, as previously explained, was an advocate of the diversification approach. However, notwithstanding
his general philosophy of prioritizing the civilian legal tradition, he
recognized the potential usefulness of looking to the common law.
As he stated in the 2010 Supreme Court decision of Globe and Mail,
“if the ultimate source of a legal rule is the common law, then it
would be only logical to resort to the common law, in the process of
interpreting and articulating that same rule in the civil law.” 80 He
therefore found it acceptable to look to a common law doctrine to
provide a framework for creating a journalist source privilege in
Quebec. He did likewise in Union Carbide by using the common

77. Lac d’Amiante du Québec Ltée v. 2858-0702 Québec Inc., [2001] 2
S.C.R. 743, paras. 37, 39 (Can.).
78. Globe and Mail v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 41, para. 45
(Can.) [hereinafter Globe and Mail].
79. Baudouin, supra note 14, at 731.
80. Globe and Mail, supra note 78, para. 45.
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law as inspiration for the creation of a settlement privilege in Quebec civil law. 81 In both these cases, Justice LeBel looked to the common law to fill lacunae in Quebec law. This does not, however, indicate an endorsement of the wholesale importation of common law
principles since, as LeBel pointed out, “this [common law inspiration] is, of course, premised on the fact that the interpretation and
articulation of such a rule would not otherwise be contrary to the
overarching principles set out in the C.C.Q. and the Quebec Charter.” 82 Similarly, in a 2014 decision, LeBel examined the commonality requirement in class action authorizations in common law
cases, noting that the understanding of this common law framework
was helpful in order “to clarify the relevance and scope of the principles in question in the context of Quebec procedural law,” but
stressed that “caution must be exercised.” 83 This approach is not
limited to the Supreme Court, nor to Justice LeBel. In a recent Quebec Court of Appeal decision, for example, Justice Dutil noted that
even though a common law decision may not have any legal force
in the civilian tradition, its spirit may be applicable in Quebec civil
law as long as judges look to it with caution. 84
Even in cases where the Court has expressly emphasized the desirability of harmonization between the legal traditions, it is careful
to ensure that its judgments are consistent with civilian sources. For

81. Union Carbide Can. Inc. v. Bombardier Inc., [2014] 1 S.C.R. 800, paras.
27-37 (Can.).
82. Globe and Mail, supra note 78, para. 45.
83. Vivendi Can. Inc. v. Dell’Aniello, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 3, para. 48 (Can.).
84. P.L. v. J.L., 2011 QCCA 1233, para. 36 (Can. Que.) (drawing inspiration
from the Supreme Court case M.(K.) v. M.(H.), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6, which established flexibility in the start date of prescription for incest cases in common law
jurisdictions) (as followed in Tremblay v. Lavoie, 2014 QCCS 3185, (Can. Que.)).
See also Struthers v. Régie des marchés agricoles et alimentaires du Québec, 2015
QCCS 5992, paras. 70-71 (Can. Que.) (where the Quebec Superior Court cites the
common law Supreme Court decision of Hyrniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, which
had interpreted the parameters of the motion for summary judgment, even though
that particular procedure is not available in Quebec. Nonetheless, the Court drew
inspiration from that case, justifying its decision to dismiss by citing the common
principle of proportionality in procedure as the basis of its decision).
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example, in the recent Jean Coutu decision, which concerned a request by contracting parties to have the court rectify their agreement,
the Supreme Court looked to the common law’s equitable doctrine
of rectification and declared that the harmonization of laws between
common law Canada and Quebec was “generally desirable.”85
Nonetheless, the decision itself, which refused rectification, is based
on an analysis of articles dealing with the interpretation of contracts
found in the Civil Code of Quebec and refers to a prior interpretation
of these codal articles in an earlier Supreme Court case from Quebec. 86 Similarly, in Caisse Populaire Desjardins de Val-Brillant v.
Blouin, a decision dealing with security on property, the Supreme
Court noted that the decision had the benefit of “fostering a degree
of uniformity in this area, one that is crucial to the conduct of numerous business activities, while remaining faithful to the letter and
spirit of the Civil Code of Québec and the civil law origins of the
concept of pledge.” 87 These cases indicate that while the Court has,
of late, been willing to praise harmonization as a beneficial outcome
or consequence of certain rulings, it continues to look first and foremost to the civilian tradition’s sources and seeks to avoid importing
ideas that would be contrary to the civilian tradition.
B. Divergence Where Appropriate
While the courts have been willing to use the spirit of the common law to inform civilian cases in certain circumstances, it is important to note that they have also refused to do so in situations
where a divergent result was necessary to maintain the distinctive
character of Quebec law and culture. This idea was expressly invoked in the Supreme Court Reference, in which the Court’s interpretation given to the statute governing the appointment of Supreme
Court justices resulted in different rules for the appointment of
85. Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc., supra note 43, para. 52.
86. Id. para. 25.
87. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Val-Brillant, supra note 44, para. 24 (emphasis added).
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judges from Quebec. In particular, the resulting interpretation meant
that while a judge of the Federal Court of Canada could be appointed
to fill one of the six non-Quebec seats on the Supreme Court, such
judge could not be appointed to fill one of the three Quebec seats.
The majority of the Supreme Court justified this difference by explaining that the wording of the statute was due to a historical compromise intended to “guarantee that a significant proportion of the
judges would be drawn from institutions linked to Quebec civil law
and culture,” and that the law must remain as such since, “the objective of ensuring representation from Quebec’s distinct juridical tradition remains no less compelling today.” 88
The same attitude towards the province’s distinct history and
culture was expressed in a 2013 case dealing with the constitutionality of certain aspects of Quebec’s marriage laws, in particular,
those governing spousal support and division of family assets for de
facto spouses. A de facto spouse challenged these provisions alleging that they contravened the equality provision in the Charter of
Human Rights and Freedoms because in Quebec, de facto spouses
were not entitled to claim spousal support or a division of family
assets, whereas their married counterparts in Quebec, and fellow de
facto spouses elsewhere in Canada, were so entitled. Here, Justice
LeBel provided a lengthy analysis of the historical and cultural
backdrop to marriage laws in the province stating that, “the entire
history of societal and legal changes that have led to the de facto
union becoming an accepted form of conjugality in Quebec . . . is
essential if we are to understand the constitutional issue before us
and consider it in its context.” 89 Chief Justice McLachlin, who also
endorsed the constitutionality of these laws, argued that while they
were vastly divergent from the laws in other provinces, they were
88. Supreme Court Act, 2014, supra note 46, para. 93.
89. Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, 2013 SCC 5, para. 262 (Can.). In upholding the constitutionality of these laws, Justice LeBel wrote on behalf of four
of the nine Supreme Court justices. Chief Justice McLachlin wrote a decision
concurring in the result and thus, this outcome was endorsed by the majority of
the Supreme Court.
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part of a “policy goal [that] is important to Quebec,” stating that “the
fact that Quebec has chosen a different policy than other provinces
in keeping with its own history and social values does not make the
law unconstitutional.” 90
These cases indicate both an awareness of Quebec’s legal and
historical distinctiveness and a conscious desire not to undermine it,
even if this results in a significant difference between Quebec law
and the law in the rest of Canada. Thus, even while the Court moves
towards a greater use of comparative law, and even lauds the harmonization of law across Canada, it remains resistant to such approaches in situations where the distinctiveness of Quebec’s legal
situation is at the core of the issue in question.
C. Reciprocity in Cross-Fertilization of Ideas
Perhaps one of the clearest signs that a new trend is emerging is
that we are now seeing reciprocity in the use of comparative law.
There are an increasing number of common law decisions that make
reference to, and are inspired by, Quebec civil law. The Supreme
Court failed to use the civil law as inspiration in common law decisions even once during the nineteenth century unification period. 91
This is in contrast to today’s inspiration trend, which is a bilateral
movement where the traditions serve as mutual influences on each
other rather than as a tool to impose one tradition on the other. Two
recent Supreme Court decisions are notable examples of this. In a
2012 decision on appeal from the common law province of Ontario,
the Court sought to clarify the “real and substantial connection” test
for determining court jurisdiction in the private international law
context. Justice LeBel, writing for the Court, rejected wide judicial
discretion in favour of the creation of an appropriate framework to
establish such connection based on “a set of relevant presumptive

90. Id. para. 415.
91. Baudouin, supra note 14, at 719.
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connecting factors,” an approach that mirrored the regime established in the Civil Code of Quebec. 92 In order to develop this new
approach, LeBel relied heavily on codal articles and discussed their
interpretation in Quebec case law throughout the decision. 93 This
examination of the civil law clearly inspired the development of a
new approach applicable in a common law jurisdiction.
The second notable example is the 2014 case of Bhasin v.
Hrynew, a decision that expanded the principle of good faith in contract performance in Canadian common law, elevating it to the status
of a general organizing principle. 94 While the robustness of the common law duty of good faith created by the Supreme Court falls short
of its broad and encompassing counterpart that has been developed
in Quebec law, the decision is noteworthy given the historic reluctance of the common law to recognize such a duty at all. In creating
what Justice Cromwell called an “incremental advance” 95 in this
area of law, he found “comfort” 96 in the Quebec experience, where
a legally imposed duty of good faith has not “impeded contractual
activity or contractual stability.” 97
One finds common law cases relying on the civil law for inspiration in lower court decisions as well. For example, the reasoning
in Opron Construction Co. v. Alberta, a first instance decision from
the common law province of Alberta, drew heavily on an earlier Supreme Court decision emanating from Quebec, Bank of Montreal v.
Bail Ltée. 98 The Bail decision had been based on the civilian principle of good faith in the formation of contracts, which creates a precontractual duty of disclosure, a principle that does not explicitly
exist in the common law. Nonetheless, the Alberta court found that

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, para. 78 (Can.).
E.g., id. paras. 107-108.
Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 (Can.).
Id. para. 29.
Id. para. 82.
Id. para. 85.
Opron Construction Co., supra note 4, paras. 536-547.
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there had been a failure to make adequate disclosure in the defendant’s invitation to tender and that this failure amounted to misrepresentation. It justified its use of the civilian decision as inspiration by
pointing to the behaviour of the Supreme Court itself, noting that the
Court “has recently emphasized the benefits of a comparative law
approach between the two legal systems in Canada.” 99 The Alberta
Court found that the examination of the civilian case, the history of
good faith in Quebec, and the articles of the Civil Code were informative since, “while the [Bail] decision is based upon the Civil
Code of Lower Canada, its reasoning finds common ground in the
common law.” 100
Common law cases relying on the civil law for inspiration are
not as prevalent as those where the inspiration moves in the other
direction. One reason is that the majority of Quebec civilian decisions, at the first instance and appellate levels, are drafted in French,
making them less accessible to common law jurists from other regions of the country who may be less comfortable with French decisions than are their Quebec counterparts with decisions drafted by
common law judges in English. The exception to this is Supreme
Court decisions, which are published simultaneously in both official
languages, and therefore it is not surprising that most of the civilian
decisions being relied upon by common law judges are those from
the Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, we are witnessing an increasing willingness on the
part of common law judges to reach out to the civil law for inspiration. Moreover, in cases where this is done, the common law courts
do not simply adopt the approach taken in the civil law. Rather than
transplanting the civilian principles in their entirety into common
law decisions, the courts use these principles as sources of inspiration that help “nourish the [applicable] common law principles.” 101

99. Id.
100. Id. para. 537.
101. Id. para. 598.
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This represents a parallel with the civilian cases that use the common law for inspiration, indicating that jurists in both traditions feel
there is educational value in looking across traditions, while acknowledging that each tradition should, ultimately, remain governed
by its own framework.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented three major trends that exemplify the
interrelationship between Quebec civil law and Canadian common
law. The initial trend of unification of the late nineteenth century
had the benefit of creating consistency in the laws across the country, but it carried a serious risk of emasculating the Quebec civilian
tradition. The opposite trend of diversification that emerged in the
early twentieth century had the advantage of preserving and protecting the autonomy of the civilian legal tradition, but carried with it
the risk of creating a narrow-minded and parochial vision of legal
interpretation and development.
The new inspiration trend, identified in this paper, also has advantages and risks. Its polyjural approach has the benefit of creating
a rich cross-fertilization of ideas through the “encounter between legal traditions” 102 and “horizontal transjudicial communication.”103
This has allowed both traditions to borrow and learn from the other
in order to shape new legal principles. Of course, while we may recognize the positive effects of such an enlightened approach to judicial methodology, we must always be alert to the risk of reverting
back to the philosophy of unification. But as long as jurists are attuned to this risk, and due regard is paid to maintaining the distinctiveness and integrity of Canada’s civil and common law traditions,
a sophisticated and careful comparative approach can yield positive

102. Nicholas Kasirer, Legal Education as Métissage, 78 TULSA L. REV. 481,
482 (2003).
103. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29
U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 104 (1994).
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results through the mutual influence that legal traditions may have
on each other.
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ABSTRACT
The proper method for translating Spanish and Portuguese civil
law concepts into English was a topic of debate among civil law
scholars and comparatists at the turn of the last century. This article
examines the translation approaches of three Americans (Clifford
Walton, F.L. Joannini, and Joseph Wheless) who independently
translated the Spanish, Colombian, Argentine, and Brazilian Civil
Codes during the period 1899-1920. Specifically, Walton’s (1899)
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Spanish Civil Code translation’s use of common law English is contrasted with Joannini’s Colombian (1905) and Argentine (1917)
Civil Codes translations’ preference for a “civilian” legal lexicon,
including substantial borrowing from the special civil law English
vocabulary of the Louisiana Civil Code.
Joannini’s as well as Wheless’s use of civilian terminology received mixed reviews in law journals. Disagreement among comparatists about the translators’ methods is explored below and
placed within the context of contemporary English-speaking scholarly paradigms of civil law-common law difference, including attitudes to civilian terminology. The article concludes with observations about the role of intellectual history and political crosscurrents—especially the creation of new mixed legal systems during the
19th and early 20th centuries—in shaping English and American
attitudes to the civil law tradition in general and to legal translation
in particular.
Keywords: legal translation, civil code, Spanish civil law, Spanish
craze
I. INTRODUCTION
The translation of civil law terms and concepts into English is
an inherently comparatist activity with challenges that are well-recognized by civil law scholars and legal translators. 1 These challenges were particularly apparent during the first quarter of the 20th
1. See H.C. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
COMPARATIVE METHOD OF LEGAL STUDY & RESEARCH 117-18 (2d ed., Cambridge U. Press 1949) (“The greatest strain [in legal translation] is naturally experienced by a lawyer who passes from a legal language of the Continent of Europe,
founded to a large extent on the phraseology of Roman law, to the curious and for
the most part unscientific terminology of Anglo-American law.”); Edgardo Rotman, The Inherent Problems of Legal Translation: Theoretical Aspects, 6 IND.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 187, 189 (1995) (“To translate a text from the language
of a civil law country to the language of another civil law country is generally less
complicated than to translate the same text to the language of a common law country.”); see also Olivier Moréteau, Les frontières de la langue et du droit : vers une
méthodologie de la traduction juridique, 61 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
COMPARÉ 695, 706-09 (2009) (describing various problems of translation in comparative law, particularly translations across the civil law-common law divide);
Alain Levasseur & Vicenç Feliú, The English Fox in the Louisiana Civil Law
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century, as the U.S. War Department and the new Comparative Law
Bureau sponsored the publication of multiple Spanish-English civil
code translations for use in the country’s new mixed legal systems
or for comparative study of South American law. Perhaps the most
noteworthy Spanish-English civil code translation of the period was
F.L. Joannini’s Colombian Civil Code, which he translated for the
Panama Canal Zone’s de facto government, the Isthmian Canal
Commission, in 1905.2 Tasked with translating Colombian civil law
terms and concepts into English for the use of Zone officials and
territorial judges, Joannini relied heavily on civilian vocabularies,
including the special legal lexicon of the Louisiana Civil Code, rather than the legal English of the common law. As a result, Louisiana
civil law terms such as acquets and gains, lesion beyond moiety, and
benefit of discussion all made their unexpected lexical debut on the
Isthmus of Panama. 3
Not every translator of the period was so sensitive to civilian
terminology. When Clifford Walton translated the Spanish Civil
Code for the War Department’s use in Cuba in 1899, the U.S. Army
lawyer largely embraced common law terminology to render civil
law concepts into English. Thus, in Walton’s translation, trespass,
fee simple, and easement are used while civil law terms are uncommon. 4 Joannini’s special emphasis on civilian English was therefore
far from being the universal practice at the turn of the last century.
Joannini nevertheless favored civil law English vocabularies in a

Chausse-Trappe: Civil Law Concepts in the English Language; Comparatists Beware!, 69 LA. L. REV. 715, 735 (2009) (stating that translation of French civil law
terms into legal English inherently obscures “the original and only authentic understanding” of the civilian concept being translated).
2. See THE CIVIL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA AND AMENDATORY
LAWS CONTINUED IN FORCE IN THE CANAL ZONE… (Frank L. Joannini trans.,
Isthmian Canal Commission 1905) [hereinafter, Col. Civ. C.]. As Joannini translated directly from the Colombian Civil Code of 1887, this article refers to his
translation as the Colombian (rather than Panamanian) code.
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. See infra Part II.A.
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subsequent translation of the Argentine Civil Code of 1871 (published by the Bureau in 1917), 5 as did another American, Joseph
Wheless, in his translation of the Brazilian Civil Code of 1916 (completed in 1920). 6 Joannini’s Colombian Civil Code translation remained a primary source of private law in the Canal Zone until its
repeal in 1933, while both Joannini’s and Wheless’s translations of
the Argentine and Brazilian Civil Codes remained the principal English translations well into the 20th century. 7
While Walton’s translation largely escaped criticism, Joannini’s
and Wheless’s preference for civilian vocabularies received mixed
reviews in law journals, with some legal scholars arguing that their
method of translation preserved unnecessary distinctions of terminology between legal systems. 8 Such criticism likely reflected
widely held beliefs among late 19th and early 20th centuries civil
law scholars and comparatists, who tended to emphasize the similarity of the world’s two great legal traditions, the civil law and the
common law. Indeed, many contemporary scholars argued that the
two traditions were growing increasingly alike and that remaining
differences were primarily distinctions of procedure and terminology, rather than substance. Moreover, the creation of new mixed legal systems vindicated predictions of global convergence as American colonial judges in Puerto Rico and the Philippines boasted that
the two traditions were blending in their courtrooms without incident, and Pan-Americanism’s emphasis on uniform legislation for
5. See infra Part II.C.
6. See infra Part II.D.
7. See John O. Collins, Canal Zone Changes to Common Law System, 20
A.B.A. J. 233 (1934) (discussing repeal of Colombian Civil Code in Zone);
Charles Szladits, Notes on Translations of Foreign Civil and Commercial Codes,
3 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 70 & nn.29-33 (1954) (listing Joannini & Wheless as primary English translations available); Ricardo J. Navarro, A Bibliography of Latin
American Law: Primary and Secondary Sources in English, 19 TEX. INT’L L.J.
133, 140-41 (1984) (same listing thirty years later).
8. Layton B. Register, The Argentine Civil Code Together with Constitution
and Law of Civil Registry, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 180, 182 (1918) (book review); E.G.
Lorenzen, The Civil Code of Brazil, 30 YALE L.J. 652, 652 (1921) (book review);
Max Radin, The Civil Code of Brazil, 9 CAL. L. REV. 443, 444 (1921) (book review).
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the Americas likewise created ideological incentives for overcoming civil law-common law difference with technical (i.e., comparative) solutions.9 In this context, Joannini’s creative translation approach, sensitive as it was to civil law-common law difference, appears at odds with strong, identifiable trends in early 20th century
American legal thought, and it is easy to understand why civil law
scholars and comparatists esteemed translations that presented civil
law concepts in legal English (such as Walton’s) and criticized those
that preserved the subtle lexical nuances of the two traditions (such
as Joannini’s).
As several scholars have noted, comparative law’s assumptions
and methods have often been influenced by contemporary cultural
and political developments, and this article argues that early 20th
century American legal comparison was no exception. 10 Joannini’s
Spanish-English civil code translations, and the debates which they
generated among comparatists and civil law scholars, provide valuable insight into the role that intellectual history and global political
developments played in shaping early 20th century English and
American attitudes to the civil law tradition in general and to the art
of legal translation in particular.
Having reviewed the historical context of Spanish-English civil
code translations in Part I, this article continues in Part II with descriptions of four civil code translations from the period and the individual translators’ different approaches to civilian terminology.
Part III examines contemporary scholars’ mixed reviews of two of
the four translations, while Part IV places negative reviews of the

9. See infra Part IV.
10. See, e.g., Esin Örücü, Something Old, Something New in Comparative
Law, 2 J. INT’L & COMP. L. 324, 324-27 (2015) (arguing that “[t]he history of
comparative law runs parallel with the history of ideas” and briefly tracing development of discipline against trends in European thought); Jonathan Hill, Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory, 9 OXF. J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 109-10
(1989) (stating that “[t]hroughout this century trends in comparative law have
been effected by world political events” and arguing that surrounding “political
climate has a pervasive influence” on comparatist assumptions).
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translators’ preference for civilian vocabularies into broader perspective by analyzing early 20th century expectations of legal convergence and contemporary comparatist assumptions about the future of civilian vocabularies. Part V concludes with a discussion of
the influence of political ideology on common law attitudes to the
civil law, with a special focus on the role of mixed systems, including Louisiana, in the survival of “civilian English.”
II. BACKGROUND TO SPANISH-ENGLISH CIVIL CODE TRANSLATIONS
(1899-1917)
Though mostly forgotten today, political developments at the
turn of the last century brought the Hispanic world’s civil law systems to the attention of American comparative law scholars at a critical moment in the discipline’s development. Specifically, the creation of new mixed legal systems in Spain’s former colonies of
Puerto Rico and the Philippines brought American colonial judges
and civil law scholars into sustained contact with Spanish civil law.
This process repeated itself on a smaller scale in the Canal Zone,
which the United States had acquired in 1904 in order to complete
construction of the transoceanic Panama Canal. 11 At the same time,
American business expansion in Latin America spurred widespread

11. See, e.g., JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, EL CHOQUE DE DOS CULTURAS JURÍDICAS
EN PUERTO RICO (1991) (examining the gradual introduction of common law doctrines into private law jurisprudence of Puerto Rico by American colonial judges
during early decades of island’s mixed legal system); Manuel Rodríguez Ramos,
Interaction of Civil Law and Anglo-American Law in the Legal Method of Puerto
Rico, 23 TUL. L. REV. 1, 1-22 (1948) (discussing the creation of mixed system in
Puerto Rico); WINFRED LEE THOMPSON, INTRODUCTION OF AMERICAN LAW IN
THE PHILIPPINES AND PUERTO RICO (U. of Arkansas Press 1989) (reviewing the
creation of mixed legal system in American-controlled Philippines after SpanishAmerican War); WAYNE D. BRAY, THE COMMON LAW ZONE IN PANAMA: A CASE
STUDY IN RECEPTION 94-122 (Inter American U. Press 1977) (documenting the
development of mixed system in Canal Zone as well as gradual replacement of
Colombian private law in Zone between 1904-1933). For a brief overview of these
mixed systems’ early development, see also Luis Muñiz-Argüelles, Puerto Rico,
in MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 381-93 (2d
ed., Vernon Valentine Palmer ed. 2012) [hereinafter MIXED JURISDICTIONS
WORLDWIDE]; Pacifico Agabin, The Philippines, in MIXED JURISDICTIONS
WORLDWIDE at 452-80.
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enthusiasm for the Pan-American movement’s promise of uniform
commercial law. 12 Over two decades, Pan-Americanism and legal
mixing in the new insular possessions proved to be reliable catalysts
for American comparison, as colonial judges applied both Spanish
civil law and American public law in territorial courtrooms, influential law professors debated civil law-common law difference, and
both groups speculated freely about the future relationship between
the two legal traditions. As a result, American legal scholars produced a steady stream of literature concerning Spain and Latin
America’s legal systems, introduced new courses on Spanish civil
law at leading law schools, and widened opportunities for further
comparison by translating multiple civil codes from Spanish into
English. 13
12. For the relationship of American business expansion in Latin America
and Pan-American unification of law efforts, see Burton I. Kaufman, United
States Trade and Latin America: The Wilson Years, 58 J. AM. HIST. 342, 343,
358-61 (1971). For inter-American conferences discussing unification of U.S. and
Latin American law during early years of the 20th century, see Curtis Wilgus, The
Third International American Conference at Rio de Janeiro, 1906, 12 HISP. AM.
HIST. REV. 420, 424, 444-48 (1932) (discussing the unification of hemispheric
law efforts at 1906 conference) and John Bassett Moore, The Pan-American Financial Conferences and the Inter-American High Commission, 14 AM. J. INT’L
L. 343 (1920) (similar focus at Pan-American Financial Conference of 1915).
13. Early 20th century American legal scholars frequently commented about
the stimulation of interest in civil law systems occasioned by American acquisition of civil law jurisdictions in the Spanish-speaking world. See, e.g., WILLIAM
WIRT HOWE, STUDIES IN THE CIVIL LAW 10 (2d rev. ed., Cambridge U. Press
1905) (for Louisiana judge arguing: “We find ourselves confronted with new
problems. Porto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines contain some twelve millions of
people whom we control, more or less, and whose laws and jurisprudence we
must, to some extent, at least, understand.”); 1 CHARLES PHINEAS SHERMAN,
ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD § 310 (Boston Book Co. 1917) (for Yale
law professor stating: “For utilitarian reasons alone, ignoring all others, the American acquisition of Spain’s former colonies has given a tremendous impulse to the
study of Roman and Spanish law in American law schools.”).
For early 20th century scholarship on Spanish civil law, see the numerous articles in the new Comparative Law Bureau’s Annual Bulletin (1908-1914), including: Samuel P. Scott, Spanish Jurisprudence Comparatively Considered, 2 ANN.
BULL. 14 (1909); Samuel P. Scott, Spanish Criminal Law Compared with That
Branch of Anglo-Saxon Jurisprudence, 3 ANN. BULL. 62 (1910); Charles S.
Lobingier, A Decade of Juridical Fusion in the Philippines, 3 ANN. BULL. 38
(1911) [hereinafter, Lobingier, Juridical Fusion]; Charles S. Lobingier, The Spanish Law in the Philippines, 4 ANN. BULL. 32 (1911) [hereinafter, Lobingier, Spanish Law]. A “Spanish Craze” in comparative law spread also to the classroom,
where Yale, Columbia, and Michigan offered courses on Spanish law by 1910.
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Most of the Spanish-English civil code translations were a response either to War Department administrative needs in new territories or were part of the Bureau’s Foreign Code Series. Shortly after the initial occupation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the
United States promptly repealed Spanish-era penal codes and codes
of civil and criminal procedure, though local private law codes were,
to varying degrees, left intact. A similar process was followed in the
Canal Zone a few years later, except that the department of Panama
had not promulgated its own civil code during the brief interval between independence from Colombia in 1903 and American acquisition of the isthmus in 1904; thus, the United States adopted the Colombian Civil Code of 1887 rather than local Panamanian legislation. 14 In each possession, the official policy of retaining private law
while replacing public law, adopted previously in Louisiana and in
several British colonies, led to the creation of hybrid legal systems
administered by American colonial judges working alongside local
judges trained in Spanish civil law. During the period, the Spanish
language was not widely taught or known in the United States, and
competent translation of primary legal authority was therefore essential. 15
After the mixed systems were established, the locus of translation activity shifted to the Comparative Law Bureau, whose membership overlapped with scholars of international law as well as the
inter-American bar in New York. Economic expansion in South
See COLUM. U., PRESIDENT’S ANN. REP. 115-16 (1902) (listing Spanish civil law
courses); U. MICH. DEP’T OF L., ANN. ANNOUNCEMENT 1902-1903 27 (1902)
(same); YALE U., CATALOGUE 375 (1908) (same).
14. See, e.g., Rodríguez Ramos, supra note 11, at 21 (describing the repeal
of Puerto Rican penal code and codes of criminal and civil procedure, replacement
with common law codes between 1902-1903); Lobingier, Spanish Law, supra
note 13, at 39-40 (describing a similar process in Philippines between 1900-1902);
BRAY, supra note 11, at 76, 96 & n.6 (describing a similar process in Canal Zone
between 1905-1907).
15. See, e.g., J. Preston Hoskins, Statistical Survey of the Effect of the World
War on Modern Language Enrollment in the Secondary Schools of the United
States, 10 MOD. LANG. J. 87, 88 & tbl.1 (1925) (‘Comparative Table for the Whole
United States’) (survey showing less than 1% of American high school students
enrolled in Spanish language classes during pre-World War I period).
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America, as well as Pan-Americanism’s emphasis on uniform legislation, created heightened demand for American lawyers with specialized expertise in Latin American law, and the Bureau’s sponsorship of Spanish-English code translations was meant to facilitate
practical and scholarly access to the fundamental laws of the most
important trading partners in the region. 16
The first Spanish-language civil code to be translated was the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889. The Code had quickly been extended
by Spain to her colonies and remained in force at the time Cuba,
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines came under American control in
1898. The following year, the military governor of Havana, MajorGeneral William Ludlow, ordered Walton, an American lawyer who
had studied at the University of Havana and was now serving in the
U.S. Volunteers, to translate the Code into English. 17 Walton’s
translation was completed in a matter of months, presumably in
Cuba. He was assisted by a Cuban-born lawyer and political exile,
Néstor Ponce de León, who had fled the Spanish colony for America
in 1870; better remembered today as a correspondent of the revolutionary José Martí, Ponce de León was also a literary figure and
sometime lexicographer in New York. 18

16. See, e.g., Andrew G. Peters, Importance of the Study of Latin-American
Law, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 208, 210 (1916) (Treasury official’s address to ABA
meeting advocating law school teaching of civil law systems as part of wider effort by legal profession to support American business expansion in Latin America); Phanor J. Eder, Pan-Americanism and the Bar, 43 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 340,
341 (characterizing the knowledge of civil law systems as “the first essential” if
American bar to play constructive role in Pan-American movement).
17. THE SPANISH CIVIL CODE IN FORCE IN SPAIN, CUBA, PUERTO RICO, AND
THE PHILIPPINES (Clifford S. Walton ed., Clifford S. Walton and Néstor Ponce de
León trans., La Propaganda literaria Printing House 1899) [hereinafter, Span. Civ.
C.].
18. See RAIMUNDO CABRERA, CUBA Y SUS JUECES 297-98, 318 (Compañía
Lévytype 1891). Ponce de León returned to Havana shortly after the SpanishAmerican War and was appointed director and custodian of the Cuban National
Archives. See [U.S. ARMY] HEADQUARTERS DIV. OF CUBA, CIVIL ORDERS AND
CIRCULARS 167 (1899) (appointment order).
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Over the next two years, the War Department translated dozens
of Spanish-era laws for use in the new possessions. 19 Among the
department’s principal translators was Francis Leon Joannini, the
son of an Italian minister to Mexico. Born in Italy, Joannini spent
part of his youth in Mexico and was presumably fluent in Spanish.20
As official translator for the Insular Affairs division, Joannini had
already translated several Filipino legal codes by the time the Canal
Zone approached him to translate the Colombian Civil Code. An
Argentine code translation for the Bureau was completed in 1913
(though not published for several years). At the time of his tragic
death in an automobile accident in 1917, Joannini was at work translating the Peruvian Civil Code and drafting an English dictionary of
Spanish legal terms. 21
Joannini’s last two civil code translations were part of the Bureau’s aforementioned efforts to translate foreign law into English. 22
Although the Bureau commissioned or agreed to publish only six
translations during its short existence, all but one (R.P. Shick’s
translation of the Swiss Civil Code) were Spanish or Latin American
codes. In the case of the Argentine and Peruvian Civil Codes, the
translations were entrusted to a revision committee chaired by
Phanor Eder, a Colombian-born lawyer based in New York. An enthusiastic proponent of Pan-Americanism, Eder was a major figure
among New York’s inter-American bar up until his retirement in the
1960s. 23 The last translation approved by the Bureau was Wheless’s

19. E.g., DIV. OF CUSTOMS & INSULAR AFF. [DCIA], TRANSLATION OF THE
NOTARIAL LAWS IN FORCE IN CUBA AND PUERTO RICO (1899); [DCIA],
TRANSLATION OF LAW OF PORTS IN FORCE IN THE ISLAND OF CUBA (1900).
20. See “P.J.E.”, Necrology: Frank Joannini, 3 A.B.A. J. 104-05 (1917) (obituary with biographical details).
21. See A Deplorable Loss to Pan-Americanism, 6 SO. AMER. 33 (1917) (additional biographical information).
22. See generally W.W. Smithers, Proceedings of the Comparative Law Bureau, 31 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1001, 1004 (1907) (listing the Bureau’s initial objectives, including translation of foreign legislation into English).
23. See To Phanor James Eder, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 479 (1970) (issue dedication). As early as the 1920s, Eder and Wheless were among a small, recognized
group of New York lawyers representing American interests in Latin America.
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Brazilian Civil Code. Like Eder, Wheless was one of a handful of
New York-based lawyers with experience representing clients in
Latin America; prior to the Mexican Revolution, he had practiced
law in that country and had written several articles on the subject of
Mexican law. 24 Indeed, there was a significant overlap between the
Bureau’s translators, its Latin American editorial staff, and this
small, cosmopolitan group of expatriate and émigré lawyers. 25
A. Walton’s Spanish Civil Code Translation (1899): A Common Lawyer’s Approach
The military order instructing Walton to prepare a translation of
the Spanish Civil Code was dated March 21, 1899; he was honorably
discharged from the Army seven weeks later, on June 13. 26 If Walton completed his translation before he left military service, he must
have worked quickly. The assumption that the translation’s publication was expedited finds further support in the numerous typographical errors. 27 A first edition nevertheless appeared that same year as
The Spanish Civil Code, while a second edition, including a new
historical introduction to Spanish law, was published in 1900 under
the title The Civil Law in Spain and Spanish-America. 28 By the time
this second, expanded edition was published, Walton was pursuing

See ENRIQUE GIL, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY OF ARGENTINE AND
BRAZILIAN CIVIL LAW 3 (1921).
24. E.g., Joseph Wheless, A Lawsuit in Mexico, 22 GREEN BAG 612 (1910);
Joseph Wheless, The Mexican Notarial System, 5 ANN. BULL. 42 (1912).
25. See Organization and Work of the Bureau of Comparative Law, 1 A.B.A.
J. 591, 592 (1915) (listing the Bureau’s editorial staff members for 1915). Shick
was chairman, while Eder, Wheless, and Robert Kerr were editors for Latin America, Charles Lobingier for the Philippines, and Scott and Wheless for Spain.
Wheless and Scott both translated codes for the Bureau, while Eder, Wheless, and
Kerr served on multiple revision committees.
26. See Special Order No. 68 in Span. Civ. C. (preface) (March 21, 1899);
[U.S. ARMY] ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S OFF., OFFICIAL REGISTER OF OFFICERS OF
VOLUNTEERS 141 (1900) (listing discharge dated June 13, 1899).
27. See, for example, Span. Civ. C. 39-48, which alone contain seven misspellings.
28. CLIFFORD STEVENS WALTON, THE CIVIL LAW IN SPAIN AND SPANISHAMERICA (1900).
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further studies (‘doctorando’) at the University of Madrid. 29 Unfortunately, while Walton supplemented this second edition with various citations to several other Latin American civil codes, there is no
evidence from the first edition suggesting which sources, if any, he
may have used in preparing the original translation.
Regardless of sources or legal training, Walton’s translation of
the Spanish Civil Code has a decidedly “common law” feel to it.
Throughout the translation, Walton rendered basic civil law concepts into legal English rather than transliterate Spanish civil law
concepts or use English civilian terminology. Thus, servidumbres,
mandato, and tutela are translated as ‘easements’, ‘agency’, and
‘guardianship’ rather than less-familiar civil law English terms such
as servitudes, mandate, and tutorship. 30 Likewise, tutela dativa is
rendered ‘guardianship by appointment’ rather than the more-civilian dative tutorship. 31
Nowhere is Walton’s method more apparent than in Book II
(property), where bienes muebles and bienes inmuebles have been
translated as ‘personal property’ and ‘real property’, respectively,
rather than movables and immovables. 32 Moreover, Walton introduced legal English’s many distinctions between realty and personalty into his translation, even though Spanish civil law’s lexicon
does not usually make such distinctions. Thus, civil law enajenación
is often rendered ‘conveyance’ in the context of immovables, yet
‘alienation’ or ‘sale’ when referring to movables. 33 Throughout his
29. Id. at tit.p.
30. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. VII (servidumbres = easements); Bk. IV, tit.
IX (mandato = agency); Bk. I, tit. IX (tutela = guardianship).
31. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IX, ch. 4 (tutela dativa = guardianship
by appointment).
32. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. I (bienes muebles, bienes inmuebles =
personal property, real property).
33. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III, arts. 974-976 (enajenación = ‘conveyance’ in context of immovables); Bk. III, tit. III, art. 978; Bk. II, tit. VI, art.
494 (enajenación = ‘alienation’, ‘sale’ in context of movables). Compare Louisiana law: “In Louisiana, ‘Land is not ‘conveyed’ by deed but is sold…One sells
land by the same contract and in the same way – in terms of theory – as one sells
an automobile.” N. Stephan Kinsella, A Civil Law to Common Law Dictionary,
54 LA. L. REV. 1265, 1289 (1993) (emphasis in original) (citing Patrick H. Martin
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translation, the long shadow of English property law (and its effect
on legal English) is apparent: plena propiedad is ‘fee simple’, 34 desahucio is ‘ejectment’, 35 and perturbación is ‘trespass’. 36
The Army lawyer was equally proactive in converting possessory actions and obligations into common law English. In Book II
(property), the Spanish action reivindicar is translated ‘recover’,
while in Book IV (obligations), causa is ‘consideration’ (not
cause), 37 obligaciones solidarias are ‘joint obligations’, 38 transacción is ‘compromise’, 39 and confusión is (usually) ‘merger’. 40 At
times, Walton’s gratuitous use of legal English serves little purpose
other than to clothe his translation in the familiar legal English of
Anglo-American law. Thus: ‘banns’ for proclamas, 41 ‘Act of God’
for siniestro, 42 ‘wear and tear’ for deterioros, 43 and ‘writ of seizure’
for mandamiento de embargo de bienes. 44 Throughout the translation, the common lawyer feels very much at home, though possibly
misled about the subtle differences in terminology.
The purpose in elaborating Walton’s translation preferences is
not to suggest that Walton was ignorant of the distinctions between

& J. Lanier Yeates, Louisiana and Texas Oil & Gas Law: An Overview of the
Differences, 52 LA. L. REV. 769, 787-88 (1992)).
34. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. II, art. 634 (plena propiedad = fee simple).
35. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. VII, art. 1656 (acción de desahucio = ejection).
36. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. VI, art. 1560 (perturbación = trespass).
37. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. II, art. 348 (reivindicar = recover); Bk. IV,
tit. II, arts. 1274-1277 (causa = consideration).
38. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. I, arts. 1136-1137 (obligaciones solidarias
= joint obligations).
39. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XIII, ch. 1 (transacción = compromise).
40. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. I, art. 1156 (confusión = ‘merger’ in
context of extinction of obligations); Bk. II, tit. VII, art. 546 (confusión = ‘merger’
in context of extinction of servitudes); but see Bk. IV, tit. I, arts. 1192-1194 (confusión = ‘confusion’ in context of extinction of obligations).
41. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IV, art. 44 (proclamas = (marriage)
banns).
42. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. VI, art. 484 (siniestro = Act of God).
43. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. X, art. 1746 (deterioros = wear and tear).
44. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. II, art. 1297 (mandamiento de embargo de
bienes = writ of seizure).
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the two legal traditions or of alternative civilian English vocabularies. Indeed, some of the civil law concepts in the Spanish Civil Code
were substantially equivalent to their common law counterparts, and
the use of legal English was not likely to lead to confusion of interpretation, although there was certainly this risk in several instances.
Moreover, Walton was perfectly capable of rendering Spanish civil
law concepts into English by transliteration or by using jurisdictionneutral English civil law terms. For example, donación is ‘donation’
(not, say, inter vivos gift), and vicios redhibitorios are ‘redhibitory
vices’, 45 while Walton hints at the important distinction between
cause and consideration when he places the Spanish concept in parentheses on the initial use of the word (i.e., ‘consideration
(causa)’), although admittedly without further elucidation. 46 In a
subsequent article for the Annual Bulletin, Walton even criticized
War Department translators of the Filipino mortgage law, alleging
confusion in their use of ‘property rights’ for derechos reales. 47
Nevertheless, Walton clearly preferred to use common law English terms for civil law concepts wherever possible. The risk of misleading American lawyers into assuming that the two systems were
broadly interchangeable was a risk Walton was willing to take, if he
considered it a risk at all. Why the translator believed that a legal
translation that de-emphasized legal difference was desirable is not
certain. That the original translation’s target audience was military
and civilian administrators is no doubt an important part of the explanation, for such men were usually trained in the common law, if
45. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. II (donación = donation); Bk. IV, tit. IV,
arts. 1491, 1499 (redhibición, vicios redhibitorios = redhibition, redhibitory
vices).
46. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. II, art. 1274 (causa). The important distinction between cause and consideration has long been recognized. See, e.g.,
GUTTERIDGE, supra note 1, at 117 (“Comparative lawyers are only too familiar
with the kind of problem which lies concealed behind such words as causa and
consideration.”); see also GREGORY W. ROME & STEPHAN KINSELLA, LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW DICTIONARY 7 (Quid Pro Books 2011) (“Cause is not the same thing
as consideration.”).
47. See Clifford S. Walton, Interests of a Mortgagee in Real Property under
the Common and Civil Law, 5 ANN. BULL. 63, 66 (1912).
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they had any legal training at all. It is also probable that Walton
lacked access in Havana to English translations of civil law materials using civilian vocabularies, although these were certainly available in the United States. 48 Yet even in the second edition (intended
for a more academic readership), Walton made few changes, and he
continued to use common law English terms to describe subtly-different Spanish civil law concepts in a subsequent article for the
Comparative Law Bureau. 49
An equally likely explanation for Walton’s translation method
was common practice of the time, which was relatively tolerant of
translations of civil law materials into the legal English of the common law. 50 It is important to note that this practice was conventional
even among English and American civil law scholars and judges
who otherwise exhibited a serious interest in comprehending the nuances of civil law-common law difference. 51

48. See, for example, the popular American edition of Harris’s translation of
the Institutes using mandatary, dative tutor, compensation, and revendication:
THOMAS COOPER, INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 61, 284, 347, 445 (2d ed. 1841).
49. Clifford S. Walton, The Spanish Law of Prescription, 2 ANN. BULL. 25,
26-28 (1909) (using the terms ‘adverse possession’, ‘tort’, and ‘real property’ for
various Spanish civil law concepts).
50. This observation was previously made by Joseph Dainow in his explanatory note to the 1940 compilation of the Louisiana civil codes (with cross-references to the Code Napoléon), in which he criticized both Wright’s (1908) and
Cachard’s (1895) English translations of the French civil code. See Explanatory
Notes, in COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA, LOUISIANA
LEGAL ARCHIVES vol. 3, at xiii, xviii (State of Louisiana 1940) (regretting that
French-English translations did not always use “the language of the civilian”)
(cited in Olivier Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code in French: Translation and
Retranslation, 9 J. CIV. L. STUD. 223, 245 & nn.42-43 (2016) (briefly discussing
problems of French civil law translations using legal English)). These problems
are similarly present in other contemporary civil code translations. See, e.g., THE
CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN (John Harington Gubbins trans., Maruya 1897) (translation
of Japanese Civil Code using predominantly common law vocabulary).
51. See, e.g., E. BLACKWOOD WRIGHT, THE CODE NAPOLEON; BEING THE
FRENCH CIVIL CODE passim (1908) (for British colonial judge comparing civil
law and common law doctrines throughout translation but nevertheless rendering
many French civil law terms into legal English). Wright was chief justice of the
Seychelles.
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B. Joannini’s Colombian Civil Code Translation (1905): A Civil
Law Alternative
By contrast, Joannini’s approach to his Colombian Civil Code
translation was radically different to Walton’s, and we know much
more about it. First, Joannini strove as much as possible to render
Colombian private law concepts into “civil law English” rather than
legal English. The desire to present civil law concepts in English
without losing the tradition’s distinctive categories and terminology
frequently meant turning to the civil law entries in Black’s Law Dictionary, or in Books II-IV, adopting the civilian vocabulary of Louisiana’s Civil Code. In an “Explanatory Note,” Joannini stated his
reasons for avoiding use of legal English for civil law concepts:
An effort has been made to secure as correct a translation as
possible, and in some cases the translator may be accused of
sacrificing what may be called good English for fidelity to
the original text. He has been constantly on guard against
making an interpretation of law instead of a translation. 52
Joannini’s policy of avoiding “making an interpretation of law”
included more than merely “sacrificing what may be called good
English.” It meant consistently reducing the use of technical legal
English in order to limit opportunities for confusion by Americans
trained exclusively in the common law tradition, as will be demonstrated in greater detail below.
Second, Joannini, unlike Walton, was more forthcoming about
the materials he used for his translation: in a “List of Works Consulted in Translating the Civil Code,” Joannini conveniently listed
his principal sources. 53 Among those which the translator consulted
were Angarita’s Código Civil Nacional (de Colombia) Concordado
(1888), two Spanish legal dictionaries (those of Alcubilla and
Escriche), and, most importantly, Black’s Law Dictionary and Merrick’s 1900 edition of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 (which itself

52. See Explanatory Note in Col. Civ. C. at 10.
53. See id. at 9 for List of Works Consulted.
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includes cross-references to corresponding articles in the Code Napoléon). 54 The “List of Works Consulted” was not exhaustive, however. Elsewhere in the translation, Joannini cited articles in the Chilean Civil Code,55 Howe’s first edition of Studies in the Civil Law,56
and Mackeldy’s Handbook of Roman Law. 57 Moreover, he referred
on at least one occasion to various unnamed Spanish and French
laws “to which the translator has had access,” while in a discussion
of Book IV, title VII, Joannini indicated that he had consulted the
Spanish, French, Italian, Mexican, and Dutch Civil Codes in an effort to better understand the title’s subject matter. 58 In retrospect, his
translation was a serious effort at legal comparison.
The result of Joannini’s different approach, including his reliance on Black’s and the Louisiana Civil Code, was a thoroughly civilian-feeling translation of Colombian private law. Where Walton
had used ‘guardianship’ for civil law tutela, Joannini instead used
tutorship (as well as related terms such as dative tutor, curator,
etc.). 59 Where Walton chose ‘easements’, Joannini chose servitudes. 60 Where Walton preferred ‘agent’, Joannini preferred mandatary. 61 Cargas are never ‘liens’. ‘Writs’, ‘trespass’, and ‘ejectment’
54. Id. (citing various sources, including MARCELO MARTÍNEZ ALCUBILLA,
DICCIONARIO DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN ESPAÑOLA (1892-1902), JOAQUÍN
ESCRICHE, DICCIONARIO RAZONADO DE LEGISLACIÓN Y JURISPRUDENCIA (1888),
REVISED CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA (Edwin T. Merrick ed., F. F. Hansell & Bro.,
Limited 1900) [hereinafter, La. Civ. C. (1870)], and HENRY C. BLACK, A
DICTIONARY OF LAW (1891) [hereinafter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY]); see also
John H. Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law, 6 TUL. L. REV. 280, 296 (1931)
(discussing Merrick’s 1900 edition).
55. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. at 71 & n.†, 86 & n.* (citing to Chilean Civil Code
arts. 208 & 266).
56. Id. at 153 & n.* (citing WILLIAM WIRT HOWE, STUDIES IN THE CIVIL LAW
79-80 (1896), for a discussion of civil law concept of real rights).
57. Id. at 164 & n.* (citing F. MACKELDY, HANDBOOK OF THE ROMAN LAW
§ 271 (T. & J. W. Johnson 1883), defining “specification”).
58. See id. at 219 & fn.† (regarding assignments); id. at 326 & n.* (regarding
facultative obligations).
59. Compare Span. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IV, art. 50 (tutor = guardian), with Col.
Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXII (tutor, tutela = tutor, tutorship) and Bk. I, tit. XXII, ch. 4
(tutor dativa = dative tutor); see also Kinsella, supra note 33, at 1293.
60. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XI (servidumbres = servitudes).
61. Compare Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. IX (mandato = agency), with Col. Civ.
C. Bk. IV, tit. XXVIII (mandato, mandatario = mandate, mandatary).
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are entirely lacking. Reivindicación is revendication (not mere ‘recovery’). 62
Based on even a cursory review, several important conclusions
can be drawn from Joannini’s translation choices. First, Joannini
preferred transliteration of Spanish-language civil law terms, in
some circumstances even where the potential for confusion with legal or colloquial English was significant: thus, compensación is usually rendered compensation, not ‘set-off’; transacción is transaction, not ‘compromise’; and confusión is confusion, not ‘merger’. 63
Second, Joannini avoided legal English property terminology
with its different distinctions between real estate and chattels, as this
might have implied an exaggerated equivalence with distinctive civilian property law categories. Thus, in Joannini’s translation,
bienes muebles are, correctly, movables and bienes inmuebles, immovables; only bienes raíces are real property. 64 Absent is Walton’s
invented distinction between sale of movables and conveyance of
immovables: enajenación is usually translated alienation or sale, regardless of context. 65
Third, in Joannini’s search for an English articulation of civil
law concepts, he frequently relied on the distinctive legal English of
Louisiana’s civil law tradition, in particular the special civil law
English terminology of the Louisiana Civil Code. Thus, gananciales

62. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XII (reivindicación = revendication).
63. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XIV, art. 1625 (compensación, transacción, confusión = compensation, transaction, confusion). Cf. Levasseur & Trahan,
infra note 178, at 118, 127 (for English translators of Cornu’s Vocabulaire Juridique warning against translating compensation and confusion as common law setoff and merger).
64. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. I, ch. 1, 2 (bienes muebles, bienes inmuebles,
bienes raíces = movables, immovables, real property); see also Bk. III, tit. XIII,
art. 1457 (for rare use of ‘realty’).
65. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXX, art. 576 (for alienation of movables); Bk. I, tit. XIX, art. 345 (for alienation of immovables); but see Col. Civ. C.
Bk. I, tit. IX, art. 182 (for rare use of ‘convey’ for Spanish verb enajenar).
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are acquets and gains, 66 desheredación is disinherison, 67 obligaciones solidarias are solidary obligations, 68 and prestaciones
mutuas are mutual prestations. 69 Both lesión grave and lesión
enorme are translated lesion beyond moiety, 70 and beneficio de escusión appears as benefit of discussion. 71 The first and last examples
are both instances where Joannini departed from his usual preference for transliteration in order to follow the Louisiana Code’s
unique vocabulary.
Indeed, even in cases where Joannini had a choice between using
a particular English civil law or Scots law term (which are plentiful
in the first edition of Black’s), the translator frequently preferred the
Louisiana term instead. Thus, curador de bienes is translated as curator ad bona rather than curator bonis. 72 Elsewhere, título vicioso
is vicious title (as opposed to Walton’s more common law-sounding

66. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXII, ch. 5 (gananciales = acquets and
gains). “Community of acquets and gains. The community property matrimonial
regime of Louisiana under which spouses are co-owners of certain property that
either spouse acquires during the marriage.” ROME & KINSELLA, supra note 46,
at 9 (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2327, 2338-2340 (2011)); see also BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 28 (10th ed., Bryan A. Garner ed. 2014) (identifying acquets
and gains as a Louisiana law term); cf. JOAQUÍN ESCRICHE, ELEMENTS OF THE
SPANISH LAW 37-38 (Bethel Coopwood trans. 1886) (Texas lawyer using the term
ganancial property instead).
67. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. V, ch. 4 (desheredación = disinherison).
68. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. IX (obligaciones solidarias = solidary obligations). For a recent discussion of the problem of translating solidary obligations
as joint and several, see Moréteau, supra note 1, at 706, 709.
69. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XII, ch. 4 (prestaciones mutuas = mutual
prestations). The English ‘prestation’ survives also in Puerto Rican legal English.
See, e.g., 31 LPRA § 3048 (‘mutual prestations’).
70. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXIII, ch. 13 (lesión enorme = lesion beyond
moiety); Bk. III, tit. VII, art. 1291 (lesión grave = same).
71. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXXV, arts. 2383-84 (beneficio de excusión
= benefit of discussion). Plea of discussion has since been abolished in Louisiana,
but Joannini’s translation cites the earlier code articles that were then in effect.
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3045 cmt. (a) (2017) (“This Article … abolishes the
pleas of division and discussion formerly recognized in C.C. Arts. 3045-3051
(1870).”).
72. Compare Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXX (curador de bienes = curator ad
bona), with LA. CODE PRACTICE art. 958 (curator ad bona); see also Welsh v.
Baxter, 45 La. Ann. 1062, 1064 (1893) (discussing 1830 abolition of curators ad
bona in Louisiana). See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 54, at 309;
Black’s lists only the Scots law ‘curator bonis’.
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‘flawed title’), 73 and discernimiento (for appointment of dative tutors) is confirmation. 74 Similarly, Joannini’s preference for translating tenencia as seizin rather than tenancy (particularly in Book III
(successions)) appears to imitate Louisiana legal English’s use of
the former term in its own law of successions. 75
Despite an obvious preference for civil law terminology, Joannini did not entirely avoid technical legal English. There are occasional references in his Colombian Civil Code translation to cestui
que trustent, 76 flotsam and jetsam, 77 and other common law terms.
Both dolo and fraude have been (perhaps confusingly) rendered
fraud, and Joannini occasionally used common law terms for unrelated Colombian civil law concepts. 78 For the most part, however,
Joannini confined legal English terms such as ‘agency’, ‘bailments’,
and ‘easements’ to the translation’s index, where readers are directed to search instead for mandate, loans for use and consumption,
and servitudes. 79 The result is a civil code translation well on its way
to being purged of English property and contract law terminology.
Joannini’s translation raises the interesting question: Why did he
rely so heavily on the Louisiana Civil Code for articulating the civil
law in English? There are at least two plausible explanations. First,
Joannini may have been told to do so by the Isthmian Canal Commission. Such a possibility is raised by parallel developments in
Puerto Rico, where the local revision commission of two Americans
and one Puerto Rican had recently incorporated language from the
73. Compare Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXII, art. 1792 (título vicioso), with
La. Civ. C. art. 3452 (1870) (“vicious and defective title”).
74. Compare Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXIII, art. 463 (discernimiento = confirmation), with La. Civ. C. art. 260 (1870) (judicial “confirmation” of tutors).
75. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. VII, art. 1297 (tenencia = seizin); cf. La.
Civ. C. arts. 940-949 (1870) (for seizin of heirs in Louisiana law of successions).
76. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. VIII, art. 807 (fideicomisario = cestui
que trustent).
77. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. IV, art. 710 (especies náufragas = flotsam and
jetsam).
78. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. IX, art. 846; Bk. II, tit. VII, art. 768 (dolo,
fraude); Bk. III, tit. V, art. 1245 (cuarta de mejoras = quarter betterments); cf. LA.
C.C. ANN. art. 1231 (2017) (discussing “advantages” and “extra portions”).
79. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. at 599, 602, 622 (index terms).
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Louisiana Code into Book I of the island’s Spanish-era Civil Code. 80
By making Canal Zone law look and sound more like Louisiana law,
the Canal Zone government may have hoped that American colonial
judges on the Isthmus, though unfamiliar with the civil law tradition
generally, might nevertheless be able to interpret the local civil code
using Louisiana jurisprudence. There is only scattered evidence
from the Canal Zone’s law reports (1905-1926) of local judges actually applying Louisiana law in this way (assuming they even had
access to Louisiana decisions), and, in any event, the Canal Zone’s
mixed legal system did not survive the 1930s. 81 Nonetheless, it is
possible that Joannini’s many cross-references to Louisiana Code
articles and use of the state’s legal English were meant to facilitate
comparative use of Louisiana jurisprudence by American judges in
Panama.
A chief problem with this explanation, however, is scattered evidence that Joannini began his translation work without the Louisiana Civil Code. First, there are no cross-references to Louisiana
Code articles in Book I (persons), although these are frequent elsewhere in the translation. 82 Second, the use of distinctive Louisiana
civil law terms such as disinherison, lesion beyond moiety, and benefit of discussion, is irregular and relatively infrequent until Book II
(property), and is most pronounced in Books III and IV (successions, obligations). Third, although, as a rule, Joannini preferred civilian terminology to legal English, there are several instances in
80. 1 LUIS MUÑOZ MORALES, RESEÑA HISTÓRICA Y ANOTACIONES AL
CÓDIGO CIVIL DE PUERTO RICO 22-44 (Junta Editora de la Universidad de Puerto
Rico 1947) (discussing the work of the 1901-1902 revision commission including
adoption of articles from Louisiana code).
81. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Panama R.R. Co., 2 C.Z. Rep. 111 (C.Z. 1913)
(for a rare example of Canal Zone court applying Louisiana jurisprudence to question of Colombian private law); see also Collins, supra note 7, at 233 (describing
the Colombian Code’s repeal in 1933 and replacement by a new code based on
California law). The adoption of a common-law code greatly reduced the potential
influence of Louisiana jurisprudence in the Zone’s future legal development.
82. See, for example, Joannini’s citations to La. Civ. C. arts. 533 et seq.
(1870) for parallel references to Louisiana law of usufruct, Col. Civ. C. at 182;
La. Civ. C. arts. 2520 et seq. (1870) for revendication, Col. Civ. C. at 397; La.
Civ. C. arts. 3176 et seq. (1870) for antichresis, Col. Civ. C. at 495; etc.
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Book I where the translator initially used a common law term, such
as ‘convey’ or ‘set-off’, only to abandon it by the middle of Book II,
possibly suggesting a change of approach early on in the translation
process. 83 In further support of this conclusion, Joannini’s inconsistent alternation between translating fianza and caución as bond,
surety, and suretyship appears to stabilize only in Book IV, or
around the time that the translator would have compared the Colombian articles to the Louisiana Civil Code’s articles 3035 et seq. on
suretyship.
A second explanation, therefore, seems more likely: Joannini decided to consult the Louisiana Civil Code only after encountering
numerous citations to its articles in the civil law entries in Black’s
Law Dictionary. 84 The fact that Alcubilla’s 1892 Diccionario (like
many legal encyclopedias and dictionaries in the civil law tradition)
cites to code articles for definitions of Spanish civil law terms may
have reinforced in Joannini’s mind the utility of consulting an English-language civil code for his own translation work. By doing so,
Joannini’s translation became truly comparative, as he checked his
own definitions and civil law English vocabulary against that of the
Louisiana Civil Code.
That Joannini was satisfied with the approach is evident from
the fact that he continued to employ Louisiana’s civilian terminology in his subsequent translation of the Argentine Civil Code.

83. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IX, art. 182 (enajenar = convey); Bk. I,
art. 207 (simple mandatario = simple agent); Bk. II, tit. VII, art. 818 (compensar
= set off [n.]). By Bk. III, Joannini has abandoned convey, while in Bk. III, tit.
XXVIII, he uses mandatary, and in Bk. IV, tit. XVII, he uses compensation.
84. See, e.g., entries for ‘curator’, ‘immovable’, ‘servitudes’ in BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 54, at 309, 593, 1085 (citing Louisiana Civil Code articles for civil law terms appearing in Books I and II).
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Table 1. Spanish Civil Law Terms: Translation Choices in Walton
and Joannini

Spanish Civil
Law Term
gananciales 85
enajenación
(of immovables) 86
enajenación
(of movables) 87
desheredación 88
tutela dativa 89
bienes muebles,
bienes inmuebles 90
reivindicar [v.] 91
plena propiedad 92
dolo [n.] 93
servidumbres 94
obligaciones
solidarias 95
confusión 96

Walton’s
Translations

Joannini’s
Translations

profits of the conjugal
society (gananciales)
conveyance

acquets and gains*

alienation

alienation

disinheritance
guardianship by
appointment
personal property, real
property
recover [v.]
fee simple
deceit (dolo) or fraud
easements
joint obligations

disinherison*
dative tutorship*

merger

confusion

alienation or sale [n.]

movables, immovables
revendicate [v.]
full ownership
dolus
servitudes
solidary obligations*

85. Span. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IV, art. 72; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXII, ch. 5.
86. Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III, arts. 974-976; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXIII,
art. 1887 (alienation of immovables).
87. Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III, art. 978; Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXX, art.
576 (alienation of movables).
88. Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III, arts. 848-857; Col. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. V,
arts. 1258-1259.
89. Span. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IX, ch. 4; Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXII, ch. 4.
90. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. I; Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. I.
91. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. II, art. 348; Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XII.
92. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. III, art. 399; Arg. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. X, art. 2909.
93. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. V, art. 457; Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. I, art. 1102;
Arg. Civ. C. Bk. II, § II, tit. I, ch. 2.
94. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. VII; Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XI.
95. Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. I, art. 1136; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. IX.
96. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. VII, art. 546; Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XI, art. 942
(both in context of servitudes).
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causa 97

consideration

perturbación 98
mandato, mandatario 99
beneficio de escusión 100
herederos forzosos 101

trespass [n.]
agency, agent

‘consideration
(causa)’ on initial use;
cause thereafter
disturbance [n.]
mandate, mandatary

benefit of a levy

benefit of discussion*

forced heirs*

forced heirs*

*terms presumably adopted from Louisiana Civil Code articles

C. Joannini’s Argentine Civil Code Translation (1917): More Civilian Yet?
If anything, Joannini’s 1917 translation of the Argentine Civil
Code was more “civilian” in feeling than his Colombian Civil Code
translation. First, he continued to prefer distinctive Louisiana civil
law terms such as acquets and gains, 102 disinherison, 103 solidary obligations, 104 and benefit of discussion. 105 The fact that standard editions of the Argentine Code include the drafter Dalmacio Vélez
Sarsfield’s notes, with their occasional references to the 1825 Louisiana Civil Code, may have influenced Joannini in this respect. 106

97. Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. II; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. II.
98. Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. VI, art. 1560; Arg. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III.
99. Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. IX; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXVIII.
100. Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XIV, arts. 1834-1837; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit.
XXXV, arts. 2383-2384.
101. Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III, art. 807; Col. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. V (for forced
heirs). Also known (in the Philippines) as compulsory heirs.
102. See Arg. Civ. C. Bk. II, § III, tit. II, art. 1271 (gananciales = acquets and
gains). (Joannini relied on the 1906 LaJouane edition for his translation, which
had erroneously re-numbered articles to take into account new legislation and
placed the code’s original article numbers in [brackets]. Only the earlier (correct)
numeration is used here).
103. See Arg. Civ. C. Bk. IV, § I, tit. XVI (desheredación = disinherison).
104. See Arg. Civ. C. Bk. II, § I, tit. XIV (obligaciones solidarias = solidary
obligations).
105. See Arg. Civ. C. Bk. II, § III, tit. X, art. 2019 (beneficio de escusión =
benefit of discussion).
106. See Tucker, supra note 54, at 295: the Civil Code of 1870 was itself a
revision of the Civil Code of 1825, which was promulgated in French, translated
into English. See also Tucker, supra note 54, at 290-92, it later had its own im-
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Second, Joannini clarified certain civil law terms that he had used
inconsistently in his Canal Zone translation: he abandoned ‘fraud’
for dolo in favor of the Latin dolus, then placed fraude in parentheses to suggest a possible distinction between English fraud and the
Argentine civil law concept (i.e., ‘fraud (fraude)’). 107 Third, he
purged various common law terms which had survived in his earlier
project, including liens, consideration, betterments, breach (of contract), and wear and tear.
Even where Joannini preserved common law categorical distinctions, he was careful to clarify civilian usage. In the matter of successions, Joannini (rather unusually) distinguished between common law realty and personalty when he rendered cosas legadas as
‘things bequeathed’ (when movable) and ‘things devised’ (when immovable). 108 Nevertheless, Joannini provided a footnote explaining
that in the Spanish-language original the one term legar encompasses both concepts, and that the distinction in legal English is not
present in Spanish civil law. 109 Elsewhere, he re-purposed devise
and bequeath to instead distinguish between civil law concepts; in
Book III, he used the former to refer to a transfer of naked or full
ownership and the latter to refer to a transfer of rights merely of
enjoyment of a thing or usufruct. 110
portant, indirect influence on Vélez Sarsfield’s Argentine Civil Code via Florencio García Goyena’s Concordancias of 1852. See Agustín Parise, The Place of
the Louisiana Civil Code in the Hispanic Civil Codifications: The Comments to
the Spanish Civil Code Project of 1851, 68 LA. L. REV. 823, 848-52 (2008) [hereinafter Parise, Hispanic Codifications]; see also Olivier Moréteau & Agustín
Parise, Recodification in Louisiana and Latin America, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1103,
1116 (2009).
107. See, e.g., Arg. Civ. C. Bk. II, § II, tit. I, ch. 2 (dolo = dolus); Bk. II, § II,
tit. I, art. 954 (fraude = fraud).
108. See Arg. Civ. C. Bk. IV, § I, tit. XVII (cosas legadas = things bequeathed,
things devised).
109. Arg. Civ. C. at 570 & n.20 (“This term [legado] includes both bequests
and devises. Legatario, which has been translated legatee, includes both legatees
and devisees. Devisee has, however, been used when a devise only and not also a
bequest is involved. The verb legar has been translated by the words bequeath
and devise, according to the class of property referred to.”).
110. See, e.g., Arg. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. X, arts. 2815-2816 (using ‘devise’ for
legado in context of naked ownership, ‘bequeath’ for legado in context of usufruct).
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In addition to purifying the civilian vocabulary in this second
translation, Joannini also supplemented the text with numerous footnotes that offered a comparative perspective on civilian terminology. Thus, on the first use of servitude, Joannini explained that
“[t]his term is used in lieu of the common law term easement not
only because the latter is not the exact equivalent of servitude, but
in order to be consistent in the use of civil law terms throughout this
translation.” 111 Similarly, on the first use of compensation, Joannini
clarified that, “[c]ompensation resembles in many respects the common law set-off. The principal difference is that a set-off must be
pled to be effectual; whereas compensation is effectual, without any
such plea.” 112 Even where Joannini concluded that the civil law and
common law terms represented more or less identical concepts, he
was careful to note the difference in terminology and persisted in
using the civil law term instead of a more-accessible common law
alternative. For example, in discussing transaction, Joannini conceded that “[t]his term is the equivalent of the common-law compromise” yet reaffirmed his decision to use the civilian rather than
legal English term, explaining that, “[a]s stated in the introductory
note, civil law terms have been strictly adhered to in this translation.” 113 Joannini then noted that ‘compromise’ means something
“very different” in the civil law, and defined that term as well, rather
than abandon the use of two civil law terms by substituting the morefamiliar ‘compromise’ and ‘settlement’. 114 Similar footnotes clarified civil law concepts such as cause, 115 charges, 116 cautions,117 and
so on, usually with citations to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary or Howe’s
Studies in the Civil Law.118

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See id. at 7 & n.2.
See id. at 118 & n.11.
Id. at 118 & n.12.
Id. at 118 & n.12.
Id. at 87 & n.1.
Id. at 96 & n.7.
Id. at 250 & n.42.
See, e.g., id. at 87 & n.1, 97 & n.8.
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In a “Translator’s Note,” Joannini was explicit about his objectives as a translator, which had not changed significantly from his
Colombian Civil Code translation a decade earlier:
In the following translation . . . the translator has used civil
law terms exclusively. Any attempt to employ common law
terms would have led to confusion and obscurity, but the index has been so prepared to afford the common law lawyer
enlightening facil’ty [sic] in consulting the work, and a number of footnotes have been inserted throughout giving authorized definitions of words not defined in the text itself.119
Joannini’s preference for banishing common law English terms
such as bailments, chattels, and replevin to his index (itself over 100
pages), and explaining differences in legal concepts in footnotes,
may be considered a significant departure from Walton’s method.120
For Walton, the comparative work of the translator occurs within the
text; for Joannini, comparison appropriately belongs outside the text
or in the postliminary materials. It is an approach that is often followed today, but which was by no means universal at the time.
D. Wheless’s Brazilian Civil Code Translation (1920): A Modified
Civilian Approach
The Comparative Law Bureau’s final translation prior to its demise was Wheless’s Brazilian Civil Code of 1920. In large part,
Wheless followed Joannini’s method, although not nearly to the
same extent. The former’s approach is best described as an attempt
to give the translation a civilian feel, while suggesting possible avenues of comparison for the English-speaking lawyer with no
knowledge of Portuguese or limited background in the civil law.
Thus, Wheless, unlike Joannini, avoided many unusual civilian
terms that would not be familiar to common law practitioners: he
prefers ‘recover’ for reivindicar, 121 ‘guardian’ for tutor, 122 and
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at xix.
See, e.g., id. at 638, 642, 709 (index terms).
Braz. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. 2, art. 248 (reivindicar = recover).
Braz. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. 7, ch. 1 (tutela = guardian).
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‘merger’ for confusão. 123 Distinctive Louisiana legal English terms,
for the most part, have been omitted: there are no acquets and gains
or disinherison, 124 although obrigações solidarias has been rendered solidary obligations. 125 On the other hand, Wheless regularly
employed civil law English terms for Brazilian property and contract law concepts: he uses servitudes for servidões, movables and
immovables for bens moveis and immoveis, redhibitory vices for vicios redhibitorios, dation in payment for dação em pagamento. 126
Elsewhere, Wheless rendered Portuguese-language civil law concepts into jurisdiction-neutral civilian English but placed an analogous common law English term in parentheticals for clarification.
Thus: ‘compensation (set-off)’ for compensação, ‘mandate (powers
of attorney)’ for mandato, ‘deposit (bailment)’ for deposito. 127 In
many cases, Wheless simply left the original Portuguese-language
civil law term in parentheses. The result is a translation that presents
basic civilian concepts in civilian legal English where possible yet
does not rely on jurisdiction-specific civil law terms from Louisiana’s Civil Code.

123. See, e.g., Braz. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. 3, art. 804 (confusão = merger).
124. Cf. Braz. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. 3, ch. 15 (desherdação = disinheritance).
125. See, e.g., Braz. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. 1, ch. 6 (obrigações solidarias = solidary obligations).
126. See, e.g., Braz. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. 3, art. 674 (servidões = servitudes), Bk.
II (parte geral), tit. 1, ch.1 (bens immoveis, bens moveis = immovables, movables);
Bk. III, tit. 4, ch. 5 (vicios redhibitorios = redhibitory vices); Bk. III, tit. 2, ch. 6
(dação em pagamento = dation in payment). This last term is near to Louisiana’s
‘giving in payment’ or ‘dation in paiement’. Cf. La. Civ. C. arts. 2655-2659 (1870)
(giving in payment); see also Taylor v. Taylor, 24 So. 2d 74, 75 (La. 1945)
(likening Louisiana law’s giving in payment to common-law ‘accord and satisfaction’).
127. See, e.g., Braz. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. 2, ch. 7 (compensação = compensation
(set-off)); Bk. III, tit. 5, ch. 7 (mandato = mandate (powers of attorney)), Bk. III,
tit. 5, ch. 6 (deposito = deposit (bailment)).
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III. CRITICAL RESPONSES TO JOANNINI AND WHELESS: BOOK
REVIEWS FROM LEGAL SCHOLARS
Initially, civil law scholars took negligible interest in the War
Department translations. There was little comment, for example, on
Walton’s Spanish Civil Code translation or its methods, with one
notable exception. 128 Even less was said of Joannini’s Colombian
Civil Code translation when it appeared a few years later, although
the work was briefly mentioned by both the Harvard Law Review
and Green Bag. 129 Only Phanor Eder appears to have expressed an
appreciation of the utility of a Spanish-English code translation that
preferred civil law terms to legal English. In the preface to his 1910
translation of Colombia’s mining laws, Eder stated cryptically that:
[He was] somewhat indebted to the translations of the Civil
Code [of Colombia] . . . by Frank L. Joannini . . . for the
occasional rendering of a knotty word or phrase whose near
equivalent (exactness is so often impossible so widely do the
English and the Spanish systems of law differ) involved
much groping . . . . 130
When the Bureau turned to publishing its own civil code translations, however, interest from legal scholars was much greater. Reviews in leading law journals alternated between effusive praise and
strong criticism of Joannini’s and Wheless’s use of civilian terminology. At first, the reviews were largely positive, particularly for
Joannini’s Argentine Civil Code translation. For example, in an
128. The one exception was Joseph Henry Beale, Jr., whose otherwise positive
review in the Harvard Law Review complained that Walton’s translation was “not
always commendable; hispanicisms remain to obscure the sense, and per contra
certain terms of our own law are misapplied to unlike Spanish ideas.” Joseph
Henry Beale, Jr., The Civil Law in Spain and Spanish America, 14 HARV. L. REV.
160 (1900) (book review).
129. The Civil Code of the Republic of Panama, 19 HARV. L. REV. 76 (1905)
(book review); The Civil Code of the Republic of Panama and Amendatory Laws,
17 GREEN BAG 556, 556 (1905) (book review) (stating that the translation is “said
to be the first civil code of a Latin-American country to be translated into English.”). In fact, Joannini missed this distinction by at least a year. Cf. THE CIVIL
CODE OF THE MEXICAN FEDERAL DISTRICT AND TERRITORIES (J.P. Taylor trans.,
American Book & Printing Co. 1904).
130. PHANOR JAMES EDER, THE MINING LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
COLOMBIA 3 (Press of B.S. Adams 1912).
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April, 1917 review in the ABA Journal, New York attorney and politician F.D. Pavey praised Joannini for exhibiting the necessary sensitivity to civil law-common law distinctions in vocabulary:
One of the distinguishing features of the work is the manner
in which the use of the civil law terms and common law
terms has been co-ordinated. The translator, with excellent
judgment, has used literal translations of civil law terms in
the text of the translation. The corresponding ideas in AngloSaxon jurisprudence are usually expressed by terms of the
common law which were either taken from other sources or
were so altered in the course of their transit through the early
stages of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that they bear no resemblance to the civil law terms. 131
Likewise, in the same issue, former law librarian of Congress
and Yale law professor Edwin Borchard stated that:
No one who has had experience in rendering into English the
legal concepts embraced in the system of a civil law country
can fail to appreciate the difficulty of the translator’s task,
nor be unduly captious in the criticism of terminology. The
work under review incorporates civil law terms in literal
translation, such as ‘prestation,’ ‘mandatory,’ [sic] ‘rehibitory vices,’ [sic] ‘tutorship,’ ‘benefit of inventory,’ ‘fisc,’
‘usufruct,’ ‘paternal power,’ ‘revendication,’ ‘transaction,’
and numerous others. Sometimes the expression is explained
in a footnote, at other times the Anglo-American lawyer will
be compelled to bring to the subject some prior orientation.
This method, however, whatever its weakness, is preferable
to any attempt at a free translation, with its efforts, inevitably
misleading and inaccurate, to employ a complete commonlaw terminology. 132
In early 1918, however, negative reviews began to appear. Several comparatists criticized Joannini’s civilian vocabulary, arguing
that the translation method was a weakness, not a strength. Layton
Register, who had studied law in Madrid and wrote several articles
on French law from a comparative perspective, was the first to raise
131. Frank D. Pavey, The Argentine Civil Code, 3 A.B.A. J. 702, 704 (1917)
(book review).
132. Edwin M. Borchard, The Argentine Civil Code, 3 A.B.A. J. 707, 707
(1917) (book review).
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an objection. Register wrote in the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review that Joannini’s avoidance of legal English’s technical terms
was unnecessary, even counterproductive:
He [the translator] decided to avoid a search for English
equivalents and to take over bodily the terminology of modern Roman law. Against this method of itself we make no
criticism beyond the inartistic invention of taking over of
such words as ‘mandate,’ ‘benefit of inventory,’ ‘prestation,’
‘discussion,’ ‘dative,’ ‘dolous,’ ‘resolutory conditions,’ ‘solidary obligations,’ ‘onerous contract of life annuity,’ (there
is almost humor in this), ‘disinherison,’ ‘caution juratory,’
and many other terms that might be enumerated . . . . Moreover we do not at all admit that it is necessary to invent a
terminology for words of Roman origin used to describe legal institutions having a broad equivalent in the common law
system. Any work on general jurisprudence would have enlightened the translator on the universalities of such categories as ‘agency,’ ‘bailment,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘lien,’ ‘defect.’ There
[sic] need not be rendered by ‘mandate,’ ‘commodatum,’
‘offense,’ ‘privilege,’ ‘vice’ . . . . 133
Two months later, Joseph Drake, who taught both Roman and
Spanish civil law at Michigan, came to the translation’s defense. In
what was a generally positive assessment in the Michigan Law Review, Drake stated that “[t]he translator, who has already proved his
capacity in several translations for the Bureau of Insular Affairs, has
wisely transliterated civil law terms instead of attempting to find
common translations for them . . . .”134 The reviewer also praised
Joannini for placing every-day common law terms in a copious index “for those unacquainted with civil law phraseology.” 135
A final review, however, was the most negative by far: the author criticized Joannini’s use of exceptions and civil fruits instead of
allegedly “equivalent terms” from the common law such as defenses

133. Register, supra note 8, at 182.
134. Joseph H. Drake, The Argentine Civil Code, 16 MICH. L. REV. 460, 469
(1918) (book review).
135. Id.
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and income and questioned the choice of compensation for compensación (rather than set-off) and transaction for transacción. 136 Of
the last two examples, the reviewer stated that there was “no excuse”
for “literal translations which result in evident confusion with English words, colloquial or technical, of different meaning.” 137
Reviews of Wheless’s Brazilian Civil Code translation a few
years later were even more negative. Ernest Lorenzen, whose research and teaching straddled both comparative law and conflicts of
law, panned Wheless not for the quality of his translation, which he
acknowledged “to be fairly accurate,” but rather for his adherence
to civilian terminology. 138 In echoes of Register from a few years
before, Lorenzen wrote in the Yale Law Journal that:
A good translation requires furthermore that the original text
should be reduced into idiomatic English. In the case of a
legal work this means that so far as possible the translation
should be expressed in the legal terminology familiar to English and American lawyers. In this respect the translation is
subject to criticism. In large number of instances where it
would have been perfectly easy to give the English [i.e.,
common law] equivalent the Portuguese words have been
simply anglicized. 139
In particular, Lorenzen criticized Wheless’s use of tradition instead of ‘delivery’ (for tradição), dation in payment instead of ‘giving in payment’ (for dação em pagamento), transaction instead of
‘compromise’ (for transação), and compromise instead of ‘arbitration’ (for compromisso), etc. 140
The most revealing of all the reviews, however, must be Max
Radin’s critique of Wheless’s translation in the California Law Review. According to Radin,

136. F.S. Philbrick, The Argentine Civil Code Together with the Constitution
and Law of Civil Registry, 13 ILL. L. REV. 64, 67-69 (1918) (book review).
137. Id. at 69.
138. Lorenzen, supra note 8, at 652.
139. Id. at 652-53.
140. Id. at 653.
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In all translation it is difficult to keep one’s linguistic balance, and the most careful writer finds himself lured into literal renderings that are quite unidiomatic in English. In law
the difficulty is increased by the fact that we have to translate
a fixed and technical terminology of one system of law into
the fixed and technical terminology of a wholly different
one. Most of the terms, even when superficially alike, have
wholly different implications. 141
In other words, Radin recognized the difference between the two
legal systems in question but cautioned against transliterations that
led to confusion with legal English. From Radin’s point of view, the
job of the translator was principally to overcome the inconveniences
of difference by rendering civil law concepts into the common law’s
“fixed and technical terminology.” If there were too much risk of
confusion, Radin argued for leaving such terms in the original language, which he criticized Wheless for doing too sparingly. 142
IV. COMPETING COMPARATIST PARADIGMS OF CIVIL LAWCOMMON LAW DIFFERENCE
Criticism of Joannini’s approach to legal translation might suggest, at first, a lack of sophistication about civilian terminology on
the part of the more-negative reviewers, or at least minimal awareness that use of legal English for distinct civil law concepts could
obscure the nuances of civil law-common law difference. Yet such
conclusions must be rejected, for Register, Lorenzen, and Radin
were all scholars of civilian systems, and their writings reveal that
they were well-acquainted with some of the critical differences between the two traditions. 143 Instead, their indifference to preserving

141. Radin, supra note 8, at 444.
142. Id. at 443.
143. Register studied modern civil law in Paris and Madrid before the First
World War and wrote mostly about comparative and international law topics. See,
e.g., Layton B. Register, A Morning at the Paris Law School, 61 U. PA. L. REV.
33 (1912); Layton B. Register, The Dual System of Civil and Commercial Law,
61 U. PA. L. REV. 240 (1913). He also contributed to several legal translation projects himself. See, e.g., SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD: SELECT ESSAYS BY VARIOUS
AUTHORS (Ernest Brunker & Layton B. Register trans., Boston Book Co. 1917).
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a separate civilian vocabulary in English (in the case of Register and
Lorenzen) was an informed one and more likely reflects assumptions about the nature of civil law-common law difference that were
widely-held among early 20th century American legal scholars.
Such assumptions in turn affected attitudes to perceived differences
in legal terminology as well as legal translation.
Of these assumptions, the most important was the widespread
belief (reaching then perhaps the height of its influence) that the civil
and common law traditions were more alike than previously thought
and that remaining differences were historically contingent or declining in importance. 144 The popular form of this theory likely had
its origins with Henry Sumner Maine’s “Roman Law and Legal Education,” first published in the 1856 Cambridge Essays and included
in later editions of Village-communities in the East and West (1871),
in which the English legal historian argued that the world’s two great
legal systems, English law and Roman law, were becoming more
alike as English law followed a similar trajectory of historical development. 145 Moreover, the British Empire’s rapid commercial and
Lorenzen is better known for his work on conflicts of law, but he also wrote several articles on Roman, civil, and comparative law and was an occasional contributor to both American and French comparative law journals. See, e.g., Ernest Gustav Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28 YALE L.J.
621 (1919) (comparing civil law and common law doctrines); Ernest Gustav Lorenzen, The German 1908 Law of Checks, 2 ANN. BULL. 29 (1909); see also Arthur L. Corbin, Ernest Gustav Lorenzen, 60 YALE L.J. 579, 580 (1951) (describing
Lorenzen’s academic background and interest in Roman and European comparative law). Lorenzen’s preoccupation with private international law, however, undoubtedly colored his attitudes to the potential purposes of legal comparison. By
contrast, Radin was destined for a career as a Roman and civil law scholar. See,
e.g., MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW (West Publ’g Co. 1927); Max Radin, Fundamental Concepts of Roman Law, 13 CAL. L. REV. 207 (1925).
144. See, e.g., HOWE, supra note 13 (lecture I) (arguing that Roman and English law were more similar than typically imagined and proposing numerous examples). Howe believed that historical development, rather than cultural conditions, explained most differences between national legal systems, and he thought
classical and modern civil law very similar. About Roman and American admiralty practice, Howe claimed (without any sense of hyperbole) that “[i]f the gracious shade of Ulpian could appear in a district court of the United States in an
admiralty case, he would require but a brief preparation either in principle or practice.” HOWE, supra note 56, at 48.
145. See Henry Sumner Maine, Roman Law and Legal Education, in
CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS 1, 2 (1856):
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colonial expansion brought English lawyers into renewed contact
with civilian systems and encouraged English lawyers to think of
English and Roman law as the twin foundations of world law. By
1901, James Bryce was predicting that, though neither system was
likely “to overpower or absorb the other” in geopolitical terms, it
was nevertheless possible that “they may draw nearer, and that out
of them there may be developed, in the course of ages, a system of
rules of private law which shall be practically identical as regards
contracts and property and civil wrongs . . . .” 146 A generation later,
Radin himself stated that, “[t]he most obvious movement in law at
the present time is the gradual assimilation which is taking place
between the modified Roman law of most modern countries and the
only system that can pretend to rival it, the common law of England,
the United States, Canada and Australia.” 147
The idea that English law and Roman law were growing more
alike was initially rooted in abstract (and often erroneous) theories
of the common law’s historical development, but political events
during the period tended to lend credibility to such explanations.
Among these was the steady development of mixed legal systems,

It is not because our own jurisprudence and that of Rome were once alike
that they ought to be studied together – it is because they will be alike. It
is because all laws, however dissimilar in their infancy, tend to resemble
each other in their maturity; and because we in England are slowly, and
perhaps unconsciously or unwillingly, but still steadily and certainly accustoming ourselves to the same modes of legal thought and to the same
conceptions of legal principle to which the Roman jurisconsults had attained after centuries of accumulated experience and unwearied cultivation (emphasis in original).
See also HENRY SUMNER MAINE, VILLAGE-COMMUNITIES IN THE EAST AND
WEST 332-33 (3d ed., H. Holt 1880). But see Michele Graziadei, Changing
Images of the Law in XIX Century English Legal Thought, in THE RECEPTION
OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD 1820-1920 (Mathias
Reimann ed., Duncker & Humblot 1993) (examining 19th century trends in
English legal history and their effects on perceptions of similarity/difference
with continental legal systems and stating that assumptions of a close (historical) relationship between Roman and English law were already in decline by
last quarter of 19th century).
146. JAMES BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 122-23 (Oxford
U. Press 1901).
147. RADIN, supra note 143, at 101.
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both in the British Empire as a result of 18th and 19th century imperial growth (for example, in Lower Canada and the Cape Colony),
as well as in the United States’ new insular territories (such as Puerto
Rico, the Philippines, and, briefly, Panama). The creation of these
systems, which generally combined English (or American) public
law and some form of modern civil law, suggested the interchangeability or compatibility of civil and common law systems, or at least
the declining significance of civil law-common law distinctions. At
the very most, bijural mixing promised new opportunities for judges
to select the best rules from each tradition to create a third, superior,
system, a project not unrelated to the original goals of European
comparative law. 148 In this spirit, R.W. Lee, a Roman-Dutch scholar
with practical and academic experience in the legal systems of Quebec and Ceylon, pronounced in 1915 that “we are at the end of the
time in which it is still possible to contemplate the Civil Law and
the Common Law as separate and self-contained entities . . . . They
are becoming assimilated.” 149 The French comparatist Henri LévyUllmann came to a similar conclusion in an article reviewing the
development of another mixed jurisdiction, Scotland. LévyUllmann happily predicted that the future “law of the civilised nations” would be, like Scots law, a “combination between the AngloSaxon system and the continental system.” 150

148. Cf. Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Cultural Voices of Judges and Jurist:
Purists, Pragmatists, and Pollutionists, in MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE,
supra note 11, at 41 (associating this view of the mixed jurisdictions as “laboratories of comparative law” with “pragmatists”).
149. R.W. Lee, Civil Law and Common Law: A World Survey, 14 MICH. L.
REV. 89, 100 (1915) (“The law of the future, like the first man fashioned by Prometheus, will consist of particles gathered from every side, will be as composite
as an English plum pudding.”). Others were more skeptical about Roman-Dutch
law’s capacity for survival against the onslaught of English common law’s global
expansion. See, e.g., F.W. MAITLAND, ENGLISH LAW AND THE RENAISSANCE 31
(Cambridge U. Press 1901) (Rede lecture) (stating that “the so-called ‘Roman
Dutch’ law of certain outlying parts of the British Empire now stands alone, and
few, I imagine, would foretell for it a brilliant future . . . .”).
150. Henri Lévy-Ullmann, Law of Scotland, 37 JURID. REV. 370, 390 (1925).
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American comparatists soon put such theories to use in their own
Pan-American context. In the Virginia Law Review’s very first article, Hannis Taylor, following Bryce, argued that it was “hard to
overestimate the importance of the fusion now going on between
Roman private and English public law in the state systems of Latin
America,” a reference to the mix of private law and republican forms
of government in the independent republics of South America. 151
Extrapolating from Latin American examples to a more global perspective, Taylor asked his readers rhetorically, “[W]ho is willing to
deny that out of this fusion of Roman private and English public law
there is arising throughout the world a new and composite state system, whose outer shell is English constitutional law, including jury
trials in criminal cases, and whose interior code is Roman private
law?”152 For those in doubt, Taylor argued that Louisiana showed
what could be accomplished. As early as 1899, he told the state’s
bar that their mixed jurisprudence was an “epitome of all that is best
in the past, and as an index finger that points to the ultimate form
which the state system of the Western Hemisphere may possibly assume.” 153
For Bureau founder William Smithers, the two opportunities for
legal mixing presented by the new insular possessions and the PanAmerican movement were directly-related. In 1909, Smithers gleefully announced that the mixing of Spanish civil and Anglo-American common law in the United States was leading to the “inauguration of a distinct system to be known as American law” which would
“draw perfection from every juridical, philosophical, ethical and political source . . .” available, irrespective of national origin. 154 Two
years later, he touted the benefits of better knowledge of Hispanic
151. Hannis Taylor, The Jurisprudence of Latin America, 1 VA. L. REV. 1, 13
(1913).
152. Id.
153. Hannis Taylor, A Comparative Study of Roman and English Law, in the
Old World and the New, 7 AM. LAW. 473, 476 (1899).
154. William W. Smithers, Comparative Law as a Practical Science 5 (1909)
(paper given at Pennsylvania Bar Association meeting).
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legal systems so that the Hispanic world’s civil law systems might
“be amalgamated with the Common Law and later American legislation.” 155 Perceptions that the uniform state law movement held out
an important opportunity for commercial integration during a period
of national economic expansion likewise reinforced assumptions
that comparison’s primary utility was to mitigate the myriad (usually commercial) inconveniences of legal diversity. It is significant
that several comparatists considered here, including Smithers and
Walton, were supporters of the uniform state law movement and that
Lobingier twice proposed extending the movement’s successes to
the Philippines. 156 In addition, Register’s writings appear to suggest
that his own interest in comparison centered on the promise of harmonizing systems, while Lorenzen’s interests in private international law reflect a similar hermeneutic. 157
From far parts of the globe, American colonial judges also
joined voices such as Taylor’s and Smithers’ by insisting that legal
blending was not only feasible but that legal difference could be
overcome with facility. In particular, several American territorial
judges in the Philippines argued that they were witnessing legal convergence between the civil law and the common law in their own
courtrooms and boasted that the process was proceeding without incident. For example, Charles Lobingier, a trial judge sitting on the
Court of First Instance in Manila, wrote in 1911 that the task of
155. William W. Smithers, Latin America, 3 ANN. BULL. 14, 15 (1911) (explicitly linking comparison and Pan-Americanism).
156. See William W. Smithers, Editorial Miscellany, 3 ANN. BULL. 10 (1910)
(“The educative force of the many years devoted to uniform legislation has not
only secured national recognition for that work, but aroused a sense of appreciation, both lay and professional, to the advantages of comparative law study generally.”); Charles S. Lobingier, Civil Law Rights through Common Law Remedies,
20 JURID. REV. 97 (1908) (recommending the extension of uniform state law
movement to Philippines); Charles S. Lobingier, Codification in the Philippines,
3 ANN. BULL. 42 (1910) (similar) [hereinafter Lobingier, Codification].
157. In general, Register never liked a civil law system better than when it was
in the process of adopting common-law methods. See, e.g., Layton B. Register,
Judicial Powers of Interpretation under Foreign Codes, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 39, 39,
50 (1916) (expressing cautious optimism that Swiss Civil Code of 1912’s preliminary title had opened door to greater use of case law as supplementary legal authority).
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American courts in that colony had been to “adjust, harmonize and
blend the two distinct systems.” 158 Clearly satisfied with the progress made over the previous decade, Lobingier told fellow Bureau
members that “the experiment has demonstrated the feasibility of
blending segments of the Civil and the Common (Anglo-American)
law, the two systems which divide the civilized world, thus confirming the view that at root the two are really one.” 159
Assumptions that civil law-common law difference was illusory
or declining in importance soon had a predictable impact on attitudes to civilian terminology. English-speaking civil law scholars,
in their efforts to explain allegedly superficial distinctions between
the two systems, frequently promoted the idea that such distinctions
were principally limited to differences in procedure and vocabulary,
rather than substance. For example, in his widely-read Studies in the
Civil Law, Howe had argued that the “difference between the civil
law and the common law is by no means so great as some persons
imagine . . . . There are differences of terminology, which, to some,
seem strange and alien, but when they are once understood, the leading doctrines are found to be much the same.” 160 In fact, Howe told
his readers, the common law’s “technical terms” largely covered the
same “topics” of the civil law. 161 In the opinion of Sir Frederick Pollock, “[t]he more we look into other civilized [i.e., non-English]
modern laws, the more we shall find that under all differences of
terminology and procedure the results come out not much unlike.” 162
158. Lobingier, Juridical Fusion, supra note 13, at 38-39. See also the comments of American colonial judge George Malcolm a few years later, which are
very similar. Philippine Law, 11 ILL. L. REV. 331, 332 (1917) (“The two great
streams of the law, the civil, the legacy of Rome to Spain coming from the west,
and the common, the inheritance of the United States from Great Britain coming
from the east, have here in the Philippines, met and blended.”).
159. Lobingier, Codification, supra note 156, at 41-42 (citing BRYCE, supra
note 146, at 122-23).
160. HOWE, supra note 13, at 149 (emphasis supplied).
161. Id. at 8.
162. Frederick Pollock, Genius of the Common Law, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 660,
661 (1912).
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It is interesting to note that Pollock’s comment was followed
with the claim that, “[n]o sane and impartial man will believe that in
the main there is not as good justice in Edinburgh as in London, or
at Montreal as at Toronto,” a clear reference to two mixed systems
(Scotland and Quebec). 163 Indeed, it was evidence from the mixed
systems that convinced many that vocabularies were the last to
merge in the process of legal convergence. Thus, Lee, predicting
that the civil law and common law were blending on a global scale,
claimed that the two traditions’ “assimilation will, before very long,
be complete, the difference, if any remains, being a difference rather
of terminology than of substance,” a conclusion similar to Pollock’s. 164 Likewise, in an article reviewing the common law’s rapid
global spread, Roscoe Pound (yet another early Bureau member) described the outlier Louisiana as a “common-law system in all but its
terminology” and stated elsewhere that “[e]xcept as it lingers in their
legal vocabulary, the Scotch have almost abandoned Roman law in
all their courts.” 165 In The Spirit of the Common Law, Pound cast
significant doubt on the civil law’s very survival in the mixed systems, apart from their unique legal lexicons, when he stated that
“[i]n the Philippines and in Porto Rico there are many signs that
common-law administration of a Roman code will result in a system
Anglo-American in substance if Roman-Spanish in its terms.”166
Comments such as these suggest a prevalent suspicion that civilian
vocabularies were holdovers of a past era of legal diversity. Moreover, the emphasis on terminology as the principal locus of difference
or the fading indicia of a divided past was clearly a consistent theme
for many English-speaking scholars of the period and one that reflected their specific historical and political circumstances.

163. Id. at 661-62.
164. Lee, supra note 149, at 100.
165. Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, 18 GREEN BAG 17, 17-18
(1906) (citations omitted).
166. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 2 (Marshall Jones Co.
1921).
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By contrast, it was among those comparatists who emphasized
civil law-common law difference in their scholarship (law professors such as Borchard and Sherman) or who expressed skepticism
about the speed of the hypothesized global legal convergence (such
as the colonial judge Peter Hamilton) that criticism of Walton’s
translation, and praise of Joannini’s and Wheless’s, was most reliably encountered. 167
V. CONCLUSIONS
Scholars of comparative law have frequently noted the important
role that intellectual history and global politics have played in the
discipline’s development, both in terms of its scholarly ambitions
and its fundamental assumptions. 168 The history of English-speaking comparison in particular is replete with examples (some dating
to the early modern period) of the impact of contemporary trends in
politics and ideology on English and American attitudes to the civil
law tradition. 169 Indeed, shifting priorities in domestic politics and
167. See, e.g., Peter J. Hamilton, The Civil Law and the Common Law, 36
HARV. L. REV. 180, 190 & n.25 (1922) (expressing more-skeptical stance to rapid
civil law-common law convergence, criticizing Walton’s translation of causa as
consideration); Charles P. Sherman, Salient Features of the Argentine Law of
Sale, 14 ILL. L. REV. 617, 618 & n.9 (1920) (praising Joannini’s translation as a
“splendid work”); Charles P. Sherman, Salient Features of the Brazilian Law of
Sale, 42 CAN. L. TIMES 648, 650 & n. 4 (1922) (praising Wheless’s translation as
a “most excellent and scholarly work”); see also Edwin M. Borchard, Some Lessons from the Civil Law, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 570, 581 (1916) (emphasizing substantive differences between civil law and common law systems, in particular use
of stare decisis).
168. See, e.g., Gerhard Danneman, Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or
Differences?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 386-89 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford U. Press 2006) (discussing
20th-century comparative law’s emphasis on legal convergence); see also Maria
Pargendler, The Rise and Decline of Legal Families, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 1043,
1062-73 (2012) (describing 19th-century globalization’s effects on comparative
thought and stating that “[i]n the rapidly globalizing world of the nineteenth-century, early comparatists seemed less concerned with measuring differences across
legal systems than with paving the way for legal convergence. The purpose of
most comparative works was to search for common ground amidst apparent diversity.”).
169. See BRIAN P. LEVACK, THE CIVIL LAWYERS IN ENGLAND, 1603-1641: A
POLITICAL STUDY (Clarendon Press 1973), ch. 3-5 (examining the relationship
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intellectual history have often shaped common law views of the civil
law tradition in either positive (when viewed as a scientific or universal system) or negative directions (when viewed as fundamentally foreign). 170 As the degree of difference between the two systems has taken on important implications for European legal integration, what had once been a particular preoccupation of Englishspeaking legal scholars has become an important concern and point
of debate among European comparatists as well. 171
The turn of the last century was one such moment in the cyclical
history of changing common law attitudes to the civil law tradition,
particularly in American comparative thought. Both Pan-Americanism’s emphasis on uniform commercial legislation and legal mixing
in the new insular possessions created heightened expectations of
legal convergence across the civil law-common law frontier, though
between political ideology and Puritan/Royalist attitudes to English civil law tradition during period leading up to Civil War); Luigi Moccia, English Attitudes to
the Civil Law, 2 J. LEG. HIST. 157, 159-60, 164 (1981) (arguing that “traditional,
‘antagonistic’ attitude of common lawyers towards ‘civil law’ . . . finds an explanation in [17th century] English constitutional history . . . .”); see also Peter Stein,
The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 52 VA. L. REV.
403, 407-14 (1966) (discussing early 19th century American lawyers’ interest in
civil law tradition and attributing use of civil law to variety of practical and intellectual factors).
170. Compare Daniel R. Coquillette, Legal Ideology and Incorporation I: The
English Civilian Writers, 1523-1607, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1981) (noting
traditional Whig/common-law associations of the civil law tradition in general
with royal absolutism), and HOWE, supra note 56, at 37 (“[W]e may all admit that
down to times long after those of Blackstone the civil law was associated in the
minds of many Englishmen with a system that was thought to be most hostile and
alien to the liberties of England.”), with R.H. Helmholz, Continental Law and
Common Law: Historical Strangers or Companions?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1207,
1224-26 (1990) (discussing early American perceptions of civil law as closer to
natural law and universal legal principles and concluding that during period
“[n]either English nor American lawyers seemed to regard the division between
common law and civil law as an absolute and unbridgeable gulf.”), and M.H.
Hoeflich, Comparative Law in Antebellum America, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD.
L. REV. 535, 536 (2005) (stating that, “by the second decade of the nineteenth
century, the English common law was widely seen as the legal system of a tyrannous enemy regime,” identifying this attitude as one of several “reasons for American jurists to look at other legal systems . . . .” for answers to legal problems).
171. See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are Not Converging,
45 INT’L L. & COMP. L.Q. 52, 64 (1996) (arguing that, despite European comparatists’ de-emphasis of civil law-common law difference in support of EU’s project
of legal integration, the two traditions are “irreducibly different”).
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in different contexts. Political developments in both spheres of activity prompted ideologically-motivated justifications for such convergence, including the proposition that future mixed systems would
be stronger or combine the best of both traditions. 172 Indeed, overcoming civil law-common law difference was inherent to both processes, and the expansion of English common law at the civil law’s
expense in the bijural systems had additional implications for perceptions of difference in legal terminology.
That perceptions of civil law-common law difference might
have affected contemporary attitudes to legal translation of civilian
concepts into English should hardly be surprising given the close
relationship between legal English and the common law tradition.173
The stakes are particularly high in mixed jurisdictions where English-speaking judges and lawyers may unknowingly import common
law doctrines into civilian jurisprudence via the use of legal English, 174 and the possibility of injury to the civilian interpretative
framework is also suggested when we recall that “the language of a
civil code in particular, is also a technical and scientific language.” 175 In response, several scholars of Louisiana’s civil law tradition caution strongly against such translation approaches and argue convincingly that it is possible to express the civil law in English
without adopting the terms and concepts of the common law.176
172. See, e.g., José Trías Monge, Legal Methodology in Some Mixed Jurisdictions, 78 TUL. L. REV. 333, 349-50 (2003) (arguing that American colonial judges
embraced “Fantasy of the Wise Mix” and “Fantasy of the Unification of Law” as
ideological justifications for introduction of common law concepts into early 20th
century Puerto Rican and Filipino jurisprudence).
173. See GUTTERIDGE, supra note 1, at 117-18; Rotman, supra note 1, at 189;
Moréteau, supra note 1, at 706-09; Levasseur & Feliú supra note 1, at 735.
174. See, e.g., T.B. Smith, The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition, in CIVIL
LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 16 (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed. 1965) (“[L]et
me stress that mixed legal systems which use English as the language of the courts
are particularly exposed to subversion through imposition or incautious acceptance of technical terms of Anglo-American common lawyers as equivalents
to civilian concepts. A torrent of alien jurisprudence can pour through the
breaches thus made.”).
175. ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, DECIPHERING A CIVIL CODE: SOURCES OF LAW
AND METHODS OF INTERPRETATION 61 (2015).
176. See, e.g., Levasseur & Feliú, supra note 1, at 717 (arguing that:
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Alain Levasseur and Vicenç Feliú in particular have stated that the
Louisiana Civil Code’s 200-year history is proof that a “uniform”
and “consistent” translation into English of civil law concepts of
similar lexical origin is feasible, regardless of whether the source
language is Spanish or French. 177 Elsewhere, Levasseur and Randall
Trahan argue for the special importance of “securing the survival of
the civil law tradition in general by anchoring it in the English language and not just any English language, but an English language
different from the English language of the common law.” 178
Against this backdrop, Joannni’s use of Louisiana’s special civilian vocabulary at the turn of the last century appears remarkably
prescient. It is perhaps also ironic that his resort to Louisiana’s special legal lexicon came at a period in time when that state’s future
identity as a civilian jurisdiction was itself in doubt, a historical moment reflected in Pound’s assumption of the common law’s total triumph there. 179 Moreover, the attention to the subtle nuances of civil
law-common law difference embraced by Levasseur, Feliú, and Trahan may reflect a high degree of concern for keeping the two tradi-

[T]here is no need to resort to the legal vocabulary found in the Common
Law of England to express the ‘civil law in English.’ Actually, we are
issuing a strong warning against any such attempt. The survival of the
civil law system in the English language of the Louisiana Civil Code
since 1808 is a vivid testimony that the civil law can exist in ‘English’
as long as it is an English that has been tested and tried in a civil law
environment.);
see also Agustín Parise, A Translator’s Toolbox: The Law, Moreau-Lislet’s Library, and the Presence of Multilingual Dictionaries in Nineteenth-Century Louisiana, 76 LA. L. REV. 1163, 1164-65 (2016) (stating that “[s]cholars both of Continental European and common law systems may look to Louisiana for civil law
terminology in English” and arguing that “scholars should esteem the more than
200-year-old tradition of English language civil law codification in Louisiana.”).
177. Levasseur & Feliú, supra note 1, at 735.
178. Alain A. Levasseur & J. Randall Trahan, Our Approach to Translation,
in GÉRARD CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE xiv (Alain Levasseur & Marie-Eugénie Laporte-Legeais trans., Lexis Nexis 2014).
179. See, e.g., A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law: A Lost Cause?, 54
TUL. L. REV. 830, 833-34 (1980) (reviewing perceptions of Louisiana lawyers of
the 1910s-1930s that the state was no longer a predominantly civilian jurisdiction).
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tions separate as independent sources of jurisprudence. At a minimum, they suggest the worldview of the “purist” or “pragmatist”
rather than the “pollutionist.” 180 Yet in some eras, legal pollution
has been regarded as a virtue, and the difference between pollution
and pragmatism has become obscured or contested as particular ideological requirements shifted.
F.L. Joannini worked in such an era. Yet, despite comparatist
crosscurrents to the contrary, he remained resolutely sensitive to the
implications of legal diversity across numerous translations spanning more than a decade. If, as has been argued here, his contemporaries viewed civil law-common law difference as a matter of terminology and procedure, rather than substance, then it is not surprising
that some reviewers were relatively indifferent to the risks inherent
in translating civilian concepts into legal English. Certainly, such
critics were not likely to welcome the preservation of allegedly superficial civil law-common law distinctions through the introduction
or incorporation of unique civilian English terms. This would be especially true if they shared the assumption of some legal scholars
that terms such as compensation, transaction, and dation survived
only as civilian fig-leaves for nakedly universal legal categories.
Such attitudes may also help explain the mix of positive and negative reviews for Joannini’s Argentine Civil Code translation and that
of Wheless after him. Indeed, the fact that in a slightly-different context Clifford Walton took a radically divergent approach and largely
escaped criticism for it suggests how unpredictable opinions on civil
law-common law difference were at the beginning of the last century.
“Translation illustrates the inseparability of law and language,
and the field of translation is an extraordinarily rich source for insights into the process of comparison,” states one comparatist

180. See Palmer, supra note 148, at 39-44 (offering a paradigm for mixed jurisdiction “purists” and “pollutionists”).
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scholar. 181 In the case of Joannini’s Spanish-English civil code
translations, both the translator’s method and contemporary comparatist reviews are indeed “rich sources.” Each provides us with a
glimpse of early 20th century comparatist perceptions of civil lawcommon law difference at a critical moment in the history of PanAmericanism and in the evolution of this country’s current and former mixed legal systems. Joannini’s embrace of the special civilian
language of the Louisiana Civil Code also demonstrates yet another
way in which that state’s civil law tradition has served as a vehicle
for U.S.-Latin American legal comparison. 182

181. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43, 54 (1998).
182. See, e.g., Parise, Hispanic Codifications, supra note 106 (describing influence of Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 on 19th-century Latin American codifications).
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Within the European Union, this process of informal and decentralized rulemaking has not yet resulted in the enactment of a European
Civil Code (as even the CESL enactment has failed), but it has influenced national law (the modernization of the German BGB, the
Dutch Civil Code, and the reform of the French Civil Code). This
direct influence on national law constitutes one of the aims of these
harmonizing legal texts as stated in the introduction to the “Draft
Common Frame of Reference.”
In Spain, the Civil Code enacted in 1889 has not been modernized, although the Supreme Court has seen harmonized European
Law as an instrument to integrate national law, especially through
the construction of a new system of contractual liability (providing
a unitary concept of non-performance and fundamental non-performance, rules regarding termination of contract, and change of circumstances), recognising that the solutions of the Civil Code are
mostly unsuitable for the new social reality.
Otherwise the construction of the acquis communautaire has delivered a body of norms aimed at the protection of consumers (generally as the result of the transposition of EU legislation). This large
volume of special regulations has been gathered together in a single
“Consumer Protection Act” in Spain. In a different way, other countries such as Germany or the Netherlands have recently made the
decision to incorporate consumer protection regulations into their
civil codes.
Keywords: harmonized European private law, acquis communautaire, modernization of European Civil Codes
I. INTRODUCTION
The clear tendency to modify the traditional civil codes of the
late 19th century and the legal principles of the 20th, 1 permits us to
talk of a process of recodification in the 21st century. This may be

1. It has happened not only in Europe, with the examples of the German,
Dutch and French Civil Codes, but also in other countries like Japan. The Japanese
Civil Code, 110 years since its enactment, is in the process of a fundamental reform, particularly in the field of the law of obligations.
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due to a variety of reasons, but one of them is undoubtedly the fact
that the social and economic premises of civil society upon which
those codes were built have been transformed.
Another element to be considered is the existence of an increasingly harmonized body of transnational and international contract
law formulated as a response to the rapid globalisation of the market
economy. This has also contributed to bringing together the civil law
and common law, traditionally split as two different systems. 2 Some
of the normative frameworks that have contributed to bridging the
differences inside Europe are the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG 3), the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, the
Principles of European private law (UNIDROIT Principles), the
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) and the Common European Sales Law (CESL 4).
A further impetus for change has been the necessities of legal
practice, as civil law courts have seen the need to create a huge collection of case-law-like norms outside the letter of the civil codes in
order to make their application practicable. All of these changes indicate the necessity of both a re-examination of the Spanish Civil
Code’s guiding principles and a recodification process. 5 In 2009, the
2. European harmonized legal texts have been a source of inspiration for
national legislators around Europe. In some cases because the traditional civil
codes were found to be outdated (as in Germany), in other cases because the political situation has changed, as has been the case of post-communist Eastern Europe. In relation to the latter case, see Lajos Vékás, About Contract Law in the
New Hungarian Civil Code, in 6 EUROPEAN REVIEW OF CONTRACT LAW 95-98
(Stefan Grundmann ed., de Gruyter 2010); TADAS ZUKAS, EINFLUSS DER
“UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS” UND DER
“PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW” AUF DIE TRANSFORMATION DES
VERTRAGSRECHTS IN LITAUEN (Stämpfli 2011); Mónika Jónzon, The Influence of
European Private Law on the New Romanian Civil Code, 3 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT 568 (2012).
3. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG].
4. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 0635 final (Oct. 11, 2011) [hereinafter CESL].
5. This is the situation in Spain and in France, where case law has developed
some rules that do not correspond with those contained in the “black letter” of the
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Spanish Ministry of Justice published two proposals to reform the
Spanish Civil Code (Law of Obligations) and the Commercial Code.
The two proposals were elaborated by the so called Comisión General de Codificación, 6 but the modernization has not yet taken place.
The Spanish Supreme Court has seen harmonized European Law as
an instrument to be integrated into national law, especially through
the construction of a new system of contractual liability (providing
a unitary concept of non-performance and fundamental non-performance, rules regarding termination of contract, and change of circumstances), recognising that the solutions of the Civil Code are
mostly unsuitable for the new social reality.
The drafters of the new acts seeking to modernize the traditional
civil codes in Europe addressed a large body of norms, fragmented
as a result of the transposition of European Community (EC) legislation 7 and created with the aim of protecting consumers. These acts
have generally been left outside of each nation’s civil code. These
are mainly specialized statutes that regulate specific situations inside
a contract where it is necessary to protect consumers. In relation to
general contract terms, standard-form contracts are nowadays a
common feature of commercial relationships. This type of contract
does not fit well with codes that have been structured around the
sanctity of the 19th century principle of party autonomy. Despite the
potential benefits of standard provisions from the point of view of
norm. For the situation in Spain, see Luz M. Martínez Velencoso, National
Courts: How Can They Keep Track?, in COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW MEETS
REALITY (Matthias Lehmann ed., Sellier European Law Pubs 2015). In France,
one of the reasons for the enactment of Ordinance no. 2016-131, Feb. 10, 2016,
reforming contract law, was that contract law had become a largely judge-made
law. Since 1804, contract law has evolved very significantly outside of the Code
thanks to the Court of Cassation.
6. Comisión General de Codificación, Propuesta de Anteproyecto de Ley de
modernización del Derecho de obligaciones y contratos, Boletín de Información
del Ministerio de Justicia (Supp. Jan. 2009) [hereinafter Spanish proposal to reform the Civil Code].
7. One characteristic of EU Contract Law is fragmentation, as it does not
contain any general rules applicable to all types of contracts and all types of contracting parties, nor does it address every issue that could arise in the life cycle of
a contract.
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the economic analysis of the law, courts tend to treat them with great
suspicion. The ability of businesses to identify the efficient allocation of risks also gives them the opportunity to exploit consumers
(or adherents in general) by printing standards terms much more favourable to them than to consumers, hence imposing upon them hidden risks. 8 That is the reason why the Spanish Supreme Court is applying a so called control of transparency, understood as an instrument to make sure that “the consumer has real knowledge of what
the financial sacrifice is and of the legal burden that is derived from
the contract.” 9 Consequently, any clauses introduced in the contract
that suffer from this lack of transparency are null and void.
II. NEW TRENDS IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW:
THE SITUATION IN SPAIN
A. A Special Body of Norms for the Protection of Consumers
The acquis communautaire is a body of norms (the result of the
transposition of EC legislation) aimed at the protection of consumers that have generally been kept out of national civil codes. These
specialized statutes usually deal with specific situations inside a
contract where it is necessary to protect consumers (such as consumer credits, guarantees in the sale, general contract terms, etc.).
The sheer volume of special regulations has complicated the application of the law to the extent that some countries, such as Spain,
Austria, France, Greece, and the UK, 10 have opted to collect these

8. Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting
in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (2002).
9. See Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Sept. 8, 2014 (RJ 2014/4660).
10. For Spain, see Real Decreto Legislativo (Royal Legislative Decree) no.
1/2007 (B.O.E. 2007, 287). For France, see CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION (Law
no. 92-60, Jan. 18, 1992). For Austria, see BUNDESGESETZ (Federal Act) [B.G.],
Mar. 8, 1979, establishing provisions for the protection of consumers. For Greece,
see Law no. 2251/1994 on the protection of consumers. For United Kingdom, see
the Consumer Rights Act 2015, an Act that consolidates existing consumer protection legislation and also gives consumers a number of new rights and remedies.
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norms in a single “Consumer Protection Act” or “Consumer Code”
that, while not exactly a codification of consumer rules, is effectively a compilation of them. 11 The concept of consumer does not
appear at all in the civil code of any of these countries (provided of
course that they have one), yet there is a big distinction in their contract law between special contracts concluded with consumers and
ordinary contracts. In the latter, the traditional principle of freedom
of contract is stronger because consumer protection norms are normally mandatory. Nevertheless, in recent decades, some countries
such as Germany12 and The Netherlands 13 have incorporated the
concept of consumer into their civil codes. The matter is of significance, as the majority of contracts in Europe are consumer contracts. 14
An intermediate solution was adopted in Italy and in Austria. In
Italy, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 15 and the Directive on
certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees 16 were implemented by inclusion in the Italian Civil Code of
new provisions (arts. 1469 bis-1469 sexies, 1519 bis-1519 nonies)
that basically reproduce the content of the second aforementioned

It was enacted with the aim of providing a “modern framework of consumer
rights,” at https://perma.cc/H7QZ-3TQB.
11. Brigitta Lurger, The ‘Social’ Side of Contract Law and the New Principle
of Regard and Fairness, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE (4th ed., Arthur
S. Hartkamp et al. eds., Kluwer 2010).
12. The German Civil Code, modified in 2002, includes the EC consumer
protection directives regime (e.g., for distance selling and e-commerce contract,
see BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB], §§ 312-312f; for general contract terms,
see BGB, §§ 305-310; and for warranties in sales contracts applicable to consumers and particulars, see BGB, §§ 433-445).
13. Consumer protection norms were included in the BURGERLIJK WETBOEK
[BW] (Dutch Civil Code), by a reform in 1992 (for provisions concerning general
contract terms, see arts. 6:236 et seq., and for sales contract, see arts. 7:5 et seq.).
14. This can be seen in the high rate of citations of the European Court of
Justice and European Law by national courts, see LISA CONANT, JUSTICE
CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 83 (Cornell U. Press
2002).
15. Council Directive 93/13/EEC, Apr. 5, 1993, Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts.
16. Directive 1999/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council,
May 25, 1999 [hereinafter Directive 1999/44].
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Directive without being systematically inserted in the regulation of
sales contract. One may note that the Swiss Civil Code contains a
section aimed at the regulation of consumer protection. 17 In Austria,
the transposition of the Directive has been produced through the law
on the reform of the law of warranties, May 8, 2001, 18 which has
changed some precepts of the Civil Code of Austria (ABGB) and
the Consumer Protection Act. For that reason, the regime of the Directive is applicable not only to consumer contracts, but also to business to business contracts.
Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway), apart from their special regulations for consumer protection
in which they share a longstanding tradition, have in their respective
Contract Acts a general clause that allows the judge to annul or modify unfair contracts. The scope of application of this clause is not
limited to contracts between businesses and consumers, in contrast
to the Italian Directive on unfair terms. Therefore, it is applicable in
all cases in which there is a contractual relationship where one party
is considered strong and the other weak. Indeed, this provision has
been applied in several cases to contracts concluded with banks in
the context of the recent financial crisis, where the weak party, the
17. There are some consumer protection provisions in the Swiss Code of Obligations. Pursuant to the relevant provisions, an addressee of an unordered product is neither obliged to return the product nor to store it. In addition, as far as
door-to-door transactions are concerned (Swiss Code of Obligations, arts. 40a et
seq.), the consumer has the right to revoke his offer or his declaration of acceptance if the offer was made (i) at his place of work, in living accommodations
or in their surroundings; (ii) in public transportation, or on public streets and
places; or (iii) at a promotional function combined with an excursion or a similar
event. There is no right of revocation if the consumer explicitly solicited the contract negotiations or made his declaration at a market or trade fair stand. The revocation must be declared in writing within 7 days, after having offered or accepted
the contract and after having received the said information.
In the area of e-commerce, pursuant to the Swiss Code of Obligations, it is possible to conclude a purchase contract through an electronic signature. All requirements are regulated in the Swiss Federal Law on Electronic Signatures, Dec. 19,
2003.
18. GewährleistungsrechtsÄnderungsgesetz’, BGBl. I 48/2001, p. 1019. This
law came into force on Jan. 1, 2002.
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client of the bank (not necessarily a consumer) was not aware of the
risks involved because of lack of proper information by the bank. 19
Furthermore, the CESL provides rules relating to the contents
and effects of unfair contract terms that could be applied in “business to business” (B2B) contracts. 20 Good faith and fair dealing are
also recognized, for instance in B2B transactions in the CESL,
where the duty of good faith covers the pre-contractual disclosure of
information about the main characteristics of the goods supplied
(CESL art. 23). This is also the approach in the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), where article 4:110 gives a definition
of an unfair contract term, applicable both to B2B and “business to
consumer” (B2C) contracts, borrowing its language from Directive
93/13/EEC on Unfair Contract Terms in Consumer Contracts. 21
A similar regulation can be found in BGB, § 307, 22 Dutch BW,
19. Hans Fredrik Marthinussen, Unfair Contract Terms, in EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVES ON THE COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW 93-110 (Javier Plaza Penades & Luz M. Martinez Velencoso eds., Springer 2015) [hereinafter EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CESL] (for an interesting analysis of case law).
20. See CESL, supra note 4, at section 3 chapter 8.
Nevertheless, terms in B2B contracts are subject to unfairness control, but on the
basis of a test less strict for the parties than the one applicable to B2C contracts.
21. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW art. 4:110 (Comm’n Eur.
Cont. L. 2002) [hereinafter PECL]:
(1) A party may avoid a term which has not been individually negotiated
if, contrary to the requirements of good faith and fair dealing, it causes a
significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under
the contract to the detriment of that party, taking into account the nature
of the performance to be rendered under the contract, all the other terms
of the contract and the circumstances at the time the contract was concluded.
(2) This Article does not apply to:
(a) a term which defines the main subject matter of the contract, provided
the term is in plain and intelligible language; or to
(b) the adequacy in value of one party's obligations compared to the
value of the obligations of the other party.
22. BGB § 307 states:
(1) Provisions in standard business terms are ineffective if, contrary to
the requirement of good faith, they unreasonably disadvantage the other
party to the contract with the user. An unreasonable disadvantage may
also arise from the provision not being clear and comprehensible.
(2) An unreasonable disadvantage is, in case of doubt, to be assumed to
exist if a provision
1. is not compatible with essential principles of the statutory provision
from which it deviates, or
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art. 6:248 (2), 23 and Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), § 2-30224
applicable both to B2B and B2C contracts. 25
2. limits essential rights or duties inherent in the nature of the contract to
such an extent that attainment of the purpose of the contract is jeopardised.
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) above, and sections 308 and 309 apply only
to provisions in standard business terms on the basis of which arrangements derogating from legal provisions, or arrangements supplementing
those legal provisions, are agreed. Other provisions may be ineffective
under subsection (1) sentence 2 above, in conjunction with subsection
(1) sentence 1 above.
JAN M. SMITS, CONTRACT LAW—A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 150 (2d ed.,
Edward Elgar Publ’g 2014): “The German statute has the widest scope of application as it deals with any possibly unfair term in both B2B- and B2C-contracts.”
23. BW art. 6:248: “2. A rule, to be observed by parties as a result of their
agreement, is not applicable in so far as this, given the circumstances, would be
unacceptable to standards of reasonableness and fairness.”
Cf. Martijn W. Hesselink, Unfair Terms in Contracts Between Businesses, in
TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 143, 131-148 (Jules Stuyck & Reiner
Schulze eds., Sellier 2011):
Most Member States review unfair terms in business to business contracts. They often do so on the basis of general contract law, i.e. legislation that does not distinguish between different categories of contracting
parties, for example the general clause of Article 36 of the Scandinavian
Contract Act, § 305 of the German Civil Code, and the Unfair Contract
Terms Act (1977) in the United Kingdom.
Often, for instance in Germany and the Netherlands, these statutory rules
were preceded by case law, on the basis of the general good faith clause,
where business to business contracts were the main field of application.
From that perspective, the extension of the control of content took place
in the opposite direction, from B2B towards B2C contracts.
24. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 [hereinafter UCC]:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
A definition of an unconscionable contract is that it is a contract that “no man in
his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and that no honest
and fair man would accept on the other.” M. Neil Browne & Lauren Biksacky,
Unconscionability and the Contingent Assumptions of Contract Theory, MICH.
ST. L. REV. 216 (2013).
25. Ole Lando, CISG and CESL: Simplicity, Fairness and Social Justice, in
ENGLISH AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT AND COMMERCIAL LAW:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HUGH BEALE 237-250 (Louise Gullifer & Stefan
Vogenauer eds., Bloomsbury Publ’g 2017).
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In Spain, some recent judgments of the Supreme Court have
found that a clause is unfair not only when there is an imbalance in
the position of the contractual parties, but also when there is a lack
of transparency. In a judgment delivered on May 9, 2013, 26 the
Spanish Supreme Court declared “floor clauses” 27 to be unfair. In
brief, it found that these clauses were not transparent as consumers
were unable to foresee the economic and legal burden the contract
would place upon them.
Some scholars, interpreting this case, argue that the “control of
transparency” is applicable in a standard terms contract even when
none of the parties is a consumer. Indeed, standardized contracts
represent a “profound transformation of the legal dogmatic,” distinguishable from the negotiated contract. 28 This means that the valid-

26. On May 9, 2013, the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled on the
appeals against the judgment given by the Seville Provincial Appellate Court. The
latter ruling, revoked the judgement rendered by the Commercial Court no. 2 of
Seville; it rejected the claim made by the Association of Bank Users against
BBVA, CAIXA GALICIA, and CAJA MAR, declaring that the “floor clauses” of
the mortgage loan agreements entered into with variable interest rates signed with
consumers and users of the aforementioned entities were not null and void. It
deemed that the prerequisites contained in the General Law for the Defence of
Consumers and Users for them to be considered abusive were not present.
The Supreme Court, contrary to the reasoning of the Appellate Court, has declared
the aforementioned clauses null and void, ordering the defendant entities to remove them from their agreements and to refrain from using them hereinafter in
the form and manner in which they had been doing.
The clauses lacked the clarity and transparency to enable the consumer to perceive
that they defined the main purpose of the agreement, which in turn affected or
may have affected the content of the consumer’s obligation to pay, as well as
preventing him from obtaining a real and reasonably complete knowledge of how
they played out or could have played out in the financial aspects of the agreement.
They created an appearance that the floor had as an indivisible consideration, the
fixing of a ceiling. The offer of variable interest was not completed with adequate
information and was therefore misleading for the consumer, especially in cases
where his attention was diverted and the analysis of the impact of the floor clause
was made more difficult through the joint offer of ceiling clauses.
27. It is a clause that the bank can include in the mortgage, which establishes
the minimum interest rate that the customer will pay even when the Euribor,
which is the rate used as a reference for most Spanish mortgages, is lower. That
is to say, it is a clause which does not allow the customer to benefit from the
lowering of the Euribor rate.
28. See Supreme Court, S.T.S., Dec. 2, 2014 (R.J. 2014, 6872).
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ity and effectiveness of this kind of contract does not lie in the consent of the adherent, but in the compliance by the stipulator to certain special contractual duties in order to balance the interests of the
parties and to make the standard terms comprehensible. This interpretation is essential for understanding the scope of the so-called
“transparency review,” a second review after the “review of inclusion” of the standard terms in the contract and prior to the “review
of content,” as regulated in the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.
“Transparency review” goes beyond the mere “formal requirement of drafting a clear and understandable clause” by the stipulator,
to become the additional obligation of making the clause understandable “in a way that the adherent can assess the consequences to
this contractual term.” 29 Indeed in Spain, where these consumer protection norms are collected in a “Consumer Protection Act,” the act
resulting from the transposition of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive has been left out, as it has to be applied to any standardized
contract, and does not require the participation of a consumer (although for a clause to be declared abusive by means of its content, it
is necessary that a consumer is affected). 30
B. Conformity of the Goods
Traditionally the European civil codes, most of them strongly
inspired by the French Civil Code, used to provide a double regime

29. FRANCISCO JAVIER ORDUÑA MORENO, CARLOS SÁNCHEZ MARTÍN, &
RAQUEL GUILLÉN CATALÁN, CONTROL DE TRANSPARENCIA Y CONTRATACIÓN
BANCARIA (Tirant lo Blanch 2016).
30. On June 3, 2016, the Plenary of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court
decided by judgment no. 367/2016 (JUR 2016, 128769) that the control of transparency applicable to the general conditions of contracts with consumers does not
extend to contracts concluded with professionals or entrepreneurs. The judgement
contained a dissenting vote by Judge Francisco Javier Orduña Moreno (previously
a Civil Law Professor at the University of Valencia), in which he affirmed that
transparency extends to standardized contracts between entrepreneurs, particularly with regard to small and medium-sized businesses which act as mere adherents. He maintains that, given that the control of transparency has become a general principle of law, it has to be given an extensive interpretation in the contracts
concluded between entrepreneurs.
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for the non-performance of contractual obligations “liability for hidden defects and warranties” and the general regime for the breach of
the contract.
This dual system is not reflected in the CISG and in harmonized
European law (i.e., PECL, DCFR, CESL) where all is based on the
principle of conformity of the goods. The same unitary regime also
appears in the EU Directive on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees. 31
Under this unitary approach, a non-conforming performance
proves to be a specific type of non-fulfilment for sales contracts and
follows a general principle of contract law: contracts have to be performed in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The concept
of conformity assigns more importance to the contractual terms, according to the principle of party autonomy and pacta sunt servanda.
To sum up, the concept of “lack of conformity” is much wider than
that of “hidden defects” contained in the civil codes enacted in Europe in the 19th century, and “non-conformity” is the result of the
comparison between the promised performance and actual performance. The concept fits the current economic context, with a predominance of mass-produced goods, as against predominantly customized goods in the 19th century.

31. In the different European Legal Texts, cf. Directive 1999/44, supra note
16, at art. 2 (“Conformity with the contract”); PECL, supra note 21, art. 9:401
refers to the right to reduce the price in cases of non-conformity; Draft Common
Frame of Reference, section 3 (Conformity of the goods) at arts. IV.A- 2:301 et
seq. [hereinafter DCFR]; CESL, supra note 4, at section 3 (Conformity of the
goods and digital content) arts. 99 et seq.
See also María Paz García Rubio, Non Conformity of Goods and Digital Content
and its Remedies, in EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CESL, supra note 19, at
163:
The rules concerning the non-performance and conformity of the contract included in CESL are a direct inheritance from the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) redefined by Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of the 25th of May 2009 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, the case-law of the ECJ that interprets the afore-mentioned Directive, and the Draft Common Framework of Reference (DCFR). In all of these instruments the issue of conformity is one of the most significant topics.
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In addition, the concept of “lack of conformity” has a unifying
effect. For instance, under the different criteria for conformity of
goods contained in art. 2 of the Directive 1999/44 32 there is a combination of a subjective dimension and an objective dimension to
determining the lack of conformity. The objective approach is characteristic of French-inspired civil codes, such as the Spanish Code.
According to the Spanish Code, the concept of the “vice” of a good
is confined to its inaptitude for the use for which goods of the same
type are usually intended. The subjective dimension is a particular
feature of Germanic and common law, for which the concept of a
defect includes the lack of those qualities in the good that the buyer
expects. 33 This subjective criterion was preferred by the European
drafter, as can be observed in the legislative history of Directive
1999/44. Nevertheless, due to the influence of the professional sectors involved, the final text of the Directive placed both criteria on
an equal footing.
When Directive 1999/44 had to be transposed in the legal systems of Member States, two options were available. First was the

32. Directive 1999/44, supra note 16, at art. 2.2: Consumer goods are presumed to be in conformity with the contract if they:
(a) comply with the description given by the seller and possess the qualities of the goods which the seller has held out to the consumer as a sample or model;
(b) are fit for any particular purpose for which the consumer requires
them and which he made known to the seller at the time of conclusion of
the contract and which the seller has accepted;
(c) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same type are normally
used;
(d) show the quality and performance which are normal in goods of the
same type and which the consumer can reasonably expect, given the nature of the goods and taking into account any public statements on the
specific characteristics of the goods made about them by the seller, the
producer or his representative, particularly in advertising or on labelling.
33. Cf. C.J. (Niels) de Bruijn, Historical Perspectives on the Remedies for
Non-Conformity with Contract in EU Consumer Sales Law, in ALTERNATIVE
WAYS TO IUS COMMUNE: THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAW 111-124
(Anne L.M. Keirse & Marco B.M. Loos eds., Intersentia 2012).
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so-called “big solution,” followed in Germany and in the Netherlands, 34 whereby the regime of the Directive became the general regime included in the civil code and applicable to every sale contract,
whether one of the parties was a consumer or not. The second option
was the so-called “small solution,” adopted by other countries. It
consisted in transposing the Directive by a special act applicable to
consumer sales only, amending the existing rules applicable to consumers (such as the Code de la consommation in France), or introducing in the civil code a section on sales between professional
sellers and consumer buyers (as is the case of Italy or Spain). This
contributes to a certain “de-harmonization” of the legislation on
sales in the various Member States.
As a consequence, the Spanish Civil Code contains a double regime for the non-performance of contractual obligations: “liability
for hidden defects and warranties” and the general regime for the
breach of the contract (arts. 1094 et seq.). This is because in Spain,
Directive 1999/44 was the object of transposition through a special
norm, Act 23/2003, July 10, on Guarantees in the Sale of Consumer
Goods, applicable only to the sale of consumer goods, leaving intact
the regime of the Civil Code. Subsequently, this Act was abrogated
and its content was included in the Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007,
Nov. 16, approving the revised text of the General Law for the Protection of Consumers and users and other supplementary Laws (a
compilation of special norms for the protection of consumers resulting from the implementation of European Directives), 35 in arts. 114
et seq.
34. See Sonja A. Kruisinga, The Impact of Uniform Law on National Law:
Limits and Possibilities – CISG and Its Incidence in Dutch Law, 13.2 ELECTRONIC
J. OF COMP. L. 9 (2009), at https://perma.cc/8PLF-Z777:
In the new rules on the sale of goods in the Dutch Civil Code, the notion
of conformity replaced the regulation of hidden defects. This part of the
Civil Code has been modelled after the aforementioned Benelux draft for
a Uniform Law. The concept of (non-)conformity in art. 35 CISG corresponds almost literally with the requirements in art. 7:17 BW. This provision was clearly – indirectly – inspired by the provisions in ULIS. Both
provide that the goods need to be in conformity with the contract.
35. English text available at https://perma.cc/WSV4-UMMP.
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As for the modernization process in Spain, the proposal to reform the Civil Code (Law of Obligations) made by the Spanish Ministry of Justice 36 has the aim, among others, of modernizing the regulation of the sales contract, taking the regime of the Directive
1999/44 as a reference. 37 In Spain, it is accepted among scholars that
any reform which, now or in the future, aims at changing the Civil
Code, has to be aligned with the harmonized European legal texts. 38
As the Spanish legislature has not yet completed this task, this
work has been mostly done by the Spanish Supreme Court. As regards the non-conformity of goods, courts are applying the general
regime of non-performance to cases that could be included in the
special regime.
A good example of this is the judgment of the Supreme Court,
Sept. 21, 2004, where the Court considered the jurisprudential principle of aliud pro alio (delivery of one thing instead of another) as a
remedy for situations of extreme injustice, due to the narrowness of
the concept of hidden defects in the Civil Code. It connects with the
principle of conformity of the goods enshrined in article 35 of the
CISG, also applied to consumer sales under Act 23/2003 on guarantees in the sale of consumer goods. Although none of these legal
texts was applicable to the case, the Court interpreted the Code according to this new legal framework.

36. Spanish proposal to reform the Civil Code, supra note 6.
37. Cf. Nieves Fenoy Picón, La modernización del régimen del incumplimiento del contrato: Propuestas de la Comisión General de Codificación. Parte
primera: Aspectos generales. El incumplimiento, LXIII ANUARIO DE DERECHO
CIVIL 64-65 (2010).
38. Luis Díez-Picazo, Reforma de los Códigos y Derecho Europeo, LVI
ANUARIO DE DERECHO CIVIL 1574 (2003).
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C. The Legal Consequences of a Breach of Contract
1. The Unitary Concept of Non-Performance
The CISG has been a model in the field of breach of contract and
its consequences for harmonized European private law 39 and therefore, for the modernization of the civil codes in Europe. Under the
CISG, a liable party is obligated to pay damages and the termination
of the contract is only possible when the breach is severe and fundamental. This is also the solution in Directive 1999/44, 40 and the
German BGB has also accepted it in the general law of obligations.
The CISG model bridges the common law and the civil law as it
“has been the standpoint of the common law that a party is liable for
keeping its contractual promise in principle irrespective of any fault,
whereas the civilian tradition held the party liable for any breach of
contract only if the party was at fault.” 41 In the CISG, a party is not
held liable in cases where performance has become impossible due
to circumstances for which this party neither bore the risk nor was

39. Cf. Ole Lando, Non-performance (Breach) of Contracts, in TOWARDS A
EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 505 (3d ed., Arthur S. Hartkamp et al. eds., Kluwer 2004):
In the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) the Commission on
European Contract Law (CECL) has set up a structure and terms for a
future European Code in relation to the “breach of contract.” In doing
this the CECL has been guided by two main considerations. The first is
to have a structure which is compatible with that of the CISG. The second is to use one which in principle may apply to all kind of contracts
and not only to the sale of goods.
40. The acquis communautaire tends to provide a general concept of the violation of the obligation and to apply some remedies that do not depend on a qualified kind of non-performance (such as delay or impossibility). For instance, apart
from Directive 1999/44, supra note 16, the art. 13 (3) of Directive 2015/2302,
2015 O.J. (L 326) (EU), on package travel and linked travel arrangements, states
that: “If any of the travel services are not performed in accordance with the package travel contract, the organiser shall remedy the lack of conformity . . . .”
41. Ulrich Magnus, The Vienna Sales Convention (CISG) between Civil and
Common law – Best of all Worlds?, 3 J. CIV. L. STUD. 75 (2010). Under English
Law, liability is strict, non-performance is “excused” in the limited cases of frustration. Harmonized European private law does not adopt the English distinction
between breaches of condition, warranty, and intermediate terms.
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at fault (CISG art. 79). The CISG model also includes the concepts
of force majeure and economic hardship. 42
Defining contract non-performance in Spanish Law is problematic because it encompasses two different things: it covers the lack
of performance but also the so-called mora debitoris or delay in performance, which differs from cases of simple delay. 43 Furthermore,
there has been a long discussion as to whether the liability of the
debtor for the breach should be based on fault or if it is better to have
an objective system of contractual liability. 44 There is also no coherent regulation in relation to the claim for performance, termination,
and compensation of damages.
Harmonized European private law is clearer as there is a unique
concept of non-performance and some remedies. First comes the
claim of specific performance. This remedy is not possible when
fulfilment of the contract has become impossible. It also requires
that the claim be exercised without further delay. Also, the other
contractual party can object to the claim if specific performance is
excessively burdensome (an intermediate solution between common
law and civil law).
Secondly, it is possible to terminate the contract, but only when
the breach of the contract qualifies as “fundamental.” This new regulation allows the creditor to elevate a non-fundamental delay in
performance to a fundamental one by means of granting a grace period. This does not, however, apply in cases of defective performance.
The third remedy is compensatory damages. The debtor that
breached the contract is liable for the damage caused, except in the
42. Cf. Pablo Salvador Coderch, Comentario del artículo 79, in LA
COMPRAVENTA INTERNACIONAL DE MERCADERÍAS. COMENTARIO DE LA
CONVENCIÓN DE VIENA 635-656 (Luis Díez-Picazo & Antonio Cabanillas Sánchez eds., Editorial Aranzadi 1998).
43. The simple delay is irrelevant. The debtor will only be held responsible
if the creditor requires the debtor to fulfil the contract. This is a requirement in
order to obtain compensation for the damage that has been caused by means of
the delay.
44. Díez-Picazo, supra note 38.
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circumstance that without the default of either party a contractual
obligation has become incapable of being performed because the
circumstances in which the performance is called for would render
it impossible.
In the above mentioned Proposal to reform the Spanish Civil
Code, 45 the drafters adopt a broad and unitary notion of non-compliance. The debtor who breaches the contract does not fulfil exactly
the provision or any other of the duties resulting from the obligation. 46 This is in accordance with the Principles of European Contract Law. As the Official Commentary on the PECL makes clear:
Under the system adopted by the Principles there is non-performance whenever a party does not perform any obligation
under the contract. The non-performance may consist in a
defective performance or in a failure to perform at the time
performance is due, be it a performance which is effected too
early, too late or never. It includes a violation of an accessory
duty such as the duty of a party not to disclose the other party's trade secrets. Where a party has a duty to receive or accept the other party's performance a failure to do so will also
constitute a non-performance. 47
In the Spanish Proposal, if the fulfilment of the contract becomes
definitively impossible, even without the fault of the debtor, it is still
a case of breach of the contract (art. 1188.I). The notion of breach
includes both an excusable and non-excusable breach. Nevertheless,
this distinction has some effects on the scope of remedies. According to article 1209.I of the Proposal, the debtor is not responsible for
the damage that the breach has caused to the creditor in cases of
excusable breach of contract. However, article 1209.IV of the Proposal provides that in this case, the creditor is not prevented from
seeking remedies other than damages such as the termination of the

45. See Spanish proposal to reform the Civil Code, supra note 6.
46. Id. at art. 1188.I.
47. See Comment and Notes: PECL art. 8:101: Remedies Available, Comment A. Non-performance, CISG DATABASE, available at https://perma.cc
/M3WU-MCVZ.
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contract or the price reduction (following the model of CISG art.
79).
In the PECL, art. 1:301(4) explicitly clarifies that there is a
breach of contract whether the non-fulfilment is excused or not. 48
PECL art. 8:108 defines when the non-fulfilment is excused. 49 In
this case, “the aggrieved party may resort to any of the remedies set
out in Chapter 9 except claiming performance and damages.” 50
This is exactly the model in DCFR art. III.–1:102(3) 51 complemented by DCFR art. III.–3:101, also adopted by the European
Commission in CESL art. 87. 52 However, there are some differ-

48. Lando, supra note 39, at 506:
The legal systems will allocate detrimental consequences to the defaulting party if that party is in fault or carries the risk. The failure to perform
may give the other party – the aggrieved party – certain rights against the
defaulting party. The aggrieved party may have a right to damages for
the loss he suffers from the other party’s failure to effect due performance. If he accepts a tender of performance not conforming to the contract he may reduce his own performance. Furthermore, he may withhold
his performance until the other party makes a due performance. Under
certain conditions he may terminate the contract . . . . The aggrieved party
may finally have a right to specific performance, that is to claim that the
contract be performed as agreed. All these rights are here called remedies.
49. PECL, supra note 21, at art. 8:108:
(1) A party's non-performance is excused if it proves that it is due to an
impediment beyond its control and that it could not reasonably have been
expected to take the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract, or to have avoided or overcome the impediment or
its consequences.
(2) Where the impediment is only temporary the excuse provided by this
article has effect for the period during which the impediment exists.
However, if the delay amounts to a fundamental non-performance, the
obligee may treat it as such.
(3) The non-performing party must ensure that notice of the impediment
and of its effect on its ability to perform is received by the other party
within a reasonable time after the non-performing party knew or ought
to have known of these circumstances. The other party is entitled to damages for any loss resulting from the non-receipt of such notice.
50. Cf. PECL, supra note 21, at art. 8:101.
51. DCFR, supra note 31, at art. III. – 1:102 (3): “Non-performance of an
obligation is any failure to perform the obligation, whether or not excused, and
includes delayed performance and any other performance which is not in accordance with the terms regulating the obligation.”
52. “One could and should read this proposal and its predecessors in the Draft
Common Frame of Reference on the Principles of European Contract Law as a
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ences, as the draft Common European Sales Law in art. 87 only defines a uniform notion of non-performance but does not refer to any
excuse for impediment beyond the parties’ control or for the creditor’s misbehavior. The consequences of an excuse in CESL art. 88
are only regulated in the rules on remedies (CESL arts. 106(4),
131(2), 167(1), 168(1)). Otherwise in the DCFR and the PECL there
is a distinction between two separate categories of excused non-performance and inexcusable non-performance. 53
2. Fundamental Non-Performance and Termination of the Contract
Termination is considered a subsidiary remedy both in the common and in the civil law tradition. In common law, termination is
only possible if the obligation which has been broken is a “condition” of the contract or if the breach is “fundamental.” In civil law
countries, termination needs further requirements. 54
mirror of the development of contract law, and sales law in particular, in Europe,”
see Martin Schmidt-Kessel & Eva Silkens, Breach of Contract, in EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CESL, supra note 19, at 112.
53. See id. at 115:
From a pragmatic point of view this difference may be seen as minor,
however, for dogmatically trained continental lawyers this shift is of an
importance which should not be underestimated. The text and the structure of the Commission’s proposal prevents or, at least, should help to
prevent dogmatic national lawyers from raising systematical arguments
based on two different types of breach. Coming from a legal system with
a bad experience with cause approaches and their necessities to draw
lines between these types of breach, the solution proposed by the Commission to us seems an important and innovative progression in the formulation and structuring of European Contract Law.
54. For a comparative analysis of the CISG, the PECL, and English Law on
this topic, see CISG, supra note 3; PECL, supra note 21; and see EWAN
MCKENDRICK, CONTRACT LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 791 et seq. (6th
ed., Oxford U. Press 2014). In English law, termination is an important remedy
(although not as important as damages). In addition, English law, on the basis of
the principle of freedom of contract, confers the parties’ freedom to decide themselves when the right to terminate will arise (they have the opportunity to classify
any term as a condition). Whereas, in other legal systems, it depends on the court
to decide whether or not the breach justifies termination. CISG (art. 25) appears
to deny to the parties the right to agree that any breach of a particular term shall
give rise to a right to terminate. This is because there is a preference for remedies
that enable the parties to maintain their relationship (like the right to cure the
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This subsidiary nature is because termination faces serious factors of complexity. Its use as a remedy assumes the end of the contractual relationship and perhaps the elimination of the consequences arising from the contract that have already been fulfilled.
Termination is difficult to understand in universal terms for all contracts and for all modalities of non-fulfilment. In addition, it does
not respond nor adapt to a general model, because there is a great
variety of factors (the moment in which the non-fulfilment took
place and costs associated; the specific investments made; the fluctuation of prices; the existence of markets for resale, etc.) that can
have a high differential significance in terms of its effects on the
contracting parties and their incentives for action in view of such
effects.
Being aware of the costs associated with the termination of the
contract, legal systems create doctrines, principles, and rules that
modulate the exercise of such a remedy (such as fundamental
breach, 55 favor contractus principle, and the debtor's right to cure

breach and price reduction). Nevertheless, as explained by McKendrick, the provisions of the PECL (art. 8:103) appear to be closer to English law:
To English eyes, this provision is very different from the Vienna Convention. The vital difference is paragraph (a) which seems to approximate a condition. It thus appears to preserve the right of the parties to
classify the status of the terms of their contract. Paragraph (b) is much
closer to an intermediate term, while paragraph (c) distinguishes between
intentional and unintentional non-performance (a distinction which is not
generally drawn in English law).
55. Reinhard Zimmermann, Breach of Contract and Remedies under the New
German Law of Obligations, 48 SAGGI, CONFERENZE E SEMINARI (2002) (It.),
available at https://perma.cc/6358-Y3GU:
The notion that the remedy of termination is available only if the nonperformance attains a certain minimum level of seriousness is also reflected, in some or other form, in most of the more traditional national
legal systems; it is based on the consideration that termination, in a way,
jeopardizes the fundamental principle of pacta sunt servanda and has the
effect of throwing back on the defaulting party a risk which, according
to the contract, was to have been borne by the aggrieved party.
Roman law was even stricter in this regard and never recognized a general right of termination in case of breach of contract. This approach has,
for a long time, dominated the ius commune, and it has even shaped the
BGB.
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default). 56
Under the PECL, termination is available in cases of a fundamental breach of the contract. The BGB 57 and the Dutch Civil
Code 58 require the granting of a period of grace before the remedy
of termination is available. Also, in CESL arts. 114-115, 134 and
136 for commercial buyers, the remedy of termination is subject to
Before the reform, the German BGB did not contain a general statutory right of
termination, it used to provide a highly fragmented regime which was conceptually based on a lex commissoria that had been tacitly agreed upon. The duty to
perform was extinguished if performance became impossible, as a result of the
debtor's fault and also, in the case that the debtor had not been responsible for the
impossibility of performance; in cases of mora debitoris, and in those of defective
performance, provided it seriously affected the contractual relationship. As Professor Zimmermann says, “the rules contained in the BGB were not generally admired for their clarity and ease of operation.” Id.
56. Fernando Gómez Pomar & Marian Gili Saldaña, La complejidad económica del remedio resolutorio por incumplimiento contractual—Su trascendencia
en el Derecho español de contratos, en la normativa común de compraventa europea (CESL) y en otras propuestas normativas, in LXVII ANUARIO DE DERECHO
CIVIL 1218-1219 (2014).
57. See Zimmermann, supra note 55, comparing the PECL, supra note 21,
with German Law: it can be stated that “[t]ermination under the Principles is
available in cases of fundamental breach of the contract.” Furthermore, the German BGB “requires the granting of a period of grace before the remedy of termination is available,” although there are exceptions to this requirement in certain
cases of serious breach. Both under the PECL art. 8:106 (3) and in German Law,
the creditor only loses his right to choose between claiming performance and terminating the contract at the moment he gives notice of termination. The mechanism of termination is the same in the German BGB and in the PECL art. 9:303
(1): “a party’s right to terminate the contract is to be exercised by notice to the
other party.” Nevertheless, sometimes even a notice of termination is dispensable
because the contract is terminated automatically, the BGB §326 relates to cases
of impossibility and art. 9:303 (4) of the PECL refers to the situation where a party
is excused under art. 8:108 in view of an impediment, which is total and permanent.
58. See Kruisinga, supra note 34, at 13:
In the Dutch Civil Code, the right to avoid a contract is regulated in Arts.
6:265-277 BW. art. 6:265(1) BW provides that poor performance or nonperformance of the obligation of a party, allows the other party to avoid
the contract, unless this remedy is inappropriate considering the special
nature or the limited extent of the breach of contract. The creditor is thus
allowed to choose this remedy, except where the non-performance is of
minor importance.
See CISG, supra note 3; PECL, supra note 21: Scholars in the Netherlands have
defended the position that this article should be interpreted according to the CISG,
so that termination is only possible in the case of a fundamental breach of the
contract. Nevertheless, this argument was rejected by the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands; see HR Feb. 4, 2000, NJ 2000, 562 m.nt. JBMV (Mol/Meijer Beheer) (Neth.).
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the requirement that the non-fulfillment is fundamental. Non-fulfillment is fundamental when non-performance “substantially deprives
the other party of what that party was entitled to expect under the
contract, unless at the time of conclusion of the contract the nonperforming party did not foresee and could not be expected to have
foreseen that result” or “it is of such a nature as to make clear that
the non-performing party’s future performance cannot be relied
on.” 59 A buyer will lose this right to terminate the contract “if notice
of termination is not given within a reasonable time from when the
right arose or the buyer became, or could be expected to have become, aware of the non-performance, whichever is later.” 60
Nevertheless, according to the CESL, in B2C transactions where
there is non-performance because the goods do not conform to the
contract, the consumer may terminate the contract unless the lack of
conformity is insignificant. 61 Consequently, in this case the requirements for termination are not so strict.
Concerning the concept of a fundamental breach, CISG art. 25
states that:
A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in such detriment to the other party as
substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect
under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee
and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would have not foreseen such a result. 62

59. CESL, supra note 4, at art. 87(2) (a) and (b).
60. CESL, supra note 4, at art. 119. The European Parliament proposed to fix
this period at two months in order to increase legal certainty, see PARL. EUR. DOC.
(A7-0301/001-264) 85-86 Amendment 201 (2014).
61. CESL, supra note 4, at art. 114 (2).
62. Aneta Spaic, Interpreting Fundamental Breach, in INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAW 237 et seq. (Larry A. DiMatteo ed., Cambridge U. Press 2014). Aneta
Spaic reviews a number of approaches that have been applied in order to determine fundamental breach. The author states that this situation has led to a great
deal of uncertainty that a single approach would eliminate. For that reason, she
proposes a definition combining a purposive approach (whether the aggrieved
party has been substantially deprived of what he expected out of the contract) and
a remedy-oriented approach (whether the aggrieved party’s interests can be protected through remedies short of avoidance).
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An exact definition of what constitutes a fundamental breach is
not provided due to the many differences among the definitions of
fundamental breach to be found in the various legal systems. 63
The delivery of defective goods is undoubtedly the most recurrent situation in international sales litigation. The number of decisions dealing with this issue is relatively high, but what is more
problematic is to determine the kind of deficiencies in the goods that
may amount to a fundamental breach. In this field, the courts follow
an economically oriented approach based on the loss suffered by the
aggrieved party. Some elements judges take into consideration are
the percentage of defective goods, the estimated cost of the repair
compared to the total value of the goods, and the merchantability of
the defective goods. 64
The PECL and the DCFR also consider that a fundamental
breach occurs where the breach of the contract is intentional or reckless. 65
International instruments like the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles, the PECL, and the DCRF harmonize the concept of fundamental breach.

63. PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & PETRA BUTLER, UN LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
SALES—THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 100-101
(Springer 2009):
Of course, despite the attempt to consolidate the principle of fundamental
breach through Article 25 CISG, there is still room for the national courts
and arbitral tribunals to assess the concept of fundamental breach according to the particular domestic understanding of fundamental breach, its
significance in the particular national legal system, and the particular traditions which necessarily leads to slightly different approaches by different courts and tribunals. The German and the Swiss Supreme courts
take a strict approach on fundamental breach whereas the French, Austrian, and United States courts are more flexible in finding a fundamental
breach and allowing avoidance of the contract.
64. Cf. Leonardo Graffi, Case Law on the Concept of “Fundamental
Breach”in the Vienna Sales Convention, 3 INT’L BUS. L. J. 338-349 (2003), available at https://perma.cc/7UWA-Q55W.
65. “[H]olding every intentional breach to be fundamental independent of its
significance does not fit to international trade practices and cannot be justified by
the legitimate interest of the non-breaching party.” See Ingeborg Schwenzer &
Pascal Hachem, Drafting New Model Rules on Sales: CFR as an Alternative to
the CISG?, 11 EUR. J. L. REFORM 464 (2009).
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For the CISG, the criteria of foreseeability contained in article
25 is extremely important. Even if the breach of contract results in a
detriment to the other party that substantially deprives him of what
he is entitled to expect, the breach is not fundamental if the party in
breach of contract did not foresee such a result and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result. Likewise, article 8:103 of the PECL contains a
similar notion of foreseeability: the consequences of a breach should
be foreseeable at the moment of the conclusion of the contract. The
foreseeability requisite is made more objective by the reasonableness criteria. In article 8:103(2) of the PECL, the test to be applied
is not what the party in breach of contract did not foresee or could
not have foreseen due to certain conditions, but rather what a reasonable person, acting in good faith, in the same circumstances
would not have foreseen. The CISG also uses the “reasonable person
of the same kind in the same circumstances” criterion in art. 25. Under art. III. – 3:502 of the DCFR, termination requires a fundamental
non-performance of the debtor similar to the other mentioned texts,
yet without the requirement of reasonableness. 66 The same is true of
art. 87.2 of the CESL. 67
Another criterion of fundamental breach is the concept of substantial deprivation, which is almost the same in the CISG, the
PECL and the DCFR though with a difference of wording (“detriment,” in the CISG; distinction between “strict compliance” and
66. See DCFR, supra note 31, at art. III. – 3:502 (2):
A non-performance of a contractual obligation is fundamental if: (a) it
substantially deprives the creditor of what the creditor was entitled to
expect under the contract, as applied to the whole or relevant part of the
performance, unless at the time of conclusion of the contract the debtor
did not foresee and could not reasonably be expected to have foreseen
that result . . . .
67. See CESL, supra note 4, at art. 87.2:
Non-performance of an obligation by one party is fundamental if: (a) it
substantially deprives the other party of what that party was entitled to
expect under the contract, unless at the time of conclusion of the contract
the non-performing party did not foresee and could not be expected to
have foreseen that result; or (b) it is of such a nature as to make it clear
that the non-performing party’s future performance cannot be relied on.
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“substantial deprivation” in the PECL). Substantial deprivation is
related to the expectations of the aggrieved party. In addition, the
party’s special expectations for the performance of the contract are
also relevant for ascertaining whether the breach was fundamental.
The breach is fundamental regardless of whether it occurred in respect to a primary obligation or an ancillary obligation. What should
be taken into consideration is the importance of the aggrieved
party’s interests, and this is a matter for judicial discretion. 68
In Spain, there is an important body of case law reinterpreting
the concept of fundamental breach in the light of harmonized European legal texts. The idea is that not every case of non-performance
by one of the contractual parties authorizes the other to terminate the
contract, according to the fundamental principle of “conservation of
the contract.” 69
Highly illustrative is the Supreme Court judgment of May 23,
2014 70 regarding the sale of a parking-garage place. The Court held
that the less than expected height of the entrance door and the risk
of water filtration did not prevent the usefulness or suitability of the
object to be used in accordance with the nature of the contract. It
was not therefore a fundamental breach of the contract making termination possible. The Supreme Court expressly referred to European Contract Law and the CISG.
In the opinion of the Court, fundamental breach relates to the
satisfaction of the interest of the creditor. The focus of attention is
not the possible breach of duties established in the contract or implemented in accordance with the principle of good faith. To determine the content of the satisfaction of the creditor, one has to take
into account the interests involved in the conclusion of the contract,
identified according to the so called “basis of the contract,” the specific cause of the contract, whether that is expressed in it or is simply
68. GUENTER H. TREITEL, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT—A
COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT 350 (Clarendon Press 1988).
69. Cf. Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Feb. 25, 2013 (R.J. 2013, 7413).
70. Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., May 23, 2014 (R.J. 2014, 3878).
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known to both parties, and the type and characteristics of the contract concluded. This is in line with art. 25 of the CISG. Spanish
courts use terms like “frustration of the practical purpose pursued”
or refer to the “legitimate expectations” of the parties when concluding the contract. 71
This solution is in accordance with the principle of the conservation of the contract. 72
3. Specific Performance and Compensation for Damages
Conceptually, in the field of remedies for the breach of contract,
there are great differences between common law and civil law countries. Compensation for damages has been the ordinary remedy in
common law countries for a breach of contract, while the civil law
aims at specific performance, 73 although at present this distinction
71. The basis of the contract can be defined as the aim pursued by one of the
contractual parties that was known and accepted by the other, and was reflected
in the economic consequences of the contract. For instance, in the judgment of the
Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Nov. 12, 2014 (R.J. 2014, 5911), the delay in the
delivery of the immovable that was sold, is considered as a fundamental breach
by interpreting the contract according to its basis. In this case, the object of the
contract was a piece of developable land, and the deadline for the execution of the
deed was fundamental (otherwise, the buyer would not have had the opportunity
to apply for the building licence).
In addition, the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., June 13, 2014
(R.J. 2014, 3435), solves a case of a fundamental breach of the contract by the
seller. The parties had concluded a contract of sale for a piece of land that the
buyers had planned to develop. After the conclusion of the contract, a new administrative regulation was adopted that meant that the building process was no longer
possible, as the immovable was now listed as a building of Cultural Interest. The
Supreme Court considered that this was not a case of a risk that should be held by
the buyer (res perit emptore). While, generally speaking, it is true that the buyer
assumes the risk represented by a change in land development regulations, in this
case, the fact that the buyer intended to develop the piece of land occupied by the
building (that it was no longer possible to demolish), was considered a basic element of the contractual object and for that reason, a principal obligation of the
seller (according to the basis of the contract).
72. Cf. Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Jan. 3, 1991 (R.J. 1991, 105). In this
case, termination is not possible, as the breach is not fundamental. Otherwise,
there would be a violation of the principle of conservation of the contract. This
principle avoids possible situations of fraud and meets the essential aim of complying with the expressed will of the contracting parties to satisfy the needs of the
economy of the contract.
73. Alex Geert Castermans, Ruben de Graaff, & Matthias Haentjens, The
Digital Single Market and Legal Certainty: A Critical Analysis, in 7 CONTENTS
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is no longer so sharp. 74 In the CISG the question is not resolved,
leaving the decision to the national courts. 75
Directive 1999/44 bridges the gap between the two options by
giving the seller the opportunity to cure the lack of conformity. In
the regime of the Directive, the consequences of a breach of the contract are not completely determined by the buyer’s option for one or

AND EFFECTS OF CONTRACTS-LESSONS TO LEARN FROM THE COMMON EUROPEAN
SALES LAW, STUDIES IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC LAW AND REGULATION 60 (Aure-

lia Colombi Ciacchi ed., Springer 2016).
74. The new version of the Uniform Commercial Code makes the remedy of
specific performance possible. To accommodate buyers who want the goods and
not money, the Code offers sections 2-716 and 2-502. See UCC, supra note 24, at
section 2-716:
(1) Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or
in other proper circumstances.
(2) The decree for specific performance may include such terms and conditions as to payment of the price, damages, or other relief as the court
may deem just.
(3) The buyer has a right to replevin for goods identified to the contract
if after reasonable effort he is unable to effect cover for such goods or
the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing
or if the goods have been shipped under reservation and satisfaction of
the security interest in them has been made or tendered.
“Of course the Code drafters did not write on a tabula rasa here but upon a slate
already crowded with centuries of judicial and legislative markings.” Cf. JAMES
WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 314 (6th ed., West
2010).
The Sale of Goods Act, 1979, c.54 (UK), at section 52, governs specific performance in English sales law and common law principles are provided by the section 62(2) of the same Act. Specific performance under English sales law will
only be granted to an aggrieved buyer of goods at the discretion of the court. This
will be in the form of a judgment or order, requiring the seller to deliver the goods
to the buyer in conformity with the terms of the contract when the goods are
unique and damages are proved to be inadequate.
Furthermore, in English law, the court can have the power to order that a specific
performance is carried by a party to a contract. The Consumer Rights Act, 2015,
c.15 (UK), at sections 23-24, contains rights which allow consumers to have items
replaced and repaired if they do not adequately conform to the terms of the contract which were originally agreed on between the parties.
75. See CISG, supra note 3, at art. 28:
If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one party is
entitled to require performance of any obligation by the other party, a
court is not bound to enter a judgment for specific performance unless
the court would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts
of sale not governed by this Convention.
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another or by the mere economic interest of the seller. 76
Specific performance is a remedy that fits one of the general
principles of the law present in EU contract law, which is the conservation of the contract. 77 One has to put this in relation to the termination of the contract, which is a remedy of an exceptional character in the common law and in the civil law tradition.
From a dogmatic point of view, it was said that French law used
specific performance, not because of any supposed underlying economic efficiency of this remedy, but in order to grant the creditor,
who is the victim of a breach of contract, satisfaction in the form of
the expected benefit available when an award of only damages
seemed unfair.
Nevertheless, some scholars consider this well-known “principle” of French law only didactic, conjured up by academics in order
to categorize and influence case law. 78

76. By means of the transposition of the Directive 1999/44, supra note 16,
under Dutch Law, this remedial scheme has now gained an even more subtle character, which gives the courts more power to intervene when a particular solution
is seen as disproportionate. See Castermans, de Graaff, & Haentjens, supra note
73, at 61.
77. Directive 1999/44, supra note 16, in this particular topic, has “its basis in
the principle of conservation of the contract. Repair and replacement of the goods
are, in fact, remedies which enjoy priority, in that they bring about the exact execution of the sale.” See Massimo C. Bianca, Article 3: Rights of the Consumer, in
E.U. SALES DIRECTIVE—COMMENTARY 168 (Massimo C. Bianca & Stefan
Grundmann eds., Intersentia 2002). In addition, this principle is reflected in the
CESL, supra note 4, at C. Annex II (32): “The Common European Sales Law
should aim at the preservation of a valid contract whenever possible and appropriate in view of the legitimate interests of the parties.”
78. See Yves-Marie Laithier, Comparative Reflections on the French Law of
Remedies for Breach of Contract, in COMPARATIVE REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT 103-122 (Nili Cohen & Ewan McKendrick eds., Hart Publ’g 2005).
The author analyses a judgment of the French Cour de cassation [Cass] [supreme
court for judicial matters], Cass. Civ. 3, June 24, 1971, Bull. Civ. III, no. 408,
which refuses to state that specific performance is, as a matter of “principle” available to a creditor who is the victim of a breach of contract. In this case, the Cour
de cassation approved the court of appeal’s refusal to grant specific performance
and to award damages instead. The defects were not significant enough to require
the rebuilding of the construction. The building contractor could avoid specific
performance and substitute a pecuniary compensation for the specific performance.
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The situation has changed with the French revision of obligations by Ordinance no. 2016-131, Feb. 10, 2016. It has introduced
an important modification so that specific performance can be excluded if there is an imbalance between the cost of the enforcement
for the debtor and its benefit for the creditor. 79
Moreover, the general starting point in German law is that the
parties to a contract are entitled to demand performance of their respective obligations in kind. “The effect of an obligation,” says BGB
§ 241, “is that the creditor is entitled to claim performance from the
obligor” (it is also contained in PECL art. 9:102). The most important exception is fixed in BGB § 275 (1): a claim for specific
performance is excluded, as far as such performance is impossible.
Also, according to BGB § 275 (2), “(t)he obligor may refuse
performance to the extent that performance requires expense and effort which, taking into account the subject matter of the obligation
and the requirements of good faith, is grossly disproportionate to the
interest in performance of the obligee.” When it is determined what
efforts may reasonably be required of the obligor, it must also be
taken into account whether he is responsible for the obstacle to performance. This version of BGB § 275 (2) is based on considerations
which can also be found in the PECL. In this sense, art. 9:102 (2)(b)
of the PECL states that specific performance cannot be obtained
where performance would cause the debtor unreasonable effort or
expense. In Spanish law, one can find statements to the effect that
specific performance is the general and preferential remedy in cases
of breach of contract, although this is not always true. 80

79. Cf. Code Civil [C. CIV.] art. 1221 (Fr.): “The creditor of an obligation
may, after a putting in default, seek execution in kind unless such execution is
impossible or unless there is a manifest disproportion between the cost to the
debtor and the interest of the creditor.” See on the French revision, Mustapha
Mekki, The French Reform of Contract Law: The Art of Redoing Without Undoing, 10 J. CIV. L. STUD. 223 (2017).
80. Fernando Gómez Pomar, El incumplimiento contractual en Derecho español, 3 INDRET 16 (2007). Despite some rhetorical manifestations of the Supreme Court, in Spanish Law, specific performance does not seem to be the general remedy in cases of breach of contract. It is generally but not necessarily pref-
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Specific performance has a “bigger content” in Spanish Law due
to the transposition of Directive 1999/44, as in certain contracts of
sale it is possible to demand the repair and the replacement of goods
that do not conform to the contract.
However, the idea that the creditor has a right to specific performance is an idea that can be questioned as it can create an excessive
burden for the debtor, and the reasonableness of introducing other
limits to this remedy, different from impossibility and good faith, is
currently under discussion. This kind of reasoning approximates
civil law and common law solutions, as it was traditionally common
law that granted greater importance to economic considerations in
the implementation of remedies for breach of contract. 81
Furthermore, according to Spanish case law, the defendant cannot refuse compensation for damages on the grounds that he would
prefer specific performance. 82
4. The Change of Circumstances
a. The Change of Circumstances in Harmonized European Law
The principle of pacta sunt servanda is universally recognized.
Contracts are binding because individuals are willing to fulfil them
and they trust that their counterparts will do the same. If all contracts
were generally reviewable, the confidence of the economic agents

erential to the remedy of compensation for damages. The author quotes a judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain, S.T.S., July 2, 1998 (R.J. 1998, 5123), where
specific performance was not impossible, but the cost of compliance was so disproportionate that the remedy of compensation for damages was more appropriate.
81. The situation is similar in the Netherlands where, on the basis of the requirements of reasonableness and equity, it is thought that “the creditor may not
demand specific performance if that remedy would unreasonably burden the
debtor and the specific performance would not be more beneficial to the creditor
than another remedy would have been.” See M.B.M. Loos, Section 1: Right to
Performance, in THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW AND DUTCH
LAW—A COMMENTARY 355 (Danny Busch, Ewoud Hondius, Hugo Van Kooten,
Wendy Schrama, & Harriet Schelhaas eds., Kluwer 2002).
82. Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Oct. 10, 2012 (R.J. 2013, 1537).

182

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 11

would vanish, and it is confidence that is fundamental in any economic system. In any case, the idea that, as a general rule, contracts
are binding and, therefore, in the case of non-performance generate
some kind of responsibility, is a necessary condition for the efficient
functioning of the economic system.
Yet, in many legal systems, a fundamental change to the circumstances of a contract can serve to loosen the binding nature of that
contract. The legal doctrine that provides this effect is called by various names in different European countries. In previous European
instruments, such as the PECL, and the DCFR, the term used has
been “change of circumstances,” also to be found in the CESL. 83
In comparing article 89 of the CESL with its precedents in the
PECL and the DCFR, we can conclude that there are no great differences in their respective rules. In all of them, at the very beginning, there is an explicit recognition of the principle pacta sunt
servanda. Nevertheless, this principle can be moderated in cases
where there is a change of circumstances that makes the contract
more onerous, either because it has increased the value of the performance or because it has devalued the consideration. The impact
that the exceptional change of circumstances would have on the contract is described in different words: “performance of the contract
becomes excessively onerous” in the PECL; the contract “becomes
so onerous . . . that it would be manifestly unjust to hold the debtor
to the obligation” in the DCFR; and “performance becomes excessively onerous” in the CESL. On the other hand, there is no hierarchy established between a variation of the contract or its termination; the decision in each case is left to the judge. The remedy of
termination does not present a huge problem: the judge will determine its consequences. As for variation, the terminology changes,
“adapt the contract in order to distribute between the parties in a just
83. Cf. PECL, supra note 21, at art. 6:111; DCFR, supra note 31, at art. I. 1:103; CESL, supra note 4, at art. 89.
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and equitable manner the losses and gains” in the PECL; “vary the
obligation in order to make it reasonable and equitable in the new
circumstances” in the DCFR; and “adapt the contract in order to
bring it into accordance with what the parties would reasonably have
agreed at the time of contracting if they had taken the change of
circumstances into account” in the CESL.
Both the CESL and the PECL, as a consequence, first establish
the duty to renegotiate. The DCRF refers directly to the judge's intervention, but renegotiation is a prerequisite for the application of
that intervention. Apart from that, the requirements for the application of this intervention almost totally coincide, except that art. III.1:110 of the DCFR is applicable to both contractual obligations and
obligations arising from a unilateral legal act. The inclusion of the
latter category is not a common feature of national jurisdictions or
international instruments. Its inclusion in the DCFR has its justification in the protection of the debtor in cases of unilateral contracts
that, in most cases, are gratuitous in nature.
On the other hand, it is only in the PECL that the court may
award damages for the loss suffered through a party refusing to negotiate or breaking off negotiations contrary to good faith and fair
dealing. 84
This rule of an “unexpected change of circumstances” does not
have an equivalent in every legal system of the Member States, but
there are some that recognise this legal doctrine.
b. Change of Circumstances in Spanish Law
The legal doctrine used to solve problems arising from unexpected circumstances in Spanish Law is the so-called rebus sic stantibus clause. This remedy seeks to restore the equilibrium of the contract, which has been destroyed as a result of an unforeseeable
change of circumstances. There is no regulation of the clause in the
84. See Luz M. Martinez Velencoso, Change of Circumstances, in
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CESL, supra note 19, at 137-163.
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Spanish Civil Code; instead it has been developed by the courts. According to jurisprudence, the requirements for the application of the
clause are the following: the clause is only applicable to deferred
execution contracts or contracts that should be performed at successive intervals; and the change of circumstances should be unforeseeable.
There must be a change in the basis of the contract due to the
fact that the equilibrium of the contract has been affected or because
the aim of the contract has been frustrated.
The change in the basis of the contract must be considered “reasonably” extraordinary and unforeseeable at the moment of the conclusion of the contract. For that reason, it is not possible to apply the
clause when the change of circumstances concerns a contractual risk
that has been assumed by the parties. The inclusion of the concept
of reasonableness comes from the recent judgments of the Spanish
Supreme Court, because traditionally it was understood that the
change of circumstances should be utterly extraordinary and should
mean a total destruction of the equilibrium of the contract.
In many judgments, the application of the clause has been dismissed because there was an express assumption of the risk of a
change of circumstances in the contract, or that the change of circumstances formed part of the normal distribution of risks (determined either contractually or statutorily). 85
In addition, the change in circumstances must be unforeseeable.
This requirement is difficult to meet, because in modern society,
certain risks are not natural but artificial, in the sense that they arise
as a social product, and it is very difficult in some cases to anticipate

85. For example, in the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S, June
16, 1983 (R.J. 1983, 3632), concerning a contract for the execution of building
works, there was a clause excluding justification for late delivery of the building
in the event that the workers went on strike. For that reason, the Supreme Court
did not apply the clause rebus sic stantibus when the work became more expensive than initially expected, because of strike action. There was also another
clause stipulating that the price should not be increased.
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and to insure against them. Thus, unforeseeability should be assessed in relation to the type of contract and the amount of information to which the contracting parties had access to at the time of
contracting. 86
Furthermore, none of the parties must be responsible for the
change of circumstances, because it is unfair to grant a defence
mechanism to a party who is being held to account because he violated the duty of care to avoid the risk that was required of him according to the principle of good faith. 87
As for the effects arising from the change of circumstances of
the contract, although only a few judgments in the past accepted the
application of the clause to the case under consideration, some of
them have allowed the termination of the contract, while others have
opted for its modification. The modification of the contract is done
by the court through an integrated interpretation of the content of the
contract. The legal basis for this integrated interpretation is art. 1258
CC, which states that, apart from the agreed obligations, parties
should also respect the obligations arising from the principle of good
faith. 88
86. For that reason, depreciation of currency is not considered an unforeseeable circumstance, according to the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court,
S.T.S., Dec. 14, 1940 (R.J. 1940, 1135), involving a contract for the sale of a
mine; the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Mar. 26, 1963 (R.J.
1963, 2120), on the use of water by a community; and the judgment of the Spanish
Supreme Court, S.T.S., Nov. 31, 1963 (R.J. 1963, 4264), on a mine leasing contract.
Other cases have held that, the alteration of the value of the assets, in the period
between the time of conclusion of the contract and its performance, is not an unforeseeable circumstance. See the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S.,
June 5, 1945; the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Oct. 6, 1987
(R.J. 1987, 6720); the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., May 29,
1996 (R.J. 1996, 3862); and the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S.,
Apr. 27, 2012 (R.J. 2012, 4714).
87. See the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Apr. 19, 1985
(R.J. 1985, 1804); the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Nov. 19,
1994 (R.J. 1994, 8539); and the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S.,
Nov. 15, 2000 (R.J. 2000, 9214).
88. In the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Nov. 23, 1962
(R.J. 1962, 5005), the effect of the clause was to modify the contract. However,
two judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court declared the termination of the contract, S.T.S., Jan. 28, 1970 (R.J.1970, 503) and S.T.S., Mar. 23, 1988 (R.J. 1988,

186

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 11

There has recently been a change of perspective in this doctrine
developed by the Spanish Supreme Court due to the ongoing effects
of the financial crisis on the Spanish economy and the influence of
harmonized European private law (the PECL, the DCFR, and the
CESL). For instance, in the judgment of June 30, 2014, 89 quoting
the PECL and the DCFR, the Spanish Supreme Court came to the
conclusion that it is necessary to reinterpret the old doctrine of rebus
sic stantibus according to these harmonized European texts. Referring to an advertising contract, the court states that: “Economic expectations about the advertising activity formed part of the basis of
the contract (the price could be increased if the benefits increased as
well).” As the annual turnover decreased substantially due to the financial crisis, the price should be reduced, according to the court
and in this case also the legal consequence was the modification of
the contract by the court and not its termination.
Another important milestone was the judgment of Oct. 15,
2014 90 that concerned the lease contract of a hotel. The Supreme
Court following its previous doctrine about the necessity of modernizing the old rebus sic stantibus doctrine came to the conclusion that
the rent should be revised as it had been proved that, in the city of
Valencia, in 2009, the income of this kind of companies had fallen
by 42.3% per room. The rent should correspondingly be reduced by
29% (according to an expert opinion). Even after the reduction “the
resulting income would be superior by 20% in relation to the market
rent.” Again, the modification of the contract was the preferred option.

2228). In other judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court, the effect was the modification of the contract, S.T.S., July 9, 1984 (R.J. 1984, 3803); S.T.S., Nov. 6,
1992 (R.J. 1992, 9226); and S.T.S., July 21, 2010 (R.J. 2010, 3897).
89. Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., June 30, 2014 (Rec. 2250/2012).
90. Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Oct. 15, 2014 (Rec. 2992/2012).
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III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In Spain, although a proposal to reform the Civil Code (Law of
Obligations) has been published by the Spanish Ministry of Justice,
the necessary modernization of the Civil Code has not yet taken
place. This task has, nevertheless, been assumed by the Spanish Supreme Court interpreting the harmonized European Law as an instrument to integrate national law, especially through the construction of a new system of contractual liability (unitary concept of nonperformance, lack of conformity of the goods, and termination by
means of a fundamental breach).
Also, the influence of the so called acquis communautaire can
be observed in Spanish Law. The various European Directives for
the protection of consumers have been the object of transposition in
Spain through different special acts that were finally gathered together in one single act, the Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007, Nov.
16, 2007, approving the revised text of the General Law for the Protection of Consumers and Users. Spanish Courts, applying this text,
have developed some important principles, like the so-called control
of transparency, understood as an instrument to make sure that “the
consumer has real knowledge of what the financial sacrifice is and
of the legal burden that is derived from the contract” 91 in cases of
standardized contracts. Consequently, any clauses introduced in the
contract that suffer from this lack of transparency should be declared
null and void.
Finally, the influence of harmonized European Law can be observed in relation to the change of the circumstances of the contract,
particularly important because of the ongoing effects of the financial
crisis on the Spanish economy. There is no regulation of this legal
institution in the Spanish Civil Code; instead it has been developed
by case law. There has recently been a change of perspective in this
doctrine developed by the Spanish Supreme Court due mainly to the
influence of harmonized European private law (the PECL, the
91. See judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, Sept. 8, 2014, supra note 9.
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DCFR, and the CESL), softening the strict previous requirements
and consequences.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In order to achieve the proper protection of individual interests,
tort rules need to be applied efficiently whenever these interests are
subjected to any kind of harm. For that to be possible, the traditional
approach has been the acceptance that any loss or injury sustained
by legally protected interests must meet certain requirements. The
requirements include the actual existence of specific regulation designed for their legal protection, compensability, imputability to a
person other than the victim, and certainty. 1 Hence, tort is generated
from the infringement of the general duty of respect due to any legally protected interest. 2 It is a non-contractual obligation imposed
on a person, in order to compensate the holders of such interests, for
any injuries or losses caused. These interests can be either material
or moral.
The primary requirement for the application of tort law is that
the sustained damages, losses, or injuries must originate from a negligent or intentional activity or omission. This means that care and
precaution were omitted in the execution of such activity, and that
the causation between this activity and the harmful effects can be
proved in a court of justice. However, tort liability is essentially patrimonial. Its function is to grant, impede or repair a specific economic loss,3 while its application allows the reparation of indirect
patrimonial injuries and non-pecuniary damages. 4

1. Naveira Zarra & Maita María, El evento dañoso, in DERECHO DE
RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL EXTRACONTRACTUAL 42 (José María Pena López ed.,
Cálamo 2004) [hereinafter RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL EXTRACONTRACTUAL].
2. José María Pena López, La responsabilidad civil extracontractual. El sistema español de derecho de daños, in RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL
EXTRACONTRACTUAL, supra note 1, at 17.
3. RAMÓN MARTÍN MATEO, 1 TRATADO DE DERECHO AMBIENTAL 173 (Trivium 1991).
4. Tania García López, El principio de reparación del daño ambiental en el
derecho internacional público. Una aproximación a su recepción por parte del
derecho mexicano, 7 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 481,
487-88 (2007).
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The aim of this paper is to compare the way that tort liability is
regulated in the Central American civil codes (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama), understanding
the similarities and differences in their approach. This sort of analysis could be the base of any harmonization effort, so relevant in the
actual regional context, in view of the recent developments of the
Central American economic integration process.
II. THE CHARACTERIZATION OF TORT LIABILITY IN THE CENTRAL
AMERICAN CIVIL CODES
Much like in Europe (think of art. 1382 of the Napoleonic Code),
in the Central American civil codes, the concept of tort ordinarily
rests on a general clause imposing fault-based liability, though it is
possible to identify among these civil codes some interesting variations. For example, only in Honduras (art. 2236) and Panama (art.
1644) tort liability is characterized using elements such as: action or
omission, fault or negligence, and obligation to compensate. Whereas, Costa Rica (art.1045) and Nicaragua (art. 2509) add
other elements to the characterization, such as fault and imprudence,
and in the Nicaraguan text, the notion of malicious acts is also included. The Salvadoran Civil Code (arts. 2065 and 2080) is rooted
in the classic construction of delict, quasi-delict or fault, although it
also adds features such as malice and negligence. The exception to
this trend will be the Guatemalan Civil Code (art. 1645). Although
it uses terms such as intention, carelessness or recklessness as defining criteria, this provision is not really describing a fault based liability model, because it contains a rebuttable presumption of fault or
negligence.
Another important feature of the tort liability models found in
these codes is their obvious individual character. On the one hand,
the interests that would be harmed according to the logic of the regulation are personal aspects of the individual, both material and
moral. On the other hand, any claim regarding such losses or injuries
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can only be made by the person who has suffered them. 5 Additionally, the tort liability models have a distinct economic quality, because in spite of the possibility of addressing moral injuries, their
structures are decidedly patrimonial, both from the perspective of
the damages and the compensation. 6
III. THE NATURE OF TORT LIABILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND ITS
APPLICATION
Renowned legal experts have tried to explain the lawmakers’ intentions based on the way they have regulated tort liability. For Díez-Picazo the purpose of such legal institution is the distribution of misfortunes; 7 for Pena López, the animus seems to be
the social administration of harm. 8 From these ideas one can gather
that tort liability is not intended as a way to vanish the harm that the
legally protected interests may suffer, but to transfer the loss to the
person who caused it through compensation. In civil law, such a purpose does not have a punitive nature, contrary to common law where
concepts such as punitive damages turn tort liability into a form of
sanction. 9

5. Francisco De la Barra Gili, Responsabilidad extracontractual por daño
ambiental: el problema de la legitimación activa, 29 REVISTA CHILENA DE
DERECHO 367, 369 (2002).
6. Gisela María Pérez Fuentes, La responsabilidad civil por daños al medio
ambiente en el derecho comparado, XXII PROLEGÓMENOS, DERECHOS Y
VALORES 35, 36 (2009).
7. LUIS DÍEZ-PICAZO, DERECHO DE DAÑOS 41-42 (Civitas 1999).
8. Pena López, supra note 2, at 16.
9. In fact, one could discuss if the function of punitive damages is exclusively punitive. The civilian doctrine has started to change its position towards
them. It now refers to punitive damages as being a useful tool to ensure private
enforcement and justice through the mechanisms available in private law. The
newly found utility has to do with the fact that many times, according to the civilian logic, the compensation granted through tort law is proportional to the loss
suffered, this is not necessarily proportional to patrimonial profits obtained by the
tortfeasor from such actions. This disproportion causes for the application of the
civilian tort law to lose some of its effectiveness, by making it affordable for the
wrongdoer to injure third parties. A solution such as punitive damages might
strengthen the notion that tort law is an appropriate mechanism to enable individuals to compensate for the institutional weakness of some governments to resolve
certain type of conflicts, and the gap caused by certain principles of public law
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Regarding their foundations, tort liability models tend to subscribe to two ways of understanding and bringing to reality the concept of justice: corrective justice and distributive justice. Distributive justice is invoked when laws are designed with the purpose of
objectively allocating the burdens and benefits of dangerous or risky
activities, whereas corrective justice tends to use rules that categorize illicit activities, and they also tend to include notions such as
compensation. The advantage offered by the distributive variant is
that there is no need to focus exclusively on the contending parties
(wrongdoer and victim) since it allows a much broader approach to
the conflict and its possible solutions. Thus, the purpose of distributive justice is not to correct an error or injustice that has happened
between two specific individuals. It aims to establish behaviors for
private actors that are considered socially efficient. 10
Applying these criteria to the analysis of the Central American
civil codes helps to realize that lawmakers have incorporated elements that are specific to corrective justice when designing tort liability models. All these civil codes refer in some way or another to
the obligation to compensate for the injuries caused. 11 In addition,
the Salvadoran and Costa Rican Civil Codes also refer to the existence of liability generated from unlawful actions. 12
This does not mean that distributive justice is excluded from
Central American private law. On the contrary, legal experts have
already commented that the fact that a legal system recognizes cor-

such as the ultima ratio of criminal law. See Lotte Meurkens, The Punitive Damages Debate in Continental Europe: Food for Thought, in THE POWER OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: IS EUROPE MISSING OUT? 32-36 (Lotte Meurkens & Emily
Nordin eds., Intersentia 2012).
10. LIESBETH ENNEKING, FOREIGN DIRECT LIABILITY AND BEYOND 546-47
(Eleven 2012).
11. GUAT. CIV. CODE art. 1645; EL SAL. CIV. CODE art. 2065; HOND. CIV.
CODE art. 2236; NICAR. CIV. CODE art. 2509; COSTA RICA CIV. CODE art. 1045;
and PAN. CIV. CODE art. 1644.
12. EL SAL. CIV. CODE art 2065; and COSTA RICA CIV. CODE 1046.
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rective justice is not an obstacle to the inclusion of distributive justice as well. 13 Nevertheless, it is true that most legal systems of the
Western Hemisphere tend to favor corrective justice through monetary compensation. 14
The analysis of these legal systems shows that the Central American lawmakers agree with this ampler idea of a dual system because
it is possible to identify in the civil codes features that correspond to
both systems. For example, the incorporation of some elements such
as the principle ubi emolumentum, ibi onus, 15 also known as cuius
commoda, eius incommode, 16 is an indicator of using distributive
justice as a guiding notion. Through this principle, the mere fact of
obtaining any economic benefit from an action that harms third parties is enough to constitute liability, even when the person who has
carried out such action is not the one who benefits from them. An
example of the application of this principle is the economic benefit
obtained by the employer through the injuries caused by his employee. This principle is identifiable in all the civil codes of the region. 17 Another principle that serves to incorporate distributive justice in a tort liability system is res ipsa loquitur. The latter will be
addressed later. 18

13. Hanoch Sheinman, Tort Law and Distributive Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 354-84 (John Oberdiek ed., Oxford U. Press
2014).
14. Richard J. Peltz-Steele, Wrongs, Rights, and Remedies: A Yankee Romp
in Recent European Tort Law, 26 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 102, 104 (2016).
15. Latin aphorism which translates as “the one who benefits from an activity
has to bear the risk it originates.”
16. Fernando Reglero Campos, Capítulo II. Los sistemas de responsabilidad
civil, in I TRATADO DE RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL 281 (5th ed., L. Fernando Reglero
Campos & José Manuel Busto Lago eds., Thomson Reuters-Aranzadi 2014)
[hereinafter TRATADO DE RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL].
17. GUAT. CIV. CODE arts.1662, 1672; EL SAL. CIV. CODE art. 2073; HOND.
CIV. CODE art. 2241; NICAR. CIV. CODE art. 2514; COSTA RICA CIV. CODE art.
1048; and PAN. CIV. CODE art. 1650.
18. See infra, Part. III. B.3. Acts of Things.
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A. The Criteria for the Imputation of Tort Liability
As previously stated, corrective justice is usually manifested
through fault and negligence based liability models, constituting a
more traditional and voluntarist version of tort liability. 19 Corrective justice focuses on the behavior of the person that has caused the
harm, whether the person has complied with the usual level of diligence imposed by law, while reproaching some specific behaviors. 20
It is possible for some legal systems to have additional requirements for the configuration of these types of liability, such as the
duty of care, for example, or the existence of lack of foreseeability
and prudence. It is also possible for legal systems to restrict the
scope of tort liability, limiting its application to personal injuries or
property damages. 21 Such diversity of subjective criteria has been
the cause of extensive doctrinal debates in other parts of the world,
aiming to establish their actual suitability in relation to certain types
of injuries.
Peña López discusses the test of predictability or avoidability of
harm, explaining that negligence can be established from foreseeable or avoidable harm even when due diligence has been applied.
This entails that exoneration will be available if it is possible to
demonstrate that such harm is unpredictable and inevitable. 22 It
means that one must exercise the utmost diligence to ensure that no
injury is caused because otherwise, getting rid of the imputation will
19. When analyzing the concept of negligence, it is necessary to stop for a
moment and focus on its standard of care, which is crucial to understand the adequacy of the rules governing it. These rules should pinpoint the standard of care
that needs to be taken by the potential tortfeasor in order to avoid liability entirely.
Therefore, taking the necessary care to avoid harm, also avoids compensation. See
MICHAEL FAURE, DETERRENCE, INSURABILITY, AND COMPENSATION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY—FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
22 (Springer 2003).
20. Fernando Peña López, El criterio de imputación (I. Generalidades), in
RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL EXTRACONTRACTUAL, supra note 1, at 102.
21. Cees Van Dam, European Tort Law: Features of a Diverse Landscape,
in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO EUROPEAN UNION PRIVATE LAW 167-68
(Christian Twigg-Flesner ed., Cambridge U. Press 2010).
22. Fernando Peña López, El criterio de imputación (II. La Culpabilidad), in
RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL EXTRACONTRACTUAL, supra note 1, at 119.
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be almost impossible. Interestingly, Cabanillas Sánchez suggests
that when the required level of diligence is much more rigorous than
usual, the objectification of tort liability occurs. 23
The objectification of tort liability starts by including pseudoobjective imputation criteria in civil codes. Examples are rebuttable
presumptions regarding the existence of fault or the exhaustion of
due diligence. 24 In European law, an example of such regulation is
section 836 of the German BGB 25 that imposes a rebuttable presumption of fault on the owner of buildings that when collapsing can
harm third parties or their property, allowing the defendant to be
exonerated if demonstrating having acted diligently to avoid such
harm. 26
In the Central American civil codes, the use of rebuttable presumptions is very similar to the German model. Here pseudo-objective criteria are used to define liability for the acts of others. 27 However, in art. 1648 of the Guatemalan Civil Code it is possible to observe a different and much broader example, since the rebuttable
presumption of fault is not limited to such specific cases. In this
model, the presumption of fault is general. Regardless of the case,
in order to have the right to compensation, the harmed party is only
required to prove the existence of an injury or a loss and not the
wrongdoer’s fault. 28
23. Antonio Cabanillas Sánchez, El daño ambiental, REVISTA DE DERECHO
AMBIENTAL 9, 13 (1994).
24. Pena López, supra note 2, at 26.
25. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code], as promulgated on
Jan. 2, 2002 (BGB1 I, p. 42, 2909; 2003 I page 738), § 836.
26. Franz Werro, Liability for Harm Caused by Things, in TOWARDS A
EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 925-26 (4th ed., Arthur S. Hartkamp, Martijn W. Hesselink, Ewoud Hondius, Chantal Mak, & Edgar du Perron eds., Kluwer 2011)
[hereinafter TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE].
27. EL SAL. CIV. CODE art. 2073; HOND. CIV. CODE art. 2237; NICAR. CIV.
CODE art. 2512; COSTA RICA CIV. CODE art. 1048; and PAN. CIV. CODE art. 1645.
28. The Civil Chamber of the Guatemalan Supreme Court of Justice has ruled
on the matter in Nov. 28, 2007, stating that such a rule establishes the right of the
defendant to contribute to the evidentiary process in order to weaken the presumed
fault, but a correlative right is recognized to the plaintiff, who is only required to
prove the existence of an injury, but not the defendant’s fault. See Ruling of the
Civil Chamber of Nov. 28, 2007 (Sentencia [S.] No. 462-2006, Nov. 28, 2007,
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Pseudo-objectification of this sort of imputation criteria can also
be found in the way that harm caused by animals is regulated. Both
the Salvadorian Civil Code (art. 2077) and the Nicaraguan Civil
Code (art. 2513) impute liability to the owner or the mere holder of
the animal. But in the case of stray animals, animals that have been
released, or animals that have fled, in order to impute liability, the
owner or the holder should be responsible for releasing the animal
or letting it escape previously to the occurrence of the harm object
of the claim.
A third possibility of pseudo-objectification is offered by the injuries caused by the acts of things. In the Salvadoran Civil Code (art.
2079), liability for injuries caused by a thing that falls or is thrown
from the top of a building is imputable to anyone who inhabits that
part of the building, unless it is proven that the deed was exclusively
carried out by someone in a faulty or fraudulent manner.
The appearance of these pseudo-objective criteria is indeed a reflection of the limited scope and anachronism of fault-based liability
in the actual state of things. Fault-based liability corresponds to a
reality that was typical of the nineteenth century or in preindustrial
societies. Undoubtedly, the advent of industrialization has forced
the revision of the system that has been put in place in order to assure the distribution of losses, thus, contemplating the possibility of
including objective criteria instead.
This process of objectification certainly did not stop there. Strict
liability regimes based on risk are available to date. They are a consequence of searching for possible alternatives to the traditional civilian mechanisms, due to a general understanding of the benefits
that certain modern technologies bring to the community, and avoiding the need to resort to their prohibition. As a doctrine, strict liability positively reflects the spirit of sustainable development.

GACETA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA [Gazette of the Supreme Court of
Justice], Clase Civil).
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Objective imputation criteria are used to determine the liability
of the wrongdoer of harmful actions or omissions, when these convey risks for others, regardless of whether or not there has been fault
on their part; or, in the case of negligent behavior, to determine if
the transgressor has acted with the maximum degree of care or not.
These criteria are based on the agent’s activity and not on its behavior, by focusing instead on the victim’s due protection. 29 The logic
used assumes that such activity is abnormal or extraordinary, and
therefore it cannot be safely developed, despite the degree of diligence used. 30
If economic analysis is added to the mix, it is possible to conclude that when strict liability is applied, the burden of suffering all
the social costs of the loss or injury therewith imposed on the tortfeasor has a precautionary effect. This is achieved by forcing the
potential wrongdoer to take all the needed safeguards in order to
bring his activity closer to the optimal level of care (sometimes even
above the required level), with the objective of minimizing the expected costs. 31
The fact that it is increasingly common to find strict liability
rules in the Central American civil codes speaks of a new understanding of tort liability, which tends to socialize the economic
losses increasingly. This aims at improving the position of the victims, by balancing their interests with those of the wrongdoers, 32 while also balancing the distribution of losses caused, without

29. Roberto Paulino de Albuquerque Júnior, Notas sobre a Teoria da responsabilidade Civil sem dano, 6 REVISTA DE DIREITO CIVIL CONTEMPORÂNEO 89, 90
(2016).
30. Agustín Viguri Perea, La responsabilidad civil por inmisiones, in III
CONFERENCIAS SOBRE EL MEDIO AMBIENTE. MUNICIPIO Y URBANISMO 115
(Agustín Viguri Perea ed., Comité Econòmic i Social de la Comunitat Valenciana
2000).
31. FAURE, supra note 19, at 22.
32. NICOLAS ROUILLER, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW—AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND TO THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
OF BUSINESS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 426 (Schulthess 2015).
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implying an extra effort from society in general when trying to avoid
harm. 33 Without a doubt this is a “win-win” solution.
B. Strict Liability in Central America
1. Vicarious Responsibility
Strict liability usually extends to cases dealing with vicarious liability. Some examples are the employer’s liability for the actions
of its employees, 34 or the CEO’s liability for business activities. 35 The modern theory of vicarious liability is not based on fault,
but on political and social considerations, as commented by Kodilinye. 36 This change is linked to the obvious unfairness and the fact
that it is legally unjustifiable for a person who has not committed
any fault to be responsible for another’s harmful behavior. In reality,
it is possible to argue that a person who employs others in order to
advance his or her own interests, especially if these are economic,
should be held liable for any harm caused by the actions of such
employees. Simultaneously, it can also be argued that the innocent
victim must be able to sue someone who is financially capable of
responding for that loss.
In Central America, this form of strict liability is present in Guatemala (arts.1663 and 1664) and in Costa Rica (art. 1048). 37 The
logic used is that applying strict liability should derive from the possibility of obtaining economic profit. In other words, strict liability
33. JOHN M. CHURCH, WILLIAM R. CORBETT, THOMAS E. RICHARD, & JOHN
V. WHITE, TORT LAW, THE AMERICAN AND LOUISIANA PERSPECTIVES 7
(Vandeplas Publishing 2008).
34. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.][CIVIL CODE] art. 1242, §5 (Fr.). See Reglero Campos, supra note 16, at 286.
35. BGB section 31 (Ger.); Gerhard Wagner, Vicarious Liability, in
TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 26, at 912-13.
36. GILBERT KODILINYE, COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN TORT LAW 334 (5th
ed., Routledge 2015).
37. In the case of Costa Rica, the lawmakers provided two different systems
in this article, COSTA RICA CIV. CODE art. 1048, (1) pseudo-strict liability, by including a rebuttable presumption of fault, and (2) strict liability in the case of
hazardous activities. See VÍCTOR PÉREZ VARGAS, DERECHO PRIVADO 563-72 (4th
ed., Litografía e Imprenta Lil 2013).
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rules should be linked with the principle ubi emolumentum, ibi onus,
by means of which, the simple fact of obtaining an economic benefit
through an action that harms third parties in any way, is enough
cause for making the employer liable.
In Guatemala (art. 1665) 38 and Panama (art. 1645), vicarious liability also extends to the state, which may be liable for any harm
caused by public servants in the exercise of their duties. This is an
example of fault in vigilando. However, only in Guatemala it is possible to find true strict liability, because in the Panamanian case,
fault or negligence are required. In Honduras (art. 2237) vicarious
liability is limited to any harm caused by a special agent acting in
the name of the state, and not for public servants exercising their
duties. In this case, they are solely responsible for their actions. In
the case of Costa Rica (art. 1048), there is no specific mention of
vicarious liability in the case of the state, but the general clause
available could be applied.
In these jurisdictions, the strict vicarious liability of the state is
construed as joint liability. This approach is available in Guatemala,
Honduras, and Costa Rica. In Guatemala, Constitutional art. 155 establishes joint liability on the part of the state or the state institutions
where the wrongdoer is employed. This liability is further clarified
in the Civil Code, through a strict liability regime. In Honduras, art.
2238 establishes a joint liability regime. In the case of Costa Rica,
art. 1048 contains a general clause for joint liability. It is possible to
assume that it could be also applied to the state.

38. GUAT. CIV. CODE art. 1665, originally, this article stated that such liability was subsidiary. However, it was amended by the Constitution through its art.
155. From then on, this became a joint liability, and it has a statute of limitation
of twenty years. Moreover, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court, in a judgment
of Dec. 6, 2004, said that in such cases the “jointness” attached to this form of
liability is passive, giving the claimant a faculty of choice, having the possibility
of targeting either, or if it is more convenient for his need, targeting both simultaneously. Nonetheless, it is understood that if the claim is directed against only one
of them, it should entail the possibility of entirely covering the cost of compensation.
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Costa Rican jurisprudence has also indicated that the state and
its agencies shall be liable for all the losses caused by their operations, whether they are legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal. The only exceptions allowed are force majeure, contributory
negligence, or an action of a third party. It establishes requirements
such as that the activity is actually generated from the state, that at
least adequate causality can be established, the existence of a compensable loss or harm, and that the loss or injuries should be unlawful, true, effective, real, evaluable, and individualizable. 39
2. Damages Caused by Animals
A second example of strict liability is the one allocated on the
owners or keepers of animals that cause any kind of damage. This is
regulated in art. 1669 of the Guatemalan Civil Code. This form of
liability is definitely strict because it reaches the owner, even if the
animal was stray or had escaped without the owner’s fault. The only
exception admitted is the provocation or fault of the victim. The
Honduran and Panamanian Civil Codes include similar regulations. 40 In both cases, liability is also strict, but besides allowing
contributory negligence as a defense, these codes also allow the use
of casus fortuitus or fortuitous event.
3. Acts of Things
Strict liability for the act of things is a third example. 41 It relates
to those cases where the head of the family is strictly liable for the
39. Judgements of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala Primera [First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica], no. 025-F-99, Jan. 22, 1999
and no. 589-F-99, Oct. 1, 1999; and Judgment of the Corte Suprema de Justicia,
Sala Tercera [Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica], no.
252-F-01, Mar. 28, 2001.
40. HOND. CIV. CODE art. 2239; PAN. CIV. CODE art. 1647.
41. The act of things has been included in the French Civil Code, C. CIV. art.
1244, as well as in the Spanish Civil Code, CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] art. 1910. See
Werro, supra note 26, at 925-27; Ordonnance 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant
réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations
[Ordinance no. 2016-131 of Feb. 10, 2016 on the Reform of Contract Law, the
General Scheme and Proof of Obligations], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
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damages caused by the things that fall or are thrown from the house
in which the family lives. 42 In Central America, the regulation regarding this type of liability also follows this logic, but in some cases
it has been extended to the damages caused by the ruin or collapse
of a building. The Guatemalan Civil Code (art. 1671) includes a
strict liability solution. It states that the owner is unconditionally liable, adding the possibility of joint liability for the constructor, if the
harm originates from a construction defect. The Panamanian Civil
Code (art. 1652) also uses strict liability, by making liable the head
of the family who lives in a building or part of it. The Salvadoran
Civil Code (art. 935) establishes that if a building falls because of
its bad condition, and thereby the neighbors are harmed in any way,
the caused injuries must be compensated, except in the instance of a
fortuitous event.
It is also widely recognized by legal authors that numerals 2 and
4 of art. 1908 of the Spanish Civil Code, which refer to the damage
caused by excessive smoke and by infectious materials, regulate a
sort of strict liability. It is noteworthy that some legal authors (fewer,
perhaps) also acknowledge that numerals 1 and 3 of that same article
regulate cases of strict liability as well. These numerals refer to the
explosion of machines, inflammation of explosive substances, and
falling of trees. 43 This type of liability is also regulated in some Central American civil codes. In Honduras (art. 2241) and Panama (art.
1650), the wording is almost identical, and in Guatemala (art. 1672)
the wording has some minor changes.
According to the legal doctrine, the notion of liability for the acts
of things follows the principle res ipsa loquitur, since the damages
caused to the neighboring estates are a result of the owner’s lack of
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Feb. 10, 2016,
No. 0035, NOR: JUSC1522466R; Royal Decree of July 24, 1889 (Real Decreto
(R.D.), B.O.E 1889, 206) (Spain).
42. Reglero Campos, supra note 16, at 286.
43. Luis Martínez Vázquez de Castro, La protección civil del medio ambiente, in PRIMERAS CONFERENCIAS SOBRE EL MEDIO AMBIENTE 10 (Agustín Viguri Perea ed., Comité Econòmic i Social de la Comunitat Valenciana 1999).
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care. The principle res ipsa loquitur corresponds to a technique
based on prima facie evidence, which serves to reduce the uncertainty generated by the obligation of proving the causal link, which
sometimes could be a real obstacle in order to achieve the complete
and total compensation of the victim. Prima facie evidence can be
identified under different names in different legal systems, such as
Anscheinsbeweis der Kausalität in Germany or causalité virtuelle in
France. 44
Some of these legal authors argue that applying this principle
implies recognizing a form of strict liability based on negligence. In
this case it is enough to demonstrate the existence of actual dangerousness unlike with fault based liability. 45 However, it is worth
mentioning that there are other authors who point out that liability
based on res ipsa loquitur is not really strict, because the effect is
only the reversal of the burden of proof. In those cases, the defendant
still has the option of proving that his behavior was neither negligent
nor faulty. 46 If this doctrinal position is assumed as correct, one
could not speak of a true form of strict liability, but of a pseudoobjectification of liability. Although viewed from a purely economic perspective, the effect is rather similar, since both negligence
and strict liability induce risky actors to assume those precautions
for which the cost is justifiable. 47 Regardless, if only the wording of
these provisions is taken into account, it is evident that the lawmakers did not resort to the use of rebuttable presumptions. They actually deem the wrongdoer as liable in all the cases.

44. Fernando Reglero Campos & Luis Medina Alcoz, Capítulo V. El nexo
causal. La pérdida de oportunidad. Las causas de exoneración de responsabilidad: culpa de la víctima y fuerza mayor, in I TRATADO DE RESPONSABILIDAD
CIVIL, supra note 16, at 859.
45. JAVIER TAMAYO JARAMILLO, I DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL 5 (Temis
1986).
46. KODILINYE, supra note 36, at 99.
47. Mark A. Geistfeld, Fault Lines in the Positive Economic Analysis of Tort
Law, in 1 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 157 (Arlen Jennifer ed., Edward Elgar 2013).
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4. Unlawful Effects of Lawful Activities
The Costa Rican Supreme Court of Justice has pointed out that,
historically, the notion of liability for lawful activities has been a
prevailing criterion for applying strict liability. The court states that
it should not be the victim’s responsibility to prove the causal link
between the tortious action and the sustained injuries or losses, when
the tortfeasor has assumed the risk knowingly, by deciding to carry
out a risky activity, even when the activity is a lawful one, contrary
to what is expected to happen when dealing with fault-based liability. 48 This position has been reaffirmed by the Costa Rican High
Court of Criminal Cassation in a judgement referring to the civil liability resulting from the commission of a crime. 49 Moreover, strict
liability for the unlawful effects of lawful acts, is also applicable to
the state and its agents, as it has been referred to by the Constitutional Chamber of the Costa Rican Supreme Court of Justice. 50 This
opinion goes hand in hand with the recognition that this legal system
makes of the abuse of rights doctrine in art. 22 of the Costa Rican
Civil Code.
Even though it is not expressly mentioned in the aforementioned
rulings, it is easy to deduce that the opinions are based on the notion
48. Judgement of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala Primera [Supreme
Court of Justice of Costa Rica, First Chamber], no. 398, June 6, 2001.
49. The High Court of Criminal Cassation has said that the foundation of
strict liability is the social recognition that certain activities, while being legitimate and necessary for the actual social and technological development, concomitantly are risky and possibly tortious. In those cases, the risk should not be assumed by the one suffering the effects, but rather by the one obtaining any kind
of benefit from such activity. See Judgment of the Tribunal Superior de Casación
Penal [Superior Tribunal of Criminal Cassation of Costa Rica], no. 493-2004,
May 20, 2004.
50. The Constitutional Chamber has stated that some fundamental rights,
such as the right to a clean environment, may impose some limits on the scope of
the state’s activity. These are limits that need to be considered and established
because of the role of the state. A role that includes a mandate to guarantee, defend, and preserve those rights. Therefore, the state has the obligation of omitting
some of its own interventions, even if they are lawful, especially when their foreseeable results may harm in any way fundamental rights recognized by the Constitution. See Ruling of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala Constitutional [Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica, Constitutional Chamber] no. 3248-2002,
Apr. 9, 2002.
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of unlawfulness of the effects of lawful conducts, understanding that
even if a behavior is lawful, it may cause damages to third parties, 51
affecting subjective rights or legally protected interests. In this case,
the causation of such damages is what is deemed unlawful or illegal. This qualification is to be achieved when the duty of care is not
met, putting legally protected interests at risk. 52 Unlawfulness, as a
presupposition of tort liability, implies not only a kind of objectification, but the recognition that the lives of others can be negatively
affected by the decisions that a person may take, even when this
person is legally enabled by rules that have not been analyzed
properly. 53
This is one argument in favor of the need of readjusting the regulations regarding tort liability in the civil codes of Guatemala, El
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, 54 because it is obvious
that the lawmakers of the region did not include the concept of liability for lawful acts, contrary to what happens in Costa Rica, where
this form of liability has been introduced in art. 1043.

51. Rivero Sánchez says that the liability for lawful act is a general principle
of law under which even when a behavior is authorized by the law, but it causes
harm of some kind, it must be accompanied by an adequate scheme of compensation for the damages caused. See JUAN MARCOS RIVERO SÁNCHEZ, III
RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL 61 (2d ed., Biblioteca Jurídica Diké 2001).
52. Guilherme Henrique Lima Reinig, Abuso de direito e responsabilidade
por ato ilícito: críticas ao enunciado 37 da 1.a Jornada de Direito Civil, 7
REVISTA DE DIREITO CIVIL CONTEMPORÂNEO 61, 87 (2016).
53. David Howarth, The General Conditions of Unlawfulness, in TOWARDS
A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 26, at 874-81.
54. While it is true that Title VI of the Guatemalan Civil Code is called “Obligations derived from lawful acts without previous agreement,” the lawmakers
opted for a numerus clausus system, leaving out a general rule that could govern
atypical situations. In the case of Honduras and Panama, lawmakers included general concepts related to quasi contracts in the Civil Code, but not a general rule
regarding liability for lawful acts. In Nicaragua, even though the wording of art.
2507 of the Civil Code is almost identical to that of art. 1043 of the Costa Rican
Civil Code, it only refers to liability for lawful acts, when they affect individuals
that presumably have consented to them.
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5. Abuse of Rights
The abuse of rights is regulated in almost all the Central American civil codes. Jordá Capitán is of the opinion that this doctrine
represents a rupture from the Roman Law principle of qui iure suo
utitur neminem laedit, by which it was understood that the exercise
of one’s legal rights could not cause harm to another. 55 Brazilian
legal doctrine has actually described it as another form of strict liability, attending to its finalist nature, and seeing it as totally independent from fault, and perfectly useful as legal basis for an inhibitory action. 56
Art. 1653 of the Guatemalan Civil Code regulates the abuse of
rights in the section dealing with tort liability. According to this article, the legitimacy of any right is limited by the notions of bad faith
and excess—extremes that need to be proved in court. According to
the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in this country,
the test for bad faith and excess has to be based on the idea that the
exercise of one’s rights always has to have the purpose of defending
legally protected interests. 57
In the case of the Costa Rican Civil Code, the abuse of rights is
regulated in art. 22. This article states that the law does not protect
the abuse of rights or their antisocial exercise. Any act or omission
in a contract that clearly exceeds the normal limits of the exercise of
a right, thus causing harm to third parties or to the counterparty, will
lead to the corresponding compensation and the adoption of judicial
or administrative measures in order to prevent the persistence of
such abuse. The wording used is rather unfortunate because it limits
its application exclusively to contractual liability cases.

55. EVA JORDÁ CAPITÁN, EL DERECHO A UN MEDIO AMBIENTE ADECUADO
268-69 (Aranzadi 2002).
56. Reining, supra note 52, at 64-66.
57. Ruling of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, Clase Civil, [Supreme Court of
Justice of Guatemala, Civil Chamber], no. 141-2000, Feb. 26, 2001, GACETA DE
LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA [Gazette of the Supreme Court of Justice].
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In neither Honduras, El Salvador, nor Nicaragua has the abuse
of rights been regulated yet. However, the Nicaraguan Supreme
Court of Justice has referred to the doctrine of abuse of rights in a
ruling of June 12, 1948 (Judicial Bulletin 14281), noting that the
principle nemo damnum facit qui suo jure utitur 58 cannot be applied
in an absolute manner because it would lead to many abuses, especially when someone acts with recklessness or in bad faith, damaging others. That is why jurisprudence has attenuated the rigor of the
principle, meaning that, nowadays, no liability is possible when
one’s rights have been used with prudence and in good faith. Escobar Fornos also comments that in regards to Nicaragua, this doctrine
should only be applicable when dealing with fault-based liability,
since without fraud or fault there will be no abuse. 59
This position coincides with Von Bar’s. He explains that in legal
systems that do not have special provisions in relation to the abuse
of rights, they can perfectly operate under a general clause for fault
based liability because it is enough to have the concept of fault included in the regulation. Nevertheless, the clause of abuse rights is
an advantage because it serves to dissolve the perception of subjective rights being absolute, which could be understood as a form of
impunity for their holders. 60
In Panama, this principle is not regulated yet, but it has been
addressed in judgment no. 484-2007, July 24, 2008. There, it was
ruled that this doctrine arises from the need to affirm the existence
of subjective rights and the care that is needed to avoid the excesses
that may emerge when they are exercised in such a way that they do
not become unfair. In order to consider the exercise of a right as
58. Latin maxim that can be translated as: no one can cause any harm when
exercising their right.
59. Escobar Fornos indicates some examples where it could be inferred, such
as in the case of the resignation of the partners in a company of limited duration,
in the obligations concerning an agent after his resignation, or in the obligations
concerning the cohabitation of the spouses. See IVÁN ESCOBAR FORNOS, II
DERECHO DE OBLIGACIONES 252-56 (Imprenta UCA 1989).
60. CHRISTIAN VON BAR, I THE COMMON EUROPEAN LAW OF TORTS 56-57
(Oxford U. Press 1998).
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abusive, its effects should be contrary to the economic and social
aims of the law, which can be equated with the interests of the state
itself.
6. Available Defenses
Liability models usually require some flexibility in order to accommodate to the specific circumstances of the deeds generating
losses or injuries. Therefore, it is normal for them to include some
kind of exemptions or mitigating circumstances. Oftentimes, their
availability depends on the type of liability the model is dealing with
because they could be different for fault-based liability and for strict
liability. The available exceptions normally are: (1) fortuitous event,
(2) force majeure, (3) contributory negligence, (4) necessity, and (5)
statute of limitations.
In order to understand their scope, the first three need to be discussed simultaneously. Fortuitous event refers to statistically unpredictable events and is applicable both in fault based liability and
strict liability. 61 Force majeure could also be used in both cases and
refers to unavoidable events. This defense can be used to determine
if a harmful action actually could be imputed to the alleged tortfeasor for carrying it out voluntarily, since it makes no sense to consider
a person as liable if they could not influence the inflicted risk. 62
The notion of contributory negligence implies that the faulty
negligent behavior is actually caused by the victim who is, partially
or totally, responsible for triggering the losses or injuries affecting
him. Its application is in no way connected to the existence of an
outstanding obligation owed by the victim to the wrongdoer. It
should be enough to prove that the individual suffering the damages
did not apply reasonable care, therefore contributing to his own
harm. 63 Compensation should be reduced proportionally, and in
61. Reglero Campos & Medina Alcoz, supra note 44, at 895.
62. FAURE, supra note 19, at 53.
63. NATALIE PERSADIE & RAJENDRA RAMLOGAN, COMMONWEALTH
CARIBBEAN BUSINESS LAW 264-65 (3d ed., Routledge 2016).
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some cases even denied, depending on the weight of the contribution
that the victim’s faulty or negligent action represents in relation to
the effect suffered. Some behaviors that could be considered as contributory negligence are the lack of care, renouncing to implementation of preventive measures, refraining from reacting, reacting
weakly, reacting excessively, refusing to mitigate the effects of the
inflicted losses or injuries, accepting the losses or injuries (volenti
non fit injuria), or assuming unnecessary risks. 64
Article 34-D from the Panamanian Civil Code is the only one
available in the region that recognizes the differences between fortuitous event and force majeure. It establishes that a fortuitous event
implies the occurrence of unpredictable natural events, and that
force majeure is caused by irresistible human deeds. However, although legal doctrine has clearly instituted the differences between
these two defenses, it is still possible to find legal systems in Central
America where these are used indiscriminately as if they were synonyms. This is the case of art. 43 of the Salvadorian Civil Code.65
This is also the case of art. 2512 from the Nicaraguan Civil Code,
regarding vicarious liability. In this specific case, the wrongdoer is
not considered liable if it is possible to prove that it was not in his
reach to impede the harmful act, by having common and ordinary
care or watchfulness. It is also important to note that although the
64. ROUILLER, supra note 32, at 433-37.
65. It is noteworthy that the Salvadoran case law, while recognizing the established doctrinal differences between these two defenses, continues to maintain
as valid the original wording used by the lawmakers, where they are incorporated
as equivalent, stating as a justification that their practical effects are the same, and
that both defenses are different expressions of a general category called “Just
Cause.” This case law has also established its basic requirements: (a) that the
harmful act is beyond the control of the alleging party, (b) that the harmful act is
unforeseen and insurmountable, and (c) that its consequence is a permanent inability to perform an obligation. See Judgment of the Cámara Segunda de lo Civil
de la Primera Sección Del Centro, San Salvador [Second Civil Chamber of the
First Section of the Center of San Salvador] no. 14-2MC-14-A, Nov. 26, 2014;
Judgment of the Cámara de la Tercera Sección del Centro, San Vicente [Chamber
of the Third Section of the Center, San Vicente], no. C-05-PC-2015-CPCM, Feb.
16, 2015; and Judgment of the Cámara de la Segunda Sección de Occidente, Sonsonate [Chamber of the Second Section of the West, Sonsonate], no. INC-15CPCM-2015, June 9, 2015.
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defense of fortuitous event is available in all these legal systems,
courts and legal experts seem to prefer the use of force majeure66
and contributory negligence instead. 67
The use of force majeure in the case of strict liability in Central
America is very limited, following the notion posed by legal doctrine that in such cases, one should resort to the use of fortuitous
event as a defense. 68 Force majeure is available in Guatemala (art.
1672), Honduras (art. 2241), and Panama (art. 1650) in the case of
strict liability that originates from the fall of a tree.
In most of the other legal systems of this region, force majeure
is used as a defense in the case of liability for damage caused by
animals, according to art. 2239 from the Honduran Civil Code, art.
2513 from the Nicaraguan Civil Code, and art. 1647 from the Panamanian Civil Code. It is also used in the case of liability for damage
caused by motive machinery, imposed on the person who benefits
from it, as it is regulated in art. 1048 of the Costa Rican Civil Code.
In the case of art. 1650 of the Guatemalan Civil Code, force majeure
is regulated as a defense for the liability originated from the use of
machinery, appliances, and dangerous substances.
More or less, the same happens in the case of contributory negligence. Only art. 1645 from the Guatemalan Civil Code actually
66. In the Judgment of the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal, II Circuito Judicial de San José [Criminal Court of Appeals, II Judicial Circuit of San
José], no. 00418, May 15, 2003, the Court said that while it is true that there is a
tendency to equate force majeure with the fortuitous events, because of their almost identical effects, the Costa Rican civil jurisprudence, since 1942, has made
distinctions between the two defenses. It has argued that such differentiation was
incorporated by the lawmaker, who sought important to establish strict liability in
the event of unforeseen circumstances resulting from the normal development of
the activity and risk created, and not in the case of force majeure, because in this
case, forces different from the risk operate. Hence, the difference between the
strict liability based on a fortuitous event and fault-based liability is predictability,
because in the first case damage is unpredictable, something that is not possible
when dealing with fault. These two defenses can also be differentiated upon their
effects, since force majeure frees from liability in every case, because of its external origin.
67. Reglero explains that one of the characteristics of faultless liability, for
example, is precisely the reduced number and scope of the available defenses. See
Reglero Campos, supra note 16, at 309.
68. Van Dam, supra note 21, at 168.
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includes it, as a general defense for any kind of tort liability. Central
American lawmakers have also allowed the use of contributory negligence as a defense against the employer’s vicarious liability, following the French model.
In the case of necessity, it presupposes that damages to legally
protected interests have occurred when the victim of an unjustified
attack tries to defend himself. In order to use this defense, the damage caused has to be proportional to the attack suffered. Following
this logic, it becomes obvious that the real problem behind using this
solution lies in the possibility of determining a valid hierarchy for
the legally protected interests. Art. 1658 of the Guatemalan Civil
Code uses necessity when the wrongdoer is trying to protect himself
or a third party from imminent danger. The effect in this case is to
transform the unlawful action causing the losses or injuries into a
lawful one. Besides this sole example, the Guatemalan Civil Code
actually considers that a state of necessity is insufficient to exempt
the perpetrator from his liability.
Extinctive prescription (statute of limitation) is probably the
most radical of all the defenses analyzed in this section due to its
paralyzing effect. 69 Once the period set by law has elapsed, be it
after the harmful action has occurred or once its effects have been
suffered by the victim, any claim for recovery becomes impossible.
Guatemala offers two different statutory periods: a general
timeframe of one year (art. 1673), and a special timeframe of twenty
years in the case of the state’s vicarious liability for the acts of public
servants (regulated by the Constitution). In Panama (art. 1706), the
timeframe is one year for fault based or negligence based liability
claims. In this case, the statutory period starts from the moment the
victim realizes there has been a loss or injury. This can be interpreted
as the moment when the effects are known.
The Honduran and Nicaraguan Civil Codes are not as specific as
the Guatemalan and Panamanian counterparts regarding this topic.
69. ROUILLER, supra note 32, at 432.
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In Honduras (art. 297) and in Nicaragua (art. 924), the Civil Codes
establish that the statute of limitations starts the day the claim could
be filed. The wording is rather imprecise; nevertheless, the interpretation should be similar to the one suggested in the case of Panama,
meaning that it starts the moment the effects are known. In El Salvador (art. 2254) and Costa Rica (art. 868), the Civil Codes incorporate general statutes of limitations. In the first, the statutory period
included in the general regime is of ten years for civil actions based
on executable titles and of twenty years for ordinary civil actions; in
the latter, the period is of ten years for all cases.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE TORT LIABILITY MODELS AVAILABLE IN
THE CENTRAL AMERICAN CIVIL CODES
As it was mentioned before, in addition to prevention, deterrence
is a foreseeable effect of tort liability systems. It originates from the
obligation to compensate imposed on the tortfeasor. Compensation
is dissuasive because it seeks to avoid the possibility of the transgressor carrying out further harm. At the same time, it may have an
exemplary effect for other potential transgressors. 70 It is possible to
perceive this dissuasive effect from the way in which the general
clauses for tort liability are worded. From the beginning, they already pose a threat for those who cause any damages: compensation.
However, deterrence can be viewed either from an ex ante or an
ex post perspective. Faure points out that from an ex ante perspective, tort liability can be understood as an instrument that guides the
behavior of people who could be involved in an accident. 71 But from
an ex post perspective, in Gilead’s opinion, that deterrence can be
understood as the solution proposed by tort law to the problem posed
by the economic distortion triggered by the externalities caused by

70. H. BEAU BAEZ III, TORT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (2d ed., Kluwer
2014).
71. Michael Faure, Tort Liability in France: An Introductory Economic Analysis, in 6 LAW AND ECONOMICS IN CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES 169-81 (Bruno Deffains
& Thierry Kirat eds., JAI 2001).
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the injuries or losses suffered. 72 Nevertheless, it is also possible to
find legal authors who believe that this ex post effect is precisely
what makes tort law ineffective from a preventive point of view. 73
This is something one can easily agree with because, in order to
claim any kind of compensation, the harm suffered may be current
or future, but inevitably, it must be true. And besides that, this fact
has to be proven in court. 74
Having said that, there is a possibility contained in these codes
that can actually have a real preventive effect: the inhibitory action. 75 This inhibitory action can be admitted simultaneously with a
tort liability action. Art. 479 of the Guatemalan Civil Code, art. 1680
of the Nicaraguan Civil Code, art. 405 of the Costa Rican Civil
Code, and art. 569 of the Panamanian Civil Code contain almost
identical regulations to the art. 590 of the Spanish Civil Code where
this solution has already been tried. In the case of art. 858 of the
Salvadorian Civil Code and art. 835 of the Honduran Civil Code,
the wording varies a little, but the spirit is the same: to avoid the
causation of harm.
This inhibitory action is a very broad figure that, according
to Llamas Pombo, complies with a triple function: injunction, precaution, and compensation. Its taxative nature can be used not only
to request the cessation of nuisances, but actually for all types of
72. Israel Gilead, Harm Screening Under Negligence Law, in EMERGING
ISSUES IN TORT LAW 264 (Jason W. Neyers, Erika Chamberlain, & Stephen G. A.
Pitel eds., Hart 2007).
73. Katja Fach Gómez, Acciones preventivas en supuestos de contaminación
transfronteriza y aplicabilidad del artículo 5.3 Convenio de Bruselas,
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPARECHTLICHE STUDIEN (ZEUS) 583, 590 (1999).
74. Elena Vicente Domingo, Capítulo III. El Daño, in I TRATADO DE
RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL, supra note 16, at 330-331.
75. Llamas Pombo defines the inhibitory action as an order or injunction issued by the court at the request of an individual who believes or fears that harm
could be inflicted, or when harm has already been inflicted, that it could be repeated, continued, or worsened. The injunction is addressed to the individual that
is able to avoid such results, by adopting certain preventive behaviors, or by refraining from carrying out activities that could generate such negative results. See
Eugenio Llamas Pombo, La tutela inhibitoria del daño (la otra manifestación del
derecho de daños), in V.V. A.A. II ESTUDIOS JURÍDICOS EN HOMENAJE AL
PROFESOR LUIS DIEZ-PICAZO 2217 (Thomson 2003).
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risky activities that meet the description found in the law. These provisions might be the only real option for a preventive effect that one
could find in Central American tort law. The features required by
regulation in order to apply this solution are (a) the menace of injury
towards a legally protected interest; (b) an unlawful behavior; (c) a
causal link between an action or omission and the actual damage;
and (d) a material possibility of avoiding the causation of an actual
damage. 76
V. CONCLUSIONS
Undoubtedly, tort law is one of the fundamental elements of any
legal system. The very specific purpose of granting the reparation
for the injustices caused by the effects of harmful activities is
enough justification for such qualification. Nevertheless, the way its
solutions are devised will determine tort law’s real possibilities.
Traditionally, tort law has required evidence of fault or negligence in order to grant compensation for any wrongdoing. Evidence
of causation between the action and the harmful effects has also been
required. Nevertheless, industrialization and technological development have imposed a burden on these legal systems, forcing them to
provide adequate solutions for the new risks facing humankind.
From the perspective of tort law, this has meant an evolution from
the traditional idea of penalizing negligence or fault to the protection
of the legal interests, and thereby, the equitable compensation of the
victims. This shift from corrective to distributive justice, from imputation to equity and deterrence, has also taken place in the Central
American civil codes.
However, this evolution has proved to be slow, meaning that
some very traditional features of the way civil law has approached
tort liability are still available in these codes. For example, they all
use a general clause system in order to define tort liability, although
in the case of Guatemala, this clause is rather ample. The wording
76. Id. at 2221-24.
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used describes not only fault and negligence based liability but strict
liability as well.
Having said that, the evolution undergone by Central American
civil law is evident when it is possible to find in these codes the use
of pseudo-objective criteria in order to characterize tort liability.
Once again, the Guatemalan Civil Code is the one that offers a very
particular approach, resorting to a general rebuttable presumption of
fault. Nonetheless, this evolution has not stopped there. Strict liability has also been integrated in some of these codes, except the Nicaraguan Civil Code, especially through the application of principles
such as ubi emolumentum, ibi onus and res ipsa loquitur. In El Salvador, strict liability is used when establishing responsibility for the
acts of things. Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama have integrated
this solution in an ampler way, but the Guatemalan Civil Code has
the strongest commitment with this modern take on torts.
Besides the need to harmonize the way these civil codes approach strict liability, there are still some pending issues, such as the
recognition of possible unlawful effects of lawful deeds or activities.
None of these civil codes explicitly regulates this possibility. Only
the Costa Rican jurisprudence has recognized it. Unlawfulness
needs to be recognized and regulated as a feature of tort liability in
order to alert judges that even acting with a lawful behavior is not a
free pass and that even lawful deeds may entail responsibility. This
gap has been somehow resolved in Guatemala and Costa Rica by
including in the civil codes the doctrine of abuse of rights, although
it is not exactly equivalent. Nicaragua and Panama are not that far
behind, since their jurisprudence has already established the applicability of this doctrine as well. Nevertheless, Honduras and El Salvador still need to address this gap.
It is evident from this first approach that there is still a long way
to go in order to achieve some level of harmonization regarding tort
liability models. The national lawmakers have their work cut out for
them in order to provide the users of these legal systems adequate
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tools to face the challenges of the undergoing economic integration
process.

2017: AN EVENTFUL YEAR IN GERMAN FAMILY LAW
Saskia Lettmaier ∗
Keywords: same-sex marriage, divorce, no-fault principle, civil
marriage, Protestant Reformation

In German family law, 2017 was a year of both commemoration
and change. It marked the 40th anniversary of Germany’s first major
family law reform since the foundation of the Federal Republic in
1949: the Gesetz zur Reform des Ehe-und Familienrechts 1—or First
Marriage Law Reform Act of July 1, 1977. 2017 also witnessed a
small revolution in its own right: the introduction of same-sex marriage by the Gesetz zur Einführung des Rechts auf Eheschließung
für Personen gleichen Geschlechts (the “Act” 2) of June 20. Although separated by four decades, both statutes are watershed moments that have changed the face of German family law.
The First Marriage Law Reform Act of 1977 was several years
in the making, 3 and was attended by a significant legal-ethical and
policy debate. The Act proposed reforming the German divorce
grounds (and the financial consequences of marriage dissolution)
along the lines of pure no-fault. However, the projected reform engendered strong fears on both sides: some groups were concerned
that it might lead to wives being rejected by husbands who were
more economically powerful. Others, on the contrary, feared, that
wives might leave their husbands without cause and be “rewarded”
∗ Saskia Lettmaier is a professor of Private Law, European Legal History,
Private International and Comparative Law at the University of Kiel, Germany,
and a judge at the Higher Regional Court of Schleswig, the highest court in civil
and criminal matters in the German state of Schleswig-Holstein.
1. Erstes Gesetz zur Reform des Ehe- und Familienrechts [1. EheRG] [First
Marriage Law Reform Act], July 1, 1977, BGBL. I at 1421.
2. Gesetz zur Einführung des Rechts auf Eheschließung für Personen
gleichen Geschlechts [Same-Sex Marriage Law], July 20, 2017, BGBL. I at 2878.
The Act entered into force on Oct. 1, 2017.
3. The first parliamentary bill was introduced in 1972. It was based on the
preparatory work of a reform commission convened by the Ministry of Justice.
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for their infidelity with alimony payments and property claims.
These fears explain why the no-fault principle, as eventually enacted, was tempered by marriage-stabilizing elements (a minimum
separation period of one year 4 and a hardship clause for spouses with
a legitimate interest in continuing the marriage 5). The Act passed
with robust cross-party and cross-coalition support, reflecting the
strong modernizing impetus driving it forward. 6 Its innovations have
proved durable. The divorce grounds themselves have remained virtually unchanged to this day. And, while the law of post-divorce
maintenance has undergone some revisions, 7 subsequent changes
have by and large followed the path set by the First Marriage Law
Reform Act—to make divorce and a “clean break” between spouses
easier.
Like no-fault divorce, same-sex marriage had been on the
German legal reform agenda for several years before its
introduction. A coalition government of Social Democrats and the
Green Party took the first step in 2001 with the creation of registered
partnerships (eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaften) for same-sex
unions. 8 The 2001 Act aimed to put registered partnerships on an
equal footing with marriage, but it stopped just short of doing so
because the government feared to come into conflict with Article 6
of the Grundgesetz, 9 the provision in the German Constitution
placing marriage and the family under the “special protection” of
the state. Successive piecemeal reforms, 10 which were occasionally

4. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code], section 1564, para. 2.
5. BGB, section 1568.
6. Dieter Schwab, 2017 – ein Jubiläumsjahr für das Familienrecht, FAMRZ
2017, 1.
7. Cf., in particular, Gesetz zur Änderung unterhaltsrechtlicher, verfahrensrechtlicher und anderer Vorschriften [UÄndG], Feb. 20, 1986, BGBL. I at 301,
and Gesetz zur Änderung des Unterhaltsrechts, Dec. 21, 2007, BGBL. I at 3189.
8. Gesetz zur Beendigung der Diskriminierung gleichgeschlechtlicher Gemeinschaften, Feb. 16, 2001, BGBL. I at 266.
9. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Basic
Law], article 6.
10. See, e.g., Gesetz zur Überarbeitung des Lebenspartnerschaftsrechts, Dec.
15, 2004, BGBL. I at 3396.
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prompted by the German Constitutional Court,11 chipped away at
the remaining legal differences between registered and married
partners to the point where registered partnerships and marriages
became separate, but substantially equal institutions. As of 2013, the
only significant remaining difference concerned joint adoptions
(outside of stepparent adoptions), which were legally allowed for
married couples but not for registered partners.
Between fall 2013 and fall 2015, the Left Party, the Green Party,
and the Bundesrat (the house representing the German states) each
introduced substantially identical bills proposing to legalize samesex marriage. 12 These bills, however, languished in the relevant
Bundestag Committee, 13 and when the Constitutional Court refused
to step in on behalf of the bills’ proponents, 14 there seemed little
hope of any bill passing before the end of the legislative period. It
was then, however, that a now-famous magazine interview with
Chancellor Merkel changed the likely course of events. In the interview, Merkel described the question of whether same-sex marriage
should be legalized as “a matter of conscience.” This galvanized the
Bundestag into action, and the same-sex marriage bill passed both
the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in record time. 15
The Act brought minimal change to the text of the German Civil
Code. Instead of reading “marriage is entered into for life,” section
1353 para. 1 BGB now reads “marriage is entered into for life by
two persons of the opposite or same sex.” Symbolically, however,
the change implicated was great. Like the 1977 Act before it, the
11. See ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE]
[Federal Constitutional Court case report] 124, 199, FAMRZ 2009, 1977 (on survivor’s benefits); BVERFGE 126, 400, FAMRZ 2010, 1525 (on inheritance and
gift tax); BVERFGE 133, 59, FAMRZ 2013, 521 (on stepparent adoptions).
12. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT] 18/8,
Oct. 23, 2013; DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT]
18/5098, June 10, 2015; and DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND
PROTOKOLLE [BT] 18/6665, Nov. 11, 2015.
13. The Bundestag is the lower house of the federal parliament.
14. 2 BvQ 29/17, FAMRZ 2017, 1209.
15. Dieter Schwab, Eheschließung für Personen gleichen Geschlechts,
FAMRZ 2017, 1284, 1285.
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2017 Act changed, yet again, the face of German family law. As a
result, civil marriage has lost its traditional two-sex nature and heterosexual couples have lost their exclusive right to the institution.
As with any momentous piece of legislation, the Act has sparked
lively discussions about its cultural implications as well as its constitutionality. The latter remains to be tested in the Constitutional
Court. However, it is considered unlikely that the Court would find
a violation of Article 6 GG 16 since the Court has ruled in the past
that the special constitutional protection for marriage neither requires nor legitimates legislation that discriminates against nonmarital partnerships. 17 It is worth pointing out, however, that while
the civil law definition of marriage has changed (and probably for
good), the constitutional definition of marriage has not. The “special
protection” referred to in Article 6 GG continues to be limited to
marriages between a man and a woman. 18
2017 was, of course, the year of yet another great jubilee: the
500-year anniversary of the start of the Protestant Reformation. On
October 31, 1517, a German monk named Martin Luther nailed 95
theses to the door of the Castle Church in Wittenberg, precipitating
the reform of medieval Christianity. The Protestant movement also
had far-reaching implications for the law of marriage. It replaced
Catholic sacramental theology with a new conception of marriage
as an external, worldly matter and opened the road to divorce, albeit
at first only for the limited grounds of adultery and desertion. With
its secular conception of marriage and family life, the Reformation
stands at the cradle of today’s state-authored systems of family law,
which themselves depart, often in quite radical ways, from the former canon law of marriage of the Catholic Church. It is fitting that
the two significant marriage legal reforms in recent German history
should celebrate their birth and their anniversary, respectively, in
that jubilee year.
16. Cf., e.g., Dagmar Kaiser, Gleichgeschlechtliche Ehe – nicht ganz gleich
und nicht für alle, FAMRZ 2017, 1889, 1890 et seq.
17. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July
7, 2009, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1439 (1442), 2010.
18. BVERFG July 17, 2002, FAMRZ 2002, 1169; and BVERFG May 7, 2013,
FAMRZ 2013, 1103.
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DAN E. STIGALL, THE SANTILLANA CODES: THE CIVIL
CODES OF TUNISIA, MOROCCO, AND MAURITANIA
(Lexington Books 2017)
Reviewed by Agustín Parise ∗
Keywords: codification, Islamic law, Santillana Codes
Codification develops within social and legal contexts, and is
accompanied by a circulation of legal ideas that links jurisdictions
within and across continents. 1 Dan E. Stigall confirms this statement
in The Santillana Codes: The Civil Codes of Tunisia, Morocco, and
Mauritania. His study focuses on the draft of a civil and commercial
code for Tunisia elaborated under the leading role of David Santillana (1855-1931) at the end of the nineteenth century. The work led
by Santillana offered an early “attempt at a comprehensive fusion of
modern civil law (based on European law) with Islamic law.” 2 The
text by Santillana dealt with the law of obligations and contracts.
Upon revision, the text was adopted by Tunisia, while also being
used for the codification effort in Morocco and Mauritania. Those
three texts are what Stigall refers to as the Santillana Codes, and are
still the law in those three jurisdictions.
Law is a social science that is subject to mutation. The actors
who trigger those changes—such as Santillana—are often identifiable. Stigall, who previously explored codification endeavors, 3 joins

∗ Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Maastricht University (The Netherlands); LLB, LLD, Universidad de Buenos Aires (Argentina); LLM, Louisiana
State University (USA); PhD, Maastricht University.
1. For the Americas, see AGUSTÍN PARISE, OWNERSHIP PARADIGMS IN
AMERICAN CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS: MANIFESTATIONS OF THE SHIFTS IN THE
LEGISLATION OF LOUISIANA, CHILE, AND ARGENTINA (16TH-20TH CENTURIES)
182 (Brill Nijhoff 2017).
2. DAN E. STIGALL, THE SANTILLANA CODES: THE CIVIL CODES OF
TUNISIA, MOROCCO, AND MAURITANIA xvi (Lexington Books 2017).
3. See Dan E. Stigall, The Civil Codes of Libya and Syria: Hybridity, Durability, and Post-Revolution Viability in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring, 28
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the efforts that are being undertaken by several scholars and research
institutes to reconstruct the activities of the main actors behind those
changes. These efforts help attain a legal and cultural repository for
future studies since they also develop valuable contexts. 4
This review presents the book as a triptych. The first panel consists of the first two chapters. These chapters offer an overview of
the two main building blocks of the Santillana Codes, and enable the
book to stand alone, serving as an introduction for readers that might
have no prior knowledge of civil or Islamic law. The second panel
consists of chapters three and four. In this panel, the context for the
gestation of the codes is presented together with the sources to be
used when interpreting the codes. The third panel consists of chapters five and six. Here, Stigall addresses substantive aspects of the
codes, offering at times an exegetical approach to obligations and
contracts as presented in the Santillana Codes.
The first chapter, entitled Civil Law and Civil Codes, offers a
very brief overview of the first building block of the Santillana
Codes. Stigall focuses there on the Roman law that found a place in
the nineteenth-century codification endeavors. The author, however,
neglects the necessary attention to canon law, one of the main elements of Ius commune. This non-secular aspect of the continental
system is important and enriching when exploring the blending of
civil law and Islamic law, as proposed by Santillana. Finally, it
should be noted that in this chapter and in other parts of the book,
Stigall relies heavily on the Louisiana experience, sometimes neglecting other influential civil law experiences, when elaborating on
civil law elements. The recurrent references to Louisiana may be
explained by his familiarity with that jurisdiction and the fact that

EMORY INT'L L. REV. 283 (2014); and Dan E. Stigall, Law and the Lodestar: Tunisian Civil Law and the Task of Ordering Plurality in the Aftermath of the Jasmine Revolution, 7 J. CIV. L. STUD. 1 (2014).
4. See, e.g., Agustín Parise, Comparative European Experiences in Legal
History and Constitutional Law (19th–20th Centuries), 18 HISTORIA
CONSTITUCIONAL 411 (2017).
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Louisiana provides a mixed environment where the civil law is able
to coexist with another system.
The second chapter, entitled Islamic Law, offers an overview of
the second building block of the Santillana Codes. Here, Stigall presents fundamental aspects of Islamic law: aspects that will be valuable when referring to the content of the codes in the third panel of
the triptych. Islamic law, as described by Stigall, is not ossified and
“has always been surrounded by a vibrant intellectualism which
continues to shape it and permit it to evolve.” 5 The explanation of
paramount concepts (e.g., qanun, “the law that the institutions of the
state will apply and enforce”) 6 and of the different schools (e.g.,
Maliki, which prevails in the three jurisdictions) 7 is followed by an
elaboration of the plurality of Islamic law and the tenets of contract
law, with attention to, for example, the riba and gharar. This chapter
adopts a pedagogical approach—which due to simplifications—will
be welcomed by readers unfamiliar with Islamic law.
The third chapter, entitled The Genesis of the Santillana Codes,
aims to unveil the context in which the codes were elaborated and
the path towards their adoption. The author initially offers a brief
entry overview for each of the three jurisdictions, pointing to,
amongst other influences, the presence of Islam in that part of the
Maghreb. Here the attention is devoted to the ‘ulama (i.e., scholars
of Islamic law) and the role mosques play in the development of
legal science. The three jurisdictions had centers of learning, and
Stigall focusses on a number of actors (e.g., Mahammad Bayram)
and their interaction with Santillana, who contributed to the gestation of the codes. The chapter then addresses another important context for the codes, the fact that Santillana was a Sephardic Jew,
member of one of the many families who had moved from Iberia to
North Africa. Halfway through the book, readers finally encounter
a necessary biography of Santillana, who was born in Tunisia and
5. STIGALL, supra note 2, at 12.
6. Id. at 19.
7. Id. at 22.
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received education in his home country, England, and Italy. Santillana was born into a “cosmopolitan family with considerable political influence.” 8 The chapter then delves into the codification process
in Tunisia, and the leading role of Santillana in the codifying commission established in 1896. That team produced a Projet préliminaire (1897) and an Avant-Projet (1899) that was revised by a commission of Tunisian scholars. 9 The text was shaped by the work of
different actors and resulted in a combination of civil law and Islamic law elements. That text was later used when codifying in Morocco and Mauritania.
The fourth chapter, entitled The Sources of Law, deals with the
sources “which may be called upon in interpreting the code’s provisions.” 10 The author first deals with the Tunisian code and then
points to the differences presented by its two counterparts in Morocco and Mauritania. Custom, according to Stigall, played a paramount role in the draft of Santillana, because custom in Islamic law
was a convention that enabled the creation and modification of law.
The ideas on custom, as presented in the draft, were deemed innovative and opened the door to solving problems by looking beyond
the articles of the code. Santillana profited from civil law (e.g., Italian Civil Code, 1865) and Islamic law (e.g., writings by Ibn Nadjim)
alike. His approach reaffirms the idea that, when referring to codification, to choose correctly is to create, 11 and that drafters use the
knowledge that humanity has treasured. 12 Islamic law also played a
role as a source of law. In Tunisia references to Islamic law were
8. Id. at 58.
9. See DAVID SANTILLANA, PROJET PRÉLIMINAIRE DE CODE CIVIL ET
COMMERCIAL SOUMIS À LA COMMISSION DE CODIFICATION DES LOIS TUNISIENNES
(1897) and DAVID SANTILLANA, CODE CIVIL ET COMMERCIAL TUNISIEN. AVANTPROJET DISCUTÉ ET ADOPTÉ AU RAPPORT DE M. D. SANTILLANA (1899) as cited in
Florence Renucci, David Santillana, acteur et penseur des droits musulman et
européen, 2015/1 N° 7 MONDE(S) 236 (2015).
10. STIGALL, supra note 2, at 80.
11. JOSÉ OLEGARIO MACHADO, 1 EXPOSICIÓN Y COMENTARIO DEL CÓDIGO
CIVIL ARGENTINO XVI (Félix Lajouane ed. 1898).
12. ALFREDO COLMO, TÉCNICA LEGISLATIVA DEL CÓDIGO CIVIL ARGENTINO
350 (2d ed., Abeledo-Perrot 1961).
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discouraged, while in Morocco the judiciary was more permissive
of its use. Finally, in Mauritania, lacunae could be filled by recurring
to the Malikite rite of Islamic law. Each code responded to a different society.
The fifth chapter, entitled Obligations in General, aims to depict
the interaction of civil law and Islamic law in the fabric of the Santillana Codes. In the words of Stigall, “Santillana’s work is informed
by Islamic law, which, as in a tapestry, is interwoven with European
law to create a unique juridical whole.” 13 Scholars across jurisdictions traced formal sources of their codes. On occasions, the drafters
aimed to be associated to the prestige held in the original jurisdictions by the elaborations subject to transfer. 14 Many times, nineteenth-century scholars worked on glossed editions of codes, in
which formal sources were pinpointed. Codifiers, like builders of
monuments, took hold of the best materials provided by the legal
science of their time. 15 The glossing of codes helped identify those
materials, and provided motives and resulting concordances. Some
nineteenth-century codifiers incorporated annotations to their drafts
(e.g., for Europe, Florencio García Goyena in Spain; 16 for the Americas, Dalmacio Vélez Sarsfield in Argentina 17 and David Dudley

13. STIGALL, supra note 2, at 94.
14. Agustín Parise, Libraries of Civil Codes as Mirrors of Normative Transfers from Europe to the Americas: The Experiences of Lorimier in Quebec (1871–
1890) and Varela in Argentina (1873–1875), in ENTANGLEMENTS IN LEGAL
HISTORY: CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL
HISTORY 315, 345 (Thomas Duve ed., epubli 2014).
15. Carlos J. Rodríguez, La Redacción de los Códigos: Necesidad de la Indicación de la Fuente de sus Artículos, in XVII-XVI REVISTA DEL COLEGIO DE
ABOGADOS DE BUENOS AIRES 187, 189 (El Colegio 1938).
16. See, e.g., Agustín Parise, The Place of the Louisiana Civil Code in the
Hispanic Civil Codifications: The Comments to the Spanish Civil Code Project of
1851, 68 LA. L. REV. 823 (2008).
17. See, e.g., AGUSTÍN PARISE, HISTORIA DE LA CODIFICACIÓN CIVIL DEL
ESTADO DE LUISIANA Y SU INFLUENCIA EN EL CÓDIGO CIVIL ARGENTINO
(EUDEBA 2013).
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Field 18 in New York; and for Asia, Gustave Boissonade de Fontarabie 19 in Japan). 20 Santillana was no exception, since he offered
glosses in his draft. His draft, for example, pointed to the Digest of
Justinian and the Radd al-Muhtar of Ibn Abidin. 21 In that context,
Stigall initially looks at the interplay of systems within the articles
dealing with vices of consent in the work of Santillana. Stigall
claims that vices of consent are an “area of comparative overlap” 22
between the systems, and hence provide multiple illustrations. He
then addresses several aspects of the law of obligations, as included
in the Santillana Codes. For example, Stigall deals with lesion, yet
he misses an occasion to attend to the role canon law played in shaping lesion during the Ius commune period. Stigall shows in his exegesis that the work of Santillana was subject to revision by a mixed
commission, and that the ‘ulama hence found a means to impact the
Santillana Codes. 23
The sixth chapter, entitled Sale and Other Nominate Contracts,
offers further examples of the blending of civil law and Islamic law
within the Santillana Codes. The contract of exchange illustrates on
the nuances presented by the Santillana Codes: for example, the
Mauritanian legislators altered the text intended for Tunisia, addressing Islamic requirements. This chapter is also rich in illustrating the diversity of sources with which Santillana worked. His
glosses included seminal texts from civil law and Islamic law, such
as the French, German, Italian, and Swiss codes, while pointing likewise to the Mejelle and the writings of Islamic scholars. Stigall
18. See, e.g., Rodolfo Batiza, Sources of the Field Civil Code: The Civil Law
Influences on a Common Law Code, 60 TUL. L. REV. 799 (1986).
19. See, e.g., Olivier Moréteau, Boissonade revisité: de la codification
doctrinale à une langue juridique commune, in DE TOUS HORIZONS, MÉLANGES
XAVIER BLANC-JOUVAN 103 (Société de législation comparée 2005).
20. Ezequiel Abásolo, Las Notas de Dalmacio Vélez Sársfield como Expresiones del “Ius Commune” en la Apoteosis de la Codificación, o de Cómo un
Código Decimonónico pudo no ser la Mejor Manifestación de la “Cultura del
Código,” 26 REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS HISTÓRICO-JURÍDICOS 423 (2004).
21. STIGALL, supra note 2, at 97.
22. Id. at 98.
23. Id. at 107.
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draws attention to vernacular agricultural partnerships and oaths,
further depicting the interaction of systems.
Jurists have been, and are, familiar with the concept of
borrowing ideas. 24 Borrowings, to succeed, must be suitable for the
general and legal culture of the borrowing society, 25 and this is
conveyed in Stigall’s book. In addition, each borrowing experience
has its own history that requires examination. 26 The study of the
circulation of ideas benefits from the understanding of legal
borrowings or transplants, these being fundamental elements for the
circulation or flow. Legal transplants may be used as tools for
assessing the relation amongst legal systems and the interplay of the
influences they exert. 27 As Stigall shows in his book—on occasions
also by means of tables of codal comparison—legal transplants
assist in tracing the genetic history of legal products. 28 There are
vernacular creations that go beyond legal borrowings, however;
since jurisdictions do not limit themselves to undertaking legal
borrowings, they likewise welcome intellectual challenges
regarding creation and adaptation. 29 Borrowed products may be
24. Agustín Parise, Legal Transplants and Codification: Exploring the North
American Sources of the Civil Code of Argentina (1871), in 1 LEGAL CULTURE
AND LEGAL TRANSPLANTS. LA CULTURE JURIDIQUE ET L’ACCULTURATION DU
DROIT 71, 71 (Jorge A. Sánchez Cordero ed. 2012).
25. Louis F. Del Duca & Alain A. Levasseur, Impact of Legal Culture and
Legal Transplants on the Evolution of the U.S. Legal System, 58 AM. J. COMP. L.
– Supplement 1, 1 (2010).
26. David Nelken, Comparatists and Transferability, in COMPARATIVE
LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 437, 459 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., Cambridge U. Press 2003).
27. See generally the seminal ideas presented in ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (U. Press of Virginia
1974); see also Ada Inés Sánchez Echevarría, Legal transplants: una propuesta
metodológica para el derecho comparado, in EZEQUIEL ABÁSOLO ET AL., LA
CULTURA JURÍDICA LATINOAMERICANA Y LA CIRCULACIÓN DE IDEAS DURANTE LA
PRIMERA MITAD DEL SIGLO XX: APROXIMACIONES TEÓRICAS Y ANÁLISIS DE
EXPERIENCIAS 45, 60 (Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia del Derecho 2014).

28. See the reference to “genetics” in Horst Eidenmüller et al., The Proposal
for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law: Deficits of the Most Recent
Textual Layer of European Contract Law, 16.3 EDIN. L. REV. 301, 307 (2012).
On that occasion, and in a different context, the authors advocated for “a genetic
comparison in order to trace and evaluate the development of each individual
text.” Id.
29. Parise, supra note 14, at 354.
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subject to criticism in the adopting jurisdiction and consequently
applied after further reflection, 30 as the experience of Santillana
illustrates. Original vernacular innovation and borrowings coexist,
and ultimately produce distinctive legal products. 31 The Santillana
Codes—as depicted by Stigall—are distinctive legal products.
Stigall concludes his argumentation by placing the Santillana
Codes in light of developments that are taking place in the twentyfirst century. He highlights the mixed character of the text Santillana
elaborated, which resulted from a diversity of sources, deeming it a
“progressive legal model.” 32 The context and the actors that triggered codification in Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania point to the
potential for pluralism.
The book provides useful figures and tables. The former offer
valuable contextual information, while the latter serve a clarifying
function when comparing code provisions. Readers should note that
the list of references is not in alphabetical order following surnames,
since it complies with the Bluebook style guide. Further, the index
omits some important entries. Finally, there are a number of typos
that should be corrected in future editions. 33
The Santillana Codes: The Civil Codes of Tunisia, Morocco, and
Mauritania succeeds in inviting more jurisdictions to the codification table. It likewise fills a gap in the English-language literature
on the codification endeavors undertaken in the Maghreb, focusing
30. See the Mexican example provided in Thorsten Keiser, Social conceptions of Property and Labour—Private Law in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution and European Legal Science, 20 RECHTSGESCHICHTE 258, 271 (2012).
31. Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and
Receptions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 441, 474 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford U. Press 2008).
32. STIGALL, supra note 2, at 148.
33. The following typos, amongst others, may be mentioned: at xix, incorrect
reference is made to Louisiana revising its civil code in 1875; at 27, wording incorrectly reads “a professor Duke University;” at 123, wording incorrectly reads
“civil law sources” instead of “Islamic law sources;” at 129, wording incorrectly
reads “contact of sale;” at 133, duplication of wording in quoted text; at 149,
wording incorrectly reads “are critical for to the task of providing;” at 161, incorrect reference to the German Civil Code as being the Allgemeines bürgerliches
Gesetzbuch; and at 194, wording incorrectly reads “Julius Cesar Rivera” instead
of “Julio César Rivera.”
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on the interplay of civil law and Islamic law. Codification—as a legal paradigm—can be fully understood only when contrast is offered amongst jurisdictions and endeavors. Comparative law is necessary to fully grasp a codification endeavor, and Stigall indeed
stresses this point in his work. This book further demonstrates that
codification endeavors, such as the one undertaken by Santillana,
should not be considered or studied as watertight compartments.
This book finally succeeds in confirming that codification was accompanied by the circulation of legal ideas that linked jurisdictions
within and across continents.

